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Abstract
Transparent and verifiable elections can be achieved by end-to-end veri-
fiable electronic voting systems. The purpose of such systems is to enable
voters to verify the inclusion of their vote in the final tally while keeping the
votes secret. Achieving verifiability and secrecy at the same time is hard and
this thesis explores the properties of verifiable electronic voting systems and
describes a set of developments to the end-to-end verifiable electronic voting
system Preˆt a` Voter to achieve these.
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Foreword
Democracy depends on elections — the people elects those to lead them and to make
decisions for them. Any election is the difficult marriage of secrecy and verifiability in
that we want all the votes to be secret so that no voter feels intimidated but free to vote
according to her own heart and we want the election to be verifiable so that we can all
rest assured that the outcome of the election does reflect the will of the people.
Elections depend on people, procedures, software and hardware — people run for
office, vote and count the votes and if, in the heat of the moment, they get a chance
some of them would cheat to get ahead. To make cheating hard we have put in place
procedures that have to be followed: the ballot box is shown to be empty at the start
of election day and then it is sealed; ballots are cast into it one by one; at the close of
the election the box is signed; it is safely transported to a counting place and only after
checking signatures and lists is it opened and finally the votes are counted under close
watch from election observers.
Recently voters around the world have been asked to trust that a computer does all
these things without any real evidence of them actually doing so.
Elections may fail and we may not pick it up. It may be possible for individuals or
groups to cheat in an election, giving the victory to the wrong candidate, but regardless
of the number of observers we have it is impossible to be sure. We want independence
from people, procedures, software and hardware. We want to be verifiable by voters,
media, political parties and anyone else. What we really want is mathematical proof
that the election outcome does reflect the will of the people. Because maths you cannot
cheat.
If you are thinking “we don’t need that here!” then what about Afghanistan, Iran or
the USA where elections have been disputed recently?
We’ll give the voter the power to check that her vote counts. We’ll give anyone the
power to check that the final tally is correct. While keeping the vote secret. There
is no-one you have to trust, including the current government and system providers.
No-one can know your vote including hackers, system operators and poll station staff.
Cryptography is what makes this possible.
From the author’s TEDxStockholm talk in September 2009.
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1 Introduction to Electronic Voting
An electronic voting system is the fragile combination of two opposing requirements:
the secrecy of the votes and the verifiability of the election.
In fact, any voting system used in a democratic country aims to strike some balance
between these two requirements. Voters must be assured that voting in accordance with
their preferences does not pose any risk to them, that it never will pose any risk to
them: in short, that it is impossible for anyone to find out how they voted. Voters
must also trust that the voting system works correctly and that the result produced is
in accordance with the preferences expressed by the voters.
1.1 End-to-end verifiability
Most people are used to voting in a general election by dropping a piece of paper into
a ballot box. For a very long time this has been the most transparent, and secret, way
to run an election. Transparent because voters (and their representatives) are able to
observe the procedures from the casting of the first vote to the counting of the last.
Secret because the votes are shuﬄed in the ballot box, making it impossible for anyone
to connect a vote in the ballot box to a particular voter.
Using computers and cryptography it is possible to improve on both these properties.
We can make the system completely transparent so that anyone, including voters, poli-
tical parties, media and external observers, can check that the outcome of the election
is correct. The goal is to provide this transparency without violating the secrecy of the
votes1. This may seem counterintuitive but the case is argued in this thesis.
The essence of end-to-end verifiability is that the whole chain from the list of eligible
voters, via votes cast and counted through to the outcome of the election is verifiable.
Consider again the traditional ballot box and the paper ballot forms cast into it. The
average voter comes to the polling station, completes the procedures there, which end
in the vote being cast into the ballot box, and leaves. This average voter then has to
trust that the box is brought to the place where votes are counted and that all votes in
it are, in fact, counted. This kind of trust is needed in the traditional system but we
aim to construct electronic voting systems where no such trust is required. Instead the
voter is able to verify, after the election, that her vote is among the votes counted and
the public is able to verify that the outcome of the election is correctly based on the
votes cast — and that those votes were cast by eligible voters. See Section 2.2.3 for a
complete definition of end-to-end verifiability.
1Secrecy of the votes is not part of the end-to-end verifiability requirement but is a fundamental part
of an election.
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1.2 Contents
In this thesis we describe the work undertaken as part of the first implementation of Preˆt
a` Voter and draw important lessons from this. Those lessons include our exploration of
the problem of implementing Single Transferable Vote without jeopardising the secrecy
of the votes, using a number of concurrent polling stations, the problems associated
with a human readable paper audit trail, dealing with the democratic right to spoil
one’s vote and the problem in paper-based electronic voting systems with the utilisation
of the available space on the ballot form.
We introduce a hierarchy of components, organised in four layers, that can be used
to model an electronic voting system. The proposal is that the component based model
includes information not only from purely technical domains but also non-technical do-
mains such as electoral law in the country where the system is to be used. The proposed
model would make it possible, for example, to track changes in a non-technical domain
and cascade these into those parts of the system specification that are the basis of the
actual implementation of the system. The limitation of the component based approach is
that some aspects of electronic voting systems, that appear to be different components,
are in fact impossible to separate.
In some countries the number of offices contested in each election and the number
of candidates in each of those contests may be quite high and election authorities may
therefore look to electronic voting not for the promise of end-to-end verifiability but
simply as a mean of helping voters cast their ballots. We therefore introduce a variant of
Preˆt a` Voter that allows voters to create and cast an encrypted vote using a touchscreen
interface whilst aiming to preserve verifiability and secrecy assurances of the original
system. This makes it possible for the voter to sort the list of candidates as well as
searching for candidates instead of reading through a very long list. Furthermore, the
proposed scheme reduces the amount of data that must be printed, solving the problem
of scanning immensely large ballot forms in the original scheme.
The use of non-verifiable electronic voting systems and their various failures over
the last decade has decreased public confidence in the use of any electronic system in
elections. The voter verifiable paper audit trail was suggested as a way of auditing the
electronic election and it is possible to add such a mechanism to end-to-end verifiable
electronic voting systems, but this introduces a number of vulnerabilities. In this thesis
we propose a configuration of a human readable paper audit trail that not only allows
for the manual recount of any part of the votes cast in the election, but also extends
Preˆt a` Voter with the ability to audit the correct construction of ballot forms that have
been used to cast a vote without threatening the secrecy of those votes.
Allowing voters to cast their vote from their home instead of visiting a polling station
is seen, in various places, as a way of widening participation. We propose a setup in
which various paper-based end-to-end verifiable electronic voting systems can be used
to cast postal ballots whilst limiting, as far as it is possible when votes are cast outside
of a supervised environment, the threat of vote buying and intimidation of voters.

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1.3 Disposition
The proposals made in later chapters of this thesis are based on a review of the state of
the art, which is detailed in Chapter 2. The main themes of this thesis are verifiability
and usability. In Chapter 3 the work with the first implementation of the end-to-end
verifiable electronic voting system Preˆt a` Voter is detailed, with a series of lessons learned.
Those lessons have inspired the work presented in later chapters of this thesis. In
Chapter 4 we introduce a component based model for electronic voting systems that
allows developers to reduce the security and verifiability analysis of different parts of
the system into such analysis of various components. In Chapter 5 we present what
can most easily be described as a “front-end” to the Preˆt a` Voter voting system that
aims to be usable and inclusive. In Chapter 6 we build on previous work in human-
readable verification of Preˆt a` Voter and present a paper audit trail which satisfies calls
for such auditing capabilities in electronic voting systems but also enables new auditing
possibilities not previously envisaged. Finally Chapter 7 describes a set of procedures
that aims to limit the secrecy vulnerabilities of postal voting.


2 State of the art
2.1 Introduction
Although electronic/mechanical voting systems have been in use for quite some time,
the electronic voting field has really become formalised and thus a more mature area
of research in the early 21st century — a time that has seen great controversy in the
democratic process around the world.
In this chapter the current state of the art is presented. The effort here is not neces-
sarily to state all the (mathematical) detail but to introduce various results of previous
research as tools. The chapter carries references to sources where full details can be
found.
2.1.1 Security properties
In the first instance someone who is not particularly familiar with the electronic voting
research field may assume that governments and organisations around the world wish
either just to save money or, more viciously, to be able to manipulate the result of an
election when they consider moving from traditional paper-based systems to electronic.
In this review of the current state of the art we will see that although some systems
have been devised mainly to fulfill that first requirement and actually do not go very
far to protect against the second, the academic research in the field has come a long
way to fulfill a set of security properties that in fact cannot be fulfilled by traditional
paper-based voting.
The security properties that we wish to achieve in constructing an electronic voting
system are described in more detail in Section 2.2.3 but we give the overall goal here as
end-to-end verifiability.
2.1.2 Using cryptography to achieve end-to-end verifiability
Although it has been shown by Rivest, in the form of Threeballot [73], that it is possible
to construct verifiable voting systems that do not use cryptography, a majority of systems
do and those are the systems that we are concerned with here. The goal of these systems
that employ cryptography is to achieve end-to-end verifiability by distributing trust
among a number of different parties. One such system is Preˆt a` Voter, which in its first
guise [76, 20] relies on RSA [74] and in a later form [85] on Elgamal [26] or Paillier [65].
Most electronic voting systems rely on the calculated risk (or probability) that some
participants (i.e. government, clerks, voters, trusted parties, coercers, ...) try to cheat.
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Accepting this as a necessary evil, we try to minimise the risk of such threats in the
construction of the system. For example, in Preˆt a` Voter the secrecy of the election is
based on a number of trusted parties performing a shuﬄe. If at least one of the parties
performs the shuﬄe honestly then the secrecy of the election is safeguarded [84, 21]
— the conclusion of which is that the addition of more trusted parties will decrease
the likelihood of all being dishonest. This distributes the trust in the system, using
cryptography, over a number of different parties.
2.2 Elections
Although the intention of this chapter is to detail the state of the art of electronic
voting systems it is important to remember that such a system only exists to support
the election process, which underpins democracy.
Elections and voting have a long history, as long as that of the notion of democracy in
fact, but here we will only look briefly at the history of the secret ballot, some methods
used to run elections, the desired properties of any election system and the stages of
such systems.
2.2.1 History of secret ballots
Perhaps it suffices in this context to note that progression from no vote, to some people
voting, to more people voting, to all people voting is quite a natural progression for
an evolving democratic society. Similarly a progression from you giving your vote to
someone to cast on your behalf (i.e. someone owning the land you farm or similar) via
you being asked for your vote in public to, finally, the secret ballot seems equally natural
to those having grown up in a democracy. Each of the steps in this seemingly natural
progression has of course been a struggle for those involved.
Until the mid-19th century those eligible to vote would write their preferred candidates
for each office on any piece of paper and drop this into the ballot box1. Although the
act of filling out the ballot was done in a voting booth, political parties soon realised
that they could influence voters’ choices by printing their own ballots (“tickets” in the
USA) or publishing them as advertisements in newspapers [45]. The easiest way for a
party loyal voter to vote would thus be to bring this ballot form and cast a vote for
the party’s preferred candidates for all offices. Furthermore, political parties soon also
realised that if the ballot was printed in such a way that it would be hard to strike out
a pre-printed name and write another in its place this would discourage the voter (who
was very much entitled to do this) to deviate from the party line, to “split” her ballot.
If the ballot was printed on an easily recognised type of paper then party observers at
polling stations would also easily be able to check that voters used the “correct” ballot
form [45].
1This may be true for a host of countries but the United Kingdom and the United States of America
are the setting for the history reported in this chapter [45].
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To address all these issues the use of a uniform ballot form provided by the election
authority was first written into law in the Australian Colony of Tasmania in 1856 and
it is thus called an Australian ballot [45, 103]. The purpose of this innovation was to
safeguard the secrecy of the vote, a privilege most agree is not only a fundamental right
but one without which no democracy can exist.
2.2.2 Methods
Growing up in a democracy one might take the liberties associated with this form of
government for granted — and accept the method by which elections are run as quite
natural. However, the debate about what method provides the best view of the will of the
electorate is ongoing [89]. Although a few methods of running, and most importantly
counting, an election are presented here, it is well worth noting that the number of
methods is only limited by human imagination. Each government and organisation is
free to choose its method and it is important to realise that no single method may be
optimal for all societies and organisations. Instead it seems fit to conclude that the
democratic process must be applied to forming the electoral system to the electorate
and the political system in question.
Although the way votes are counted is arguably a very important aspect of the way
the electoral system safeguards the democratic process, there are many other issues
that must be considered. For example, the plurality voting system is used to elect one
representative of a particular subarea or group called constituency. Although the wishes
and beliefs of the members of that group (constituents) might be a complex mix, a single
representative is elected. It is therefore likely that if the borders of a constituency are
changed (that is to say a different set of constituents belong to the constituency) then
this may be reflected in the election of a different representative. Gerrymandering [99]
is the term for the action of changing constituency boundaries in order to achieve an
advantage in a subsequent election.
Plurality voting and first past the post (FPTP)
Plurality voting is widely used around the world and its purpose is quite straightfor-
ward: to elect one representative for each constituency [100]. This election of a single
representative is underpinned by some method to interpret the votes cast by voters. The
“most common system, used in Canada, India, the UK, and the USA” [100] is what is
called first past the post or winner takes all.
As both terms suggest, the winner is the candidate that receives the largest number
of votes after each voter has been allowed to cast a vote for exactly one candidate. As
can be shown in examples [105, 29, 101, 96] it is quite possible to elect a candidate who
an arguably overwhelming majority of voters do not wish to elect. To mitigate this
risk it is possible to have a number of rounds. One example of this is the 2007 French
presidential election where some 37 million votes were distributed among 12 candidates
in the first round and some 35 million given to Nicolas Sarkozy and Se´gole`ne Royal in
the second, the previous being elected president with a 53% majority [98].
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However, although this may seem to be a major flaw of the electoral system, first past
the post has been used to determine the will of the electorate in elections for a very long
time. This may well be because it is easy to understand and count. There are ongoing
campaigns [89] to change the first past the post scheme used in the UK to some other
scheme such as Single Transferable Vote (STV) [89], recently trialled in Scotland [35].
Single Transferable Vote (STV)
The foremost virtue of Single Transferable Vote is that fewer votes are wasted. In the
plurality vote system where the single candidate with the most votes in a constituency
is elected the STV system allows for the election of more than one representative of each
constituency [89, 104].
In the plurality vote system a vote for any other candidate than the winner is wasted:
it says nothing more of the will of the voter. To address this STV allows the voter to
rank one or more candidates in the order of preference. The vote is first awarded to the
first preference until that candidate is either eliminated or has achieved the necessary
quota to be elected, after which it is awarded to the second preference and so forth.
There are not only a number of options to consider (such as the number of candidates
each voter is allowed to rank, what happens if the voter marks more than that allowed
number or if she skips a number in the order) but there is also a plethora of STV tallying
algorithms to choose from. In its perhaps simplest form the STV algorithm is as follows:
1. At the close of the election all ballot forms are sorted into piles according to the
indicated first preference.
2. If any candidate has achieved the necessary quota she is elected. The quota de-
pends on the number of candidates that are to be elected. If the necessary number
of candidates have not been elected the votes for this candidate are redistributed
onto the other piles according to the next preference and the algorithm reiterates.
Variations of STV exist where these votes are weighted so as to, in effect, redistri-
bute only the “surplus” votes not needed by this candidate to win the seat. If the
necessary number of candidates are elected the algorithm stops.
3. If no candidate achieves the quota in this round then the candidate with the least
number of votes is eliminated and the votes redistributed onto the other piles, after
which the algorithm reiterates.
As the STV algorithm is fairly widely used in elections around the world, there exist
a number of different versions. For example, when the votes for an elected candidate
are redistributed this can be done in a weighted fashion, such as is done in the Republic
of Ireland (for Senate elections) and Australia [104, 97]. This method ensures that
the electorate does not “waste” votes by giving a candidate more votes than he or she
needs to be elected. It does, however, increase the complexity of tallying the election as
fractions of votes have to be tracked.
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Alternative vote (AV) or instant-runoff voting (IRV)
Please consider first past the post (FPTP) and single transferable vote (STV) elections.
The first aims to elect a single winner in a multi candidate race and does not consider
whether or not the winning candidate achieves a majority. The latter gives each voter the
opportunity to transfer her vote in the event that the vote would otherwise be wasted,
for example if it is for a candidate who has no chance of winning (and is thus eliminated).
STV can also be used to elect any number of candidates in the same election.
In some parts of the world two consecutive but independent rounds of first past the
post voting are held, for example the French presidential elections used as an example
earlier. This is to ensure that the candidate that wins the election has a majority of the
votes: if one candidate achieves a majority in the first round he or she is elected but if
not, then a second round with only the two candidates with the most votes in the first
round is held. Most likely a set period of time passes between the two rounds during
which voters are able to familiarise themselves with the two remaining candidates and
are able to decide which one of them to vote for.
However, each round is very much like running separate elections with the complexities
and costs related to such an event. Polling stations must be opened, workers employed,
ballots transported, aggregated and counted. A solution to this might be to allow each
voter to submit both votes at the same time, but as it is not possible to stipulate which
two candidates will remain in the final round this may be hard — consider ranked pairs
voting [102], which has some similarities to this proposed method. The alternative vote
(AV), also called instant-runoff voting (IRV) [95, 89] is a voting method used to solve
exactly this.
In AV each voter is able to cast a single ranked vote, how many (all, any, or a maximum
specified number) of the candidates a voter is allowed to rank is specified by the rules of
the election. In the first round of the election all votes are first given to the first choice
on each form. If one candidate achieves a majority then he or she is elected, otherwise
the candidate with the least number of votes is eliminated. All those votes are then
redistributed to the next candidate in the order of preference. Each redistributed vote is
weighted as a full vote, as opposed to in STV where the the redistributed votes may be
weighted. This process of elimination and redistribution continues until one candidate
achieves the necessary majority to be elected.
One interesting variation of IRV that truly is instant-runoff is the “batch-style” IRV
[95]. In this method of tallying the votes are first distributed to the first choice candi-
dates. If no single candidate achieves a majority after this distribution then all candi-
dates but the two with the highest number of votes are eliminated and redistributed to
the two remaining, according to who appears closest to the top of the ranking on each
ballot.
Range voting and approval voting
In order to solve perceived problems with current election systems, organisations and
individual researchers devise new ways to aggregate the will of the electorate that are
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Candidate Score
Adam 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 NO OPINION
Bertil 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 NO OPINION
Cesar 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 NO OPINION
David 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 NO OPINION
Erik 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 NO OPINION
Figure 2.1: A Range Voting ballot form (adapted from [29])
then (hopefully) shown to have a set of desirable properties. One such scheme that is
not yet in widespread use2 is Range Voting [29, 101]. In this scheme the voter is asked
to give each candidate a numerical score in a pre-agreed range or indicate that she has
no opinion of a particular candidate. An example of a range vote ballot form is shown
in Table 2.1.
When all voters have expressed their views in this way the candidates are ranked using
the average score awarded to them. Furthermore, any candidate who does not achieve
at least the score sum of 50% of the highest score sum achieved by any candidate is said
not to have reached quorum and is eliminated. The election winner is the candidate at
the top of this ranked list and if a number of seats are filled by the election the required
number of winners are simply taken off the top.
If the range of scores rewardable to candidates by the voters is constrained to “accept
or not” then the scheme is in fact called approval voting [96]. In this scheme voters
are able to vote accept (1) or not (0) for each candidate in a race. After the close
of the election the votes received by candidates are counted and the candidate or the
candidates with the highest number of votes is/are elected.
2.2.3 Desired properties
The desirable properties presented in this section are purposefully listed here and not
under a heading specifically concerned with electronic voting systems. Although these
may have appeared in the literature specifically as desired properties of electronic voting
systems, they are arguably universal.
If the reader would consider any current paper-based system in use today in terms of
these properties one interesting aspect may become clear: electronic voting systems do
not merely try to emulate adherence of a paper-based system to these desired proper-
ties, they wish to add further properties. In the first instance please think about the
two verifiability properties: individual verifiability and public verifiability. In a normal
paper-based voting system there is little individual verifiability except the possibility to
watch the ballot form chain of custody and watch the people and processes in which
trust is vested.
If the definitions here deviate from the generally accepted definitions of these proper-
ties then a discussion of this is included. All properties (with the exception of eligibility
2At the time of writing it seems it is not in use anywhere.
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verifiability, which is introduced here) have been defined in [87].
Individual verifiability
Definition. Each voter is able to verify that her vote is included unaltered
in the tally.
The term verifiability has previously been defined in two seemingly opposing ways: as
“no one can falsify the result of the voting” [30] and as “anyone can verify the correctness
of the result” [64] and here we split this definition into two (individual verifiability and
public verifiability) and clarify that verifiability is only concerned with preventing the
falsification of election results by detecting errors and malfeasance.
In traditional paper-based voting systems the voter’s ability to check that her vote is
included in the final tally is substantially limited. This would involve the voter staying
in the polling station after having deposited the vote in the ballot box and subsequently
following the ballot box to the counting place and watching all votes in that box being
counted. The individual verifiability of the voter is thus only a trust that she has to
place in people and procedures and fellow voters helping her to check these.
Individual verifiability is concerned only with the ability of the individual voter to
check that her vote is included unaltered in the tally. However, if the voter detects that
her vote is not included in the tally or that it has been changed, it is desirable to give her
the ability to challenge the election. That would mean that the voter would be able to
provide some proof, which can be publicly scrutinised, that her vote has been dropped or
changed and thus not counted correctly. Traditional paper-based voting schemes do not
do this but we can turn to electronic voting schemes to provide this power to challenge
an incorrect election outcome3.
This leads to the necessity to provide the voter with a receipt, which may conflict
with the receipt-freeness property also described in this section. Such a receipt would
have to contain some kind of commitment, which should subsequently be challenged in
the event of malfeasance. The discovery that it is in fact possible to provide such a
receipt forms the foundation of the electronic voting research field that we know today
[9, 10, 17, 81, 76, 20].
As the implementation of the individual verifiability and the receipt varies from system
to system (see Section 2.4 for more information on current systems) the production of a
receipt can be summarised here in more general terms. Normally we think of a receipt as
a piece of paper stating the date of a transaction, who were involved and the contents of
the transaction, printed by one of the involved parties and given to the other. In retail
the purchase is concluded when the shopper receives the goods in exchange for money
and a receipt is printed to document this transaction — if necessary the customer is
able to prove to the retailer that an item was purchased from its outlet in a particular
transaction.
If this method of producing a receipt was to be implemented in a voting system the
voter would ask the election authority (i.e. the voting machine) to register a vote for a
3ThreeBallot [73] has shown that it is possible to construct non-electronic verifiable voting systems.
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particular candidate. The authority would do that, noting down who voted for which
candidate in which transaction. Subsequently a receipt would be printed and stamped
bearing the message that this particular voter has voted for this particular candidate
in this particular transaction. If the voter is later unhappy with the result she may
challenge the authority to show where in the tally her vote is. If the authority cannot
show that the vote is included in the tally the receipt is sufficient to successfully challenge
the election. Clearly this violates the secrecy, receipt-freeness and coercion resistance
properties described below.
The breakthrough for receipts in electronic voting came with the encrypted receipt
[17], a receipt which does not reveal the contents of the vote until it has been decrypted4.
The key is that it is possible to decrypt the receipt in such a way that the link between
an encrypted receipt and the plaintext vote is broken (see Section 2.3.6). A further
major development is the ability to look at the receipt not as a subsequent record of a
plaintext transaction but as the vote, the ballot form, itself. Thus, in several electronic
voting schemes, the voter produces an encrypted receipt without the involvement of any
technology or person (these may violate the secrecy requirement) and this receipt is then
recorded and a copy held by the election authority. Thus the receipt is in fact a record
of its own transaction.
Public verifiability
Definition. It is possible to publicly verify that cast votes have been cor-
rectly tallied.
To explain public verifiability let us first make a distinction between individual and
public verifiability. In individual verifiability the voter is able to check the inclusion of
her vote in the system input. This is something that it is necessary that each voter does,
not only because he or she will be the person with the highest stake in the inclusion of
that particular vote but because she may be the only person able to perform this check.
If it may be true that the individual voter is the most highly motivated person to
check the inclusion of her particular vote then it may also be true that the electorate
as a community is very motivated to verify other aspects of the system. In the case
of a traditional paper-based voting system the individual voter would ensure that her
ballot goes safely into the ballot box but the electorate as a community would then be
motivated to ensure that all the ballot forms in that ballot box are properly counted.
In the context of electronic voting systems the public verifiability would also be to
ensure5 that all votes cast are counted properly, but the manifestation of this will of
course differ. In a system that has an input of encrypted receipts (such as will be seen
4The encrypted receipt can take different forms and the form described here is that of Preˆt a` Voter and
Punchscan. An example of a different form of receipt is that of Punchscan II, where the receipt is not
an encryption of the vote itself but a value, the knowledge of which gives the voter the opportunity
to challenge an incorrectly recorded vote.
5This assurance would be put forward by any number of publicly appointed experts who are able to
perform whatever function, programming or mathematics that is required to verify these parts of
the system in question.
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in Section 2.4) it is in the interest of the electorate as a community that all encrypted
receipts are properly decrypted into plaintext votes. One technique for doing this is
using mix networks with random partial checks (Section 2.3.6).
Eligibility verifiability
Definition. It can be verified that cast votes have been cast by eligible
voters.
We here introduce the term eligibility verifiability, which is a property of a voting
system that concerns whether or not it is possible to verify, after the close of the election,
that the votes that become the basis for the election result have been cast by eligible
voters.
For the traditional paper-based voting system, it is sometimes the case that the local
election authority makes available a list of all eligible voters, with marks against those
voters who actually cast votes in the election. The voters with a mark against them can
be counted and this number compared to the number of votes in the ballot box. That
these numbers correspond is evidence, together with the observation of proper procedures
in the poll station, that the votes have originated with eligible voters. Making the list
of eligible voters, together with a record of whom among them actually cast a vote,
publicly scrutinisable makes it possible to reveal mistakes and malfeasance in the form
of voters ticked as having voted without actually having done so (which is a common
tactic called stuffing of the ballot box) and the exclusion of eligible voters from the list.
In some electronic voting systems such as Preˆt a` Voter (Section 2.4.2), the voter creates
an encrypted vote, which becomes the input to an anonymising mix and decryption. As
these encrypted votes do not reveal how the voter has voted they can potentially be
noted down next to the voter’s name in the list of eligible voters6. This, together with
the verification of the anonymising mix, would provide proof that the cast votes were
cast by eligible voters, making the system eligibility-verifiable.
End-to-end verifiability
Definition. A voting system is end-to-end verifiable if it is individually
verifiable, publicly verifiable and eligibility-verifiable.
In order for an election system to be end-to-end verifiable there must exist no part of
it, on which the election outcome relies, that is not verifiable, either by the public or by
individual voters. Some definitions of end-to-end verifiable, such as [87], do not include
the public verification of the eligibility of the voters who have cast the votes but say
that the system has to be verifiable from the point where (encrypted) votes have been
cast and published. We argue that without some possibility of verifying the eligibility of
the voters who have cast votes, the individual verifiability of the inclusion of individual
6This, however, enables the forced abstention attack, see Section 2.2.3 on coercion resistance and
Section 2.4.7 on “everlasting privacy”.
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votes (see below), together with public verifiability of decryption and tallying, does not
constitute a truly end-to-end verifiable voting system, a view supported by [49].
The “ends” between which the system is verifiable is thus (a list of) eligible voters on
one side and election outcome on the other, with a verifiable chain between the two.
End-to-end verifiability is related to software independence, introduced by Rivest and
Wack [75]. A voting system is software independent if “an undetected change or error
in its software cannot cause an undetectable change or error in an election outcome.”
An end-to-end verifiable system must be software independent but in some instances
a software independent system is not end-to-end verifiable as defined here (Rivest and
Wack use a DRE with a voter verifiable paper trail as example: the malfunction of such a
system would be detected by auditing procedures but the correct recording and counting
of each vote is not proven as “default”). An end-to-end verifiable system must also be
verifiable in other, non-software, parts of the system so that, for example, undetected
change or error in procedures carried out by humans cannot cause an undetectable
change or error in the election outcome.
Fairness
Definition (Fairness of opportunity). All eligible voters are able to
cast their votes.
Definition (Fairness of information). All voters have access to the
same relevant information.
Fairness has previously defined as “nothing must affect the voting” [30] and “no on
knows any intermediate result before the deadline has passed” [64] and here we wish to
bring together both these notions into ensuring that all eligible voters are able to cast
their votes with access to the same relevant information. This requires that no partial
results are made available before the close of the election as revealing such information
would not only influence remaining voters but also give them an unfair advantage against
other voters as they are able to strategically change their vote.
Although the fairness of the election is outside the scope of most current verifiable
electronic voting schemes, there are avenues for technical remedies to some of the asso-
ciated issues. For example, in order to make sure that each voter is given exactly one
vote the encrypted vote cast by each voter (see Section 2.4) can be published alongside
the name of the voter on the web bulletin board, as the encrypted vote does not reveal
the contents of the vote7. All encrypted votes that are subsequently decrypted into
plaintext votes must thus be associated with a voter and that voter is able to ensure
that that receipt is hers and no other8.
7See previous footnote about the forced abstention attack.
8This does not introduce a measure for a voter who has not voted but found that a receipt is placed
against her name to prove that she has not voted and the receipt has been erroneously placed next
to her name. It also enables the forced abstention attack whereby a coercer forces a voter not to
vote.
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Integrity
Definition. All votes are cast as intended, recorded as cast and counted
as recorded.
In essence, integrity is the property that implies that the announced result of the
election reflects the will of the people. This definition builds on reasoning around this
property by [11] and [12]. It is common to consider whether the vote has been cast as
intended , then recorded as cast and counted as recorded . This creates a chain from the
voter and her intent to the result of the election. Let us look at each of these properties
in a little more depth.
Cast as intended What is the probability that the voter has been able to correctly
express her intent on the ballot form? The cast as intended property encapsulates the
disparity between what the voter is intending to vote for (her idea of which candidate
she wishes should win the election) and the vote she is able to produce.
It may seem that electronic voting systems are particularly likely to suffer from pro-
blems in this area — but problems of this nature do invariably invade all voting systems,
be they electronic or not. Consider the traditional paper ballot for example. In an elec-
tion that uses the first past the post principle to select its winner the voter may be asked
to enter, in a table containing all candidates in the race, a cross next to the candidate
she wishes to cast a vote for. This may seem trivial to most but those unable to read
the instructions or who choose not to do so may opt to make a tick mark next to the
preferred candidate. This might not be permissible by local electoral legislation and the
voter has thus not been able to vote as intended.
Next consider an election that does use a paper ballot but the single transferable
vote (STV) method for selecting the winner. In many cases the voter may wish to vote
only for a single candidate and unless this has been made quite clear in written or oral
instructions, she might make a cross or tick mark instead of the digit “1” that legislation
demands.
From these examples it is becoming clear that all voting systems must consider usa-
bility aspects to ensure that voters are able to cast their votes as intended. As in many
issues concerning such large-scale systems as a voting system it is invariably so that the
cast as intended property is measured in some proportion of all voters who are able to
correctly express their will in the election. One may note here that it therefore should
be possible to benchmark voting systems on this property.
Recorded as cast When the voter has expressed her will by filling out the ballot form
(or some other action needed for her to do so) the next step towards the accumulation of
the will of the electorate is to ensure that all votes are entered into the system correctly.
In the case of the traditional paper-based system this of course means that the ballot
form enters the system by being dropped into the ballot box.
In the case of an electronic voting system (where the “dropping” of the ballot form
into the box is actually the recording of it) this becomes slightly more complicated.
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Let us consider a direct recording device (DRE), which in short can be described as a
computer that the voter interacts with in order to cast her vote. The computer may for
example display all candidates in a particular race on a touch sensitive screen and the
voter casts a vote by simply pressing one of these. The usability related issues of the
DRE, i.e. any problems the voter may have to use the machine to express her intention,
belong to the cast as intended property. However, when the voter has expressed her
vote (accurately or not) then whether the vote is stored and aggregated as a vote with
precisely the expressed intention, or not, is a recorded as cast issue.
A DRE is a particularly good example here because they do not normally give the
voter (or the election authority) any proof that the vote has been correctly recorded.
If, for example, the voter presses the name of a candidate G and the DRE displays a
message to thank the voter for casting her vote there is no guarantee that the machine
has not malfunctioned (or been maliciously programmed) and recorded a vote for a
different candidate B.
Counted as recorded One may argue that all propagation, transportation and ag-
gregation issues are part of the counted as recorded property because the recording of
the vote is done exactly once and subsequent steps in the election procedure may be
viewed as part of counting. In the traditional paper-based voting system this involves
transporting the ballot boxes in a certain region to some counting facility, opening them
and then counting the votes. The election authority is concerned with making sure that
all ballot boxes reach the counting facility, that all votes are properly counted and that
the results are accurately reported to some central point and in a timely fashion.
In the case of an electronic voting system each of these steps may be done electro-
nically, perhaps even over a network. In the chain from the voter via the recording
of the vote in the computer, the DRE must allow its collected votes to be aggregated,
perhaps over a network or using some mobile storage media. As previously mentioned
the DRE does not give any proof that its counters truly reflect the votes cast and it is
now worth noting that there are similarly no proof or guarantees of the proper function
of the transportation or aggregation of these counters.
Secrecy (aka Privacy)
Definition. Given a particular vote, it is not possible to determine by
which voter it has been cast.
As seen previously (Section 2.2.1) the secret vote is the result of a lengthy electoral de-
velopment and a very important property of election systems that is widely understood.
In simple terms it must be impossible for anyone (including everyone from spouses via
poll station workers and party officials to the election authority and the government) to
find out how a particular voter has voted9. Secrecy has been defined as “all votes must
be secret” [30] and later “it is infeasible to associate individual votes and voters” [64]
9Note the problems of guaranteeing that a vote is secret for ever — see also Section 2.4.7
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but a more formal definition is given by [50]: given two voters A1 and A2 and two votes
v1and v2 it is not possible to distinguish between the two cases
1. A1 casts v1 and A2 casts v2
2. A1 casts v2 and A2 casts v1
In the case where a coercer can find out how you have voted, i.e. when the secrecy
of the vote is compromised, it is easy to imagine cases where you may be influenced to
vote in a particular way. You may become unable to vote for your preferred candidate
because of fear of violence or of the influence of a monetary or other award. Only in the
case where the vote is unconditionally secret can the outcome of an election be regarded
as a fair and a true representation of the will of the electorate.
In the traditional paper-based voting system the ballot box is used to safeguard the
privacy of the voter. All voters place their ballot forms in the same ballot box (that may
then be shaken, ensuring that no-one is able to tell which ballot form belongs to which
voter). The introduction of the uniform, pre-printed Australian ballot (see Section 2.2.1)
was very much with the same intention and made it possible to legislate that the voter
must not make any distinguishing mark on her form such that someone can decisively
say that a ballot form drawn from the ballot box belongs to that particular voter.
The integrity and fairness of any voting system is quite a different matter than the
secrecy of the vote. The accuracy and the secrecy are often regarded as properties that
are provided at the same time but they are in fact so different that they not only have
different solutions but that the unconditional provision of one may severely limit the
extent at which the other can be provided, see Section 2.4.7.
As an interesting note at this stage it is possible to look at Preˆt a` Voter (Section
2.4.2), which uses a number of trusted parties to ensure the secrecy of the vote — each
trusted party breaks the link from vote to voter. The calculations of the probability
by which the secrecy of the vote is safeguarded are based on a cryptographic scheme
being unbreakable, such as RSA (Section 2.3.1) or Elgamal (Section 2.3.2), which they
may well be at the time of the election. In the same spirit one may look at the hashes
used by Punchscan (Section 2.4.3) that at the time of the election must be regarded as
“unbreakable”. However, if one looks at the development of computing in the past it
seems likely that at some point after the election will the cryptography used become
breakable. At that moment the secrecy of the vote completely ceases and even though
this may be ten, 20 or 30 years after the election was held, the threat of this “end” to
the secrecy of the election may be enough to influence the voters in one way or the other.
This has led to the introduction of the concept of everlasting secrecy (see Section 2.4.7).
Receipt-freeness
Definition. A voter is not able to prove to a third party how she has
voted.
As we have seen in the previous section detailing the individual verifiability property
it is necessary to give each voter a receipt to allow them to check that their respective

Chapter 2. State of the art
votes are included in the final tally. However, the receipt-freeness [10] property is so
named because it requires that the voter is unable to prove to anyone the contents of
the vote, using the receipt.
To explain why this is necessary we should start by exploring the consequences of
giving a voter a receipt that states how she has voted. In a scheme where such a receipt
is issued the possibilities of coercing10 a voter are abundant:
• The coercer offers the voter a sum of money to present a receipt with a vote for a
particular candidate (vote buying).
• The coercer threatens to harm the voter unless she presents a receipt with a vote
for a particular candidate.
• An employer requires that employees present receipts of votes for a particular
candidate.
• There may be pressure within the family or social group to vote in a particular
way: it may be a matter of honour to show others the receipt.
Please note that with the Internet vote buying could flourish at unprecedented levels: a
coercer can ask voters to e-mail a digital photograph of the receipt, promising to respond
with a PayPal11 online cheque. The coercer can thus target a very large proportion of
the population at a low cost.
Coercion resistance
Definition. A coercer who interacts with the voter before and during the
voting process is unable to distinguish between the voter’s compliance and
non-compliance.
Extending the receipt-freeness property, a coercion resistant electronic voting system,
as defined by [46], would ensure that a coercer that can interact with the voter during the
voting process cannot find out if the voter has voted in the way the coercer demanded.
This includes that the coercer cannot force a voter to cast a random vote or to spoil her
vote. This is closely linked to receipt-freeness because if a receipt divulges, for example,
that the vote has been purposefully spoilt, then a coercer can demand to see such a
receipt (this is called a forced abstention attack).
The definition here builds on the long definition provided by [46], part of which reads
A coercion resistant scheme offers not only receipt-freeness, but also de-
fense against randomization, forced-abstention, and simulation attacks [...]
10Forcing or otherwise making a voter cast a vote for a particular candidate.
11Company that facilitates large and small payments between persons on the web, www.paypal.com
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and this definition of the coercion resistance property regards the inability of a coercer
to distinguish between the case where the voter does comply with the coercer’s request
to vote in a particular way and the case where she does not.
As we have discussed the necessity to issue a receipt above we can now consider
only systems that do. However, it is important to note that any leak of information
through the receipt should be considered a violation of the coercion resistance property,
not only information about which candidate the vote is for, which is a violation of the
receipt-freeness property. There are other leaks such as the following:
• The receipt must not reveal if the voter has in fact purposefully spoilt her vote:
spoiling one’s vote is, in some jurisdictions, seen as a fundamental right. The
coercer would here demand that the voter presents a receipt of a spoilt vote (forced
abstention attack). If the coercer aims this attack against members of a different
party this would be beneficial to the coercer’s party.
• If the voter opted not to vote in all races contested in the same election this should
not be possible to deduce from the receipt. Here the coercer would demand that
the voter presents a receipt without a vote in one or more races.
Finally it is worth noting that of course the existence of a receipt indicates that the
voter has attended the polling station and cast a vote — even if it may be possible to
spoil the vote. A voter should thus be able to destroy the receipt to hide it from a
coercer who is forcing her to abstain.
The relationship between Secrecy, Receipt-freeness and Coercion resistance
The properties secrecy, receipt-freeness and coercion resistance are related in an increa-
sing level of strength of attack that a coercer exerts. The secrecy property is concerned
with what the coercer can simply observe by watching the voting system and published
data from it. The receipt-freeness property is also concerned with data that the coercer
can receive from the voter after she has cast her vote, which may be in the form of
a receipt. Finally the coercion resistance property also considers instructions that the
coercer can give the voter, and other interactions between the coercer and voter, before
and during the voting process.
Robustness
Definition. A system is able to withstand and/or can successfully recover
in a timely manner from the failure of hardware, software and procedures and
detected cheating.
The robustness of a system is its ability to function in the face of various failures,
such as hardware or software failure or active attempts to disrupt its function. The
verifiability of an electronic voting system is heavily dependent on the robustness of the
same system: if the system can be disrupted then it does not matter if the integrity
of individual votes can be confirmed. However, taking one step away from electronic
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voting and considering elections and voting in general is important here. Any election
system must be robust so as to ensure that all eligible voters are able to cast their votes.
It then naturally follows that the system must be sufficiently robust to count all those
cast votes.
With robustness comes recovery strategies, answering questions such as these:
• What happens if a fire breaks out in a polling station?
• What happens if ballot boxes are broken open by a golf club wielding man?12
Using electronic voting there are of course further issues to contemplate, such as:
• If one of the servers crashes, will the election keep running?
• If one of the parties involved stages a denial of service attack, what effects will this
have and are these acceptable?
2.2.4 Stages
As any election is an immense, costly project it is quite beneficial to consider its different
stages [6]. Each phase requires a set of tests to be executed to ensure that the election
does not proceed to the next phase until postconditions of the preceding phase as well
as preconditions of the succeeding phase are met.
Set-up phase
The set-up phase creates the preconditions for the election. The following are issues
addressed during this phase:
• Nomination of candidates — the candidates wishing to run for a position are
nominated and they campaign to raise awareness of their agenda in the electorate.
• Election system set up — regardless of whether the system used to run the
election is electronic or not, there are many set-up issues to consider. The definition
of a ballot form must be agreed at some early stage to allow these to be printed
and distributed to polling stations or voters in the case of the paper-based voting
system and computer systems must be loaded with the correct definitions, tested
and distributed to polling stations in the case of the electronic system.
• Rules agreed — in order to run an election with the desired properties we have
seen previously it is necessary to agree a set of rules before the start of the elec-
tion. To this set belong issues regarding not only such things as the ordering of
candidates on the ballot form and the correct way of filling the form out but also
much more detailed instructions for poll workers and others on how to behave,
what conduct is expected and how to act in a range of situations.
12Reference to news story from the 2007 Scottish elections where a man attacked staff, furniture and
ballot boxes with a golf club in Edinburgh.
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• Publication — it is important before proceeding that all rules, instructions, confi-
gurations and the like constructed during this phase be published so as to allow
them to be publicly scrutinised.
Registration phase
As stipulated by electoral law each eligible voter is either pre-registered or is able to
register to vote. After identification and accreditation the lists of accredited voters are
aggregated and distributed to the correct constituencies and poll stations.
Registration of voters is normally done by some election authority and there is nor-
mally only one such authority, making the process non-transparent and (somewhat)
unsafe: consider societies where the current government may be opposed to certain
ethnic or religious groups voting in an election.
Voting phase
When the process of running an election reaches this phase it is beneficial to run a kind
of “self test”: check that the two previous phases have completed successfully and that
stake holders (voters, candidates, government, ...) agree the election is set to run in
accordance with all the desired properties (see Section 2.2.3) before proceeding to open
the election. Of course normally the opening hour of the election is agreed and published
in the set-up phase — and one might assume that if the election process reaches this
third phase then cost and political pressure will prohibit a delay.
The voting phase normally takes place during a fairly short period of one or perhaps
a few days, “election day”. Voters are able to go to their local poll station, identify
themselves and cast a vote. The phase includes the collection and anonymisation of
votes.
Tallying phase
When votes have been cast and the predetermined vote casting period has ended the
votes are transported to a central counting facility where they are tallied by employees
or volunteers. This must be done in strict accordance with the rules determined in the
set-up phase. When this work is complete the required number of winners of each race
in the election have been elected.
2.2.5 Threats
There may always be people who wish to change the outcome of an election by unde-
mocratic means and in this section we take a brief look at those involved in the running
of an electronic voting system and what threat they pose to the correct function of that
system.
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The coercer
The coercer is someone actively trying to influence a voter to vote in a particular way.
In our view the coercer is not adverse to doing anything that is possibly in his power
to make a voter vote according to the coercer’s choices: bribery, threat, confusion,
misinformation... Whenever the opportunity would arise for the coercer to influence
a voter to give her vote to the coercer’s favourite candidate or to take her vote (see
randomisation attack below) from a different party that is likely to do better than the
coercer’s, he will.
It only makes sense for the coercer to offer a monetary reward to a voter, for voting in
a specific way, if the coercer can get some proof that the voter has complied with these
instructions. In a secret election there are procedures and technology that is put in place
to make sure that the coercer is unable to get at such evidence. This is, for example,
the reason why votes are filled out by voters in polling booths and why most countries
would consider a vote spoiled if there are any other marks than the ones necessary to
express the vote on the ballot form. If such marks were allowed then the coercer would
ask the voter to write her name on the ballot form and he would be able to inspect the
vote as it appears in public during the counting.
As we have already seen, it is the goal of an end-to-end verifiable electronic voting
system to be coercion resistant. This requirement is more than just making it impossible
for the coercer to find out how a particular voter has voted, the goal is also to make it
impossible for the coercer to force the voter to abstend from voting (the forced abstention
attack), to spoil her vote or to give the vote to a random candidate. If, as an example,
the system requires a list of all voters who have voted to be published after the election
so that it is possible to verify that the votes that have been counted have all originated
in eligible voters and have not been added by someone else, then the coercer can give
the voter a monetary reward, or threaten her, to ensure that she does not vote and thus
does not appear in the list of people who have voted.
The problems associated with the coercer are further explored in Section 2.4.7.
The trusted party
As we see in later parts of this chapter, end-to-end verifiable electronic voting systems
aim to distribute the trust in the system over a number of different trusted parties. The
secrecy and integrity of the election is therefore not in the hands of a single person or
a single organisation but rather in the hands of a number of parties that all have to
work together to violate the secrecy or integrity of the election. It is therefore important
that these trusted parties are selected in such a way that they are unlikely to work
together: they may for example be drawn from the full political spectrum and include
both international organisations and established election observers.
The general understanding of a trusted party is thus that they are given the oppor-
tunity to safeguard the votes of those who put their trust in them. So for example, if
a specific political party becomes one of the many trusted parties in the running of the
election, the party would violate the trust that their members place in them to keep
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their votes secret and secure if they cheat or leak any secret information. Such cheating
or leaking would not be detrimental to the election (if not a large enough number of
other trusted parties do the same) but it is in the party’s interest not to let down their
members.
To proceed with this example, it may also be in the interest of this specific political
party’s members to have the party try to cheat, allowing the own candidate to win. This
attempt will still not be detrimental to the election in this setup, but this is now how
we regard the trusted parties: we give them the opportunity to do the right thing, but
if they decide not to do that then they should be found out, they should not be able to
influence the outcome of the election and they should not be able to break the secrecy
of the election.
The malicious voter
As discussed above, the coercer would in most cases require some kind of proof that the
voter has complied with whatever the coercer wishes her to do. Such proof may not
always be straightforwardly available (even though it in some cases might be published
as part of the verifiability of the election) so the coercer may require the voter to create
it. Consider for example that the voter takes a camera with her into the polling booth.
As she is shielded from view no-one can see that she is taking photos of the ballot form,
a voting machine that displays a confirmation screen, or anything else that may give the
coercer indication that the voter is complying. It is of course the case that the voter
may feel she has no choice but to comply if the coercer is threatening her, but if she
is merely offered a financial reward in exchange for this then she has a choice but still
chooses to break the secrecy of her vote.
Furthermore, the goal of most end-to-end verifiable election systems is to give the
voter a possibility not only to check the inclusion of her vote in the final tally but also
challenge the election if she feels that her vote has been changed or not included in
the tally. If a voter that, for example, favours a small political party wishes to cause
problems in the election she could potentially do this by claiming that her vote was
changed, when in fact it was not. The claim that the vote was not correctly recorded,
even in the face of evidence to the contrary (which end-to-end verifiable systems aim to
provide), may be enough to cause widespread distrust in the system and may impede
the democratic process.
For these reasons we must consider the voter to be “malicious” and not only make
it impossible for her to break the secrecy and integrity of the whole election but also
that of her own vote. We must also ensure that the system can refute false claims and
support correct claims of malfunction.
2.3 Cryptography
This section aims not at providing a complete reference on the cryptographic systems
introduced here but a discussion of the key properties of these systems as a foundation
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to later chapters of this thesis.
In electronic voting systems cryptography is not merely used to hide something that
is secret and it is not simply extended to provide authentication features — this is
standard use of cryptography today. Cryptography in electronic voting is used in a
large, complex web of encryptions, decryptions, signatures, checks and proofs. It is
used to allow a large, complex, distributed system to prove to various people (voters,
media, observers, ...) that it is working as it is intended to work. Perhaps even more
importantly it is used to hide from the system itself the data that it works on.
2.3.1 RSA
Invented13 in 197714, the Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA) encryption algorithm [74]
provides public-key cryptography that can be used both for the encryption of messages
and the signing of the same [107]. “Public-key” implies that the encryption scheme uses
key pairs, a public key normally used to encrypt messages and a private (secret) key
normally used to decrypt messages. Public key cryptography thus enables me to set up
a key pair and give you the public key quite openly. When you use this key to encrypt
a message only I can decrypt it.
The security of RSA is based on the difficulty in factoring very large numbers into their
constituent primes15. When two very large primes are chosen and multiplied together
it is a hard task, even for a computer, to find those two primes. It would of course be
possible to eventually find them by using a brute force method (such as simply going
through all the primes in order and testing if they divide the number in question) but it
would take a long time. If the primes are chosen to be very large, the security of RSA
is based on the belief that it might, for example, take all the computers in the world
working together thousands, or even millions, of years to find a particular pair of primes.
2.3.2 Elgamal
The Elgamal [26] cipher system is, like RSA, a public key system, meaning that one has
a private key that is secret and a corresponding public key that can be freely distributed.
A message encrypted with the public key can only be decrypted with the private key.
One difference between RSA and Elgamal is that the previous is deterministic: every
time a particular message is encrypted with the same key, the resulting ciphertext will
look the same. Elgamal on the other hand is probabilistic and so two encryptions of the
same message under the same key may look different.
13The same cryptographic scheme was in fact invented by Clifford Cocks and James H. Ellis in 1973
but because the two men worked for the British government this discovery was kept secret until
1997 [106].
14The story is well retold in [88].
15A prime number is a number that can only be divided by 1 and itself. Therefore 2, 3, 5 and 7
are examples of prime numbers: there exists no other numbers that divide them except 1 and the
respective number.
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The secrecy of Elgamal is based on the difficulty in computing discrete logarithms. As
we are using certain aspects of Elgamal cryptography in Chapter 6 we give more detail
on this scheme.
Generating a key pair
1. A group Gq is a subgroup of Z
∗
p of order q. g is a generator of this group.
2. A random value x is chosen from {0, . . . , q − 1}
3. The value h is computed as h = gx
4. The public key is (G, q, g, h)
5. The private key is x
Encryption
Using the recipient’s public key the sender is able to calculate a shared secret s based on
the message he wishes to send. This message must be one element of the predefined group
G. A common strategy for sending messages with any content is to use a symmetric
crypto system to encrypt the message and to use a random element from the group G
as the key for this encryption.
1. A random value y is chosen from {0, . . . , q − 1}
2. c1 is calculated as c1 = g
y
3. The shared secret s is calculated as s = hy
4. The message m must be a element of the group G
5. c2 is calculated as c2 = m · s
6. The ciphertext is (c1, c2)
Decryption
1. The ciphertext (c1, c2) is received
2. The shared secret s is calculated as s = cx1
3. The message m is computed as m = c2 · s−1
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Re-encryption
Because of the probabilistic property of the Elgamal cipher it is possible to change the
ciphertext without changing the plaintext within. Knowledge of the private key is not
necessary to do this, only of the public key.
1. The ciphertext is (c1, c2) and the public key (G, q, g, h)
2. A random value s is selected from Zq
3. The re-encrypted ciphertext (c′1, c
′
2) is computed as (c
′
1, c
′
2) = (c1 · ys, c2 · gs)
Threshold Elgamal
Given a large prime p and a generator α of a q-order subgroup of Z∗p . A party A chooses
a secret key k and computes β:
β := αk (mod p)
The public key is p, α and β. k is the secret key. Encryption of m yields a pair of
terms computed thus:
c := (y1, y2) := (α
r,m · βr) (mod p)
where r is chosen at random. A decrypts c as follows:
m = y2/y
k
1 (mod p)
The security of Elgamal rests on the presumed difficulty of taking discrete logs in
a finite field. Thus, recovering the secret k exponent from knowledge of p, α and β is
thought to be intractable.
A randomising algorithm like Elgamal allows the possibility of re-encryption: anyone
who knows the public key can re-randomise the original encryption with a new random
value r′:
(y′1, y
′
2) := (α
r′ · y1, βr′ · y2)
which gives:
(y′1, y
′
2) := (α
r′+r, βr
′+r ·m)
Clearly, this is equivalent to simply encrypting m with the randomisation r + r′ and
decryption is performed exactly as before. We will see the utility of re-encryption when
we come to describe anonymising mixes. Note that, crucially, the device performing the
re-encryption does not use any secret keys and at no point in the re-encryption process
is the plaintext revealed.
In fact we will use exponential Elgamal, where m is encrypted as:
c := (y1, y2) := (α
r, αm · βr) (mod p)
Thus the plaintext is carried in the exponent of α.
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2.3.3 Paillier
The Paillier [65] cipher is a public key cryptography scheme based on the difficulty in
computing n-th residue classes. The scheme is additive homomorphic, meaning that
knowledge of the public key and the encryptions under that key of two messages, E(m1)
and E(m2), allows you to compute the encryption of the sum of those messages, E(m1 +
m2).
2.3.4 Digital signatures
A digital signature scheme is used to prove the origin of a message.
Normally the process starts with the calculation of a message digest (commonly hash),
which is a value of some predetermined length that is calculated on all the bits of the
message such that if a single bit changes then the message digest will change. A hash
algorithm is also called a one-way function, meaning that a message m is input into
the function and a message digest md is output but given a digest md it is very hard
and/or time consuming to find the corresponding m. It is the goal of a hash algorithm to
cascade a small change in the message into a large change in the message digest, making
it difficult to find two messages m1 and m2 that have the same message digest md.
As the message digest is commonly much shorter than the message itself, it is less
computationally expensive to apply a cryptographic signing algorithm to this digest
than to the whole message. The signed message digest is appended to the message
when it is sent to its recipient and this is commonly known as a digital signature. The
recipient recalculates the message digest from the message and compares the signed
message digest to this. If this check holds then it proceeds to check that the signature
on the message digest is indeed that of the alleged originator, a process fully dependent
on the cryptographic signature scheme.
2.3.5 Threshold cryptography
There are extensions to cryptographic schemes such as Elgamal [67] and Paillier that
allows the secret key to be split into several parts. Normally these parts would be held by
n different persons or organisations and the scheme would be set up in such a way that a
threshold number k of the parties must work together to perform a desired cryptographic
function. The benefit from such a setup is that if a message is encrypted using the public
key, the plaintext can only be recovered if k key holders work together. This allows a
group to enforce an agreement, for example one not to decrypt any ciphertexts before a
particular point in time. If fewer than k key holders decide to cheat then they cannot
successfully decrypt any cipertexts but of course, if k or more keyholders decide to cheat
they will be successful.
For electronic voting this is very useful in two different ways:
1. Enforce agreement not to decrypt. The secrecy and accuracy of a number of elec-
tronic voting schemes described in this thesis is dependent on some ciphertexts not
being decrypted until after a particular point in time (the close of the election)
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or never being decrypted. In a scenario where a single entity holds the only key
to these ciphertexts that entity must be fully trusted not to break the rules. In a
scenario where this trust is distributed over n parties then the likelihood that k of
these work together to cheat may drop. From the point of view of a voter this may
mean that even if he or she does not trust party A, which holds one key share not
to cheat, it may trust party B, which holds another. The likelihood that parties
A and B will work together is judged very small as they are political enemies.
2. Load balancing/robustness. In the scenario where a single entity is responsible for
the only key there may be events (malicious or non-malicious) that stops it from
performing a proper function: anything from the accidental destruction (loss) of
the private key to a deliberate denial of service attack. If the key is shared among
several political parties for example, the loss of a key share belonging to a political
party that is not happy with the likely outcome of the election does not stop
the system from functioning correctly. It may also be possible to use threshold
cryptography to perform load balancing as the k out of n available key shares does
not have to be the same k each time.
2.3.6 Mix networks
Mix networks were first introduced by David Chaum [16] and can be seen as a way of
passing a message m across a network of trusted parties Tn such that each trusted party
T constributes to the hiding of the identity of the sender. Although first envisaged by
Chaum as a way of sending and responding to e-mail anonymously across the Internet,
he also suggested that it is applicable in electronic voting protocols.
Decryption mix networks
The first devised mix network was a decryption mix network [16] where the message is
hidden under several layers of encryption and where each layer Lx is encrypted under
the public key PKTx of a particular node Tx. As the message passes to a node in the
network it removes its layer of encryption, effectively altering the look of the message,
before passing the resulting encrypted message on to the next node Tx+1.
In a decryption mix network it is thus only possible to regain the plaintext message if
the encrypted message passes through all nodes in the order specified by the layers. The
anonymisation strategy is based on the likelihood that at least one node of those through
which the message has passed will not leak from where it was passed the message. In
other words, if the eventual recipient of the message attempts to trace the message back
through the nodes of the network he will fail as soon as a node does not leak such
information. This is in fact the anonymisation strategy used by Tor [91, 72].
Chaum proceeded to use the decryption mix network in a scheme incorporating visual
cryptography [17] comparing the multi-layered encrypted values to russian dolls, which
consist of a series of different-size dolls, each contained within the next larger size doll.
Although a simplified version of the scheme was introduced by Ryan [15, 81, 76] and
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named Preˆt a` Voter, the multi-layered encrypted values were still called russian dolls.
This was changed to another suitable metaphor, namely the onion, which has many
layers when Chaum, Ryan and Schneider [20] published a joint paper on the simplified
scheme now definitely named Preˆt a` Voter. Here the trusted parties (nodes in the mix
network) are also named tellers.
In this new scheme [20] each layer of the onion holds a germ g and each teller is
responsible for two layers of this onion, i.e. the teller holds the private key of two
consecutive encrypted layers of the onion. With D0 a “nonce-like value” the construction
of the onion is thus:
{g2k−1, {g2k−2, {..., {g1, {g0, D0}PKT0}PKT1}...}PKT2k−2}PKT2k−1 (2.1)
The secret θ, i.e. the cyclic shift of the candidate list (see Section 2.4.2), is in fact the
sum of the hashes of each germ value g taken modulo the length of the cycle v:
di := hash(gi) (mod v) i = 0, 1, 2, ..., 2k − 1 (2.2)
θ :=
2k−1∑
i=0
di(mod v) (2.3)
In order to explain the decryption mix network, let us think of an encrypted receipt as
the combination of an onion with an indication of the position of the voter’s mark. The
purpose of a mix network in electronic voting is to hide16 the link between an encrypted
receipt, which the voter is allowed to take home, and the decrypted plaintext vote so
as to provide a receipt but preserving the receipt-freeness property of the system (see
Section 2.2.3).
A Chaumian mix, referring to the mix steps introduced in [17] and developed in [20],
for a teller T can be described with the following steps:
1. T receives all encrypted receipts in the batch Binput
2. One layer of encryption is removed from each encrypted receipt R and the nonce
n1 is regained
3. The position of the voter’s mark is reversed as indicated by hash(n1)
4. The complete batch of encrypted receipts now form batch Bmiddle, which is publi-
shed
5. Another layer of encryption is removed from R and its nonce n2 is regained
6. The position of the voter’s mark is again reversed as indicated by hash(n2)
7. The resulting batch of all encrypted receipts form batch Boutput, which is published
16The word “hide” was chosen here to show that there must be a link that can be audited, but that
link should be hidden by the tellers.
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Further detail of the Preˆt a` Voter scheme is found in Section 2.4.2 so here it suffices to
mention that the result of these consecutive decryptions and reversed shift of the position
of the voter’s mark is a final batch Boutput where the position of the voter’s mark is related
to a candidate list in the base order. Thus, the output from the decryption mix network
is a set of plaintext, countable votes.
At this stage it is beneficial to note that this decryption mix would be perfect in the
case where all tellers are truly reliable. However, in order to find any errors and provide
an incentive for the tellers to remain trustworthy the mix network must be audited. One
audit method is the random partial check, described below.
Re-encryption mix networks
The purpose of a re-encryption mix network [66, 1, 39, 40, 2, 42, 31, 62, 14, 34, 33, 41, 32]
is very much the same as in a decryption mix network, to hide the link between the
encrypted receipt and the plaintext, countable vote. However, the setup is slightly
different. The general actions of each node in the mix network is to shuﬄe all the
encrypted receipts in the batch and then to hide that shuﬄing by changing not the
contents but the look of the receipts. In the decryption mix network this is done by
removing a layer of encryption. In the re-encryption mix network the look of a receipt
is changed by the injection of randomness into the encryption.
In the mixing phase of the re-encryption mix network the batch of all encrypted
receipts is passed between a set of tellers (also called clerks [85]) that each shuﬄes the
receipts and re-encrypts them. As in the decryption mix network where the encrypted
receipts are turned into plaintext votes by repeated decryption the encrypted receipts
in the re-encryption mix network must also be turned into plaintext votes that can be
counted. This is done in the decryption phase where the last output batch of encrypted
receipts is decrypted once to regain the plaintext votes.
As the person or organisation that holds the private key needed to decrypt the last
batch of encrypted receipts can in fact decrypt any and all encrypted receipts in all
batches of the re-encryption mix network, many configurations stipulate that a threshold
key is used so that at least a certain number k out of the total number of key shares n
must be used to perform the decryption. The key shares can then be distributed among
a set of decryption tellers. Unless k of the n tellers work together in the decryption of
each encrypted receipt this cannot be done.
It is thus evident that a secure re-encryption mix network is based on a threshold
probabilistic cryptography scheme. It is “threshold” for the reasons we have just seen,
and “probabilistic” because the encryption contains an element of randomness, ensuring
that two encryptions of the same plaintext do not necessarily look the same. Two such
schemes are Elgamal [26] (Section 2.3.2) and Paillier [65] and implementations of these
schemes in Preˆt a` Voter have been described in [85] and [80] respectively.
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Random partial checks (RPC)
The random partial check is a method that can be used to audit the correct function of
a mix network without revealing any complete sequence of links from input to output
[43]. Using some method that cannot be controlled or influenced by the mixers, a binary
mask is created for the first column of ciphertexts in the mix network, one bit for each
of the ciphertexts in this column17.
A 0 value means that the mixer in question must reveal where the ciphertext originated
and what values were recovered (in the case of a decryption mix network) or applied (in
the case of a re-encryption mix network) in the process and this data is published. This
allows anyone to apply the same process in reverse to the ciphertext and check that the
result is the ciphertext in the previous column of the mix network.
Conversely, a 1 value in the mask for a particular ciphertext means that the mixer
must reveal the next step in the mix for this particular ciphertext and the associated
values. This allows anyone to check that this ciphertext has been properly decrypted
(or re-encrypted) and that it can be found in the next column in the mix network.
The process is continued across the whole mix network by propagating the mask such
that each ciphertext in the whole mix network has either an incoming or outgoing link
and its associated values revealed. Because no ciphertext’s origin and destination are
both revealed in any step of the mix network there can be formed no complete link from
mix network input to output.
The likelihood that a mixer can cheat “and get away with it” is inversely proportional
to the number of ciphertexts in the columns. For a particular ciphertext I, as a mixer,
can choose to cheat either in the incoming or the outgoing link — I know that one of
these will be audited and so the chance that my cheating will remain unnoticed is 1 in
2. If I cheat with two ciphertexts my chance to get away with this is 1 in 4 as I first
have 1 chance in 2 to get away with the first ciphertext and then 1 in 2 to get away with
the second. If I cheat with three ciphertexts my chance to get away with this is 1 in 8,
a rapidly sinking likelihood.
As random partial checks are computationally relatively inexpensive, they seem parti-
cularly appropriate to auditing mix networks used in electronic voting because a cheating
mixer must change a certain number of ciphertexts to throw the election (i.e. give the
victory to a different candidate than the actual winner). If the number of votes that the
cheating mixer has to change is n the likelihood that it gets away with it is one chance in
2−n. For n = 10 this is one chance in 2−10 = 1024, ≈ 0, 09%. As the number of changed
votes increase the likelihood of avoiding detection falls exponentially.
2.3.7 Zero-knowledge proofs
A zero-knowledge proof is the term for a process whereby an entity A proves to an entity
B the possession of some secret, or that something is true, without revealing that secret
17The mask may be created by some random function performed by a third party (coin tosses) or
some pre-agreed method such as the output of a well-known hashing algorithm on the complete mix
network data.
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or any other information [57]. In an interactive zero-knowledge proof A and B execute
a protocol that contains a number of messages exchanged between the two parties and
which results in some proof that convinces B of A’s possession of the secret. The exact
protocol depends on the circumstances: for example A may be proving to B that it
knows a secret that B also knows or it may be proving knowledge of the plaintext in a
particular ciphertext without B knowing this plaintext.
One example of the use of zero-knowledge proofs in electronic voting systems is the
Neff mix [62] where a mixer18 can prove that the mix has been performed correctly
without revealing any information about the contents of the encrypted votes.
2.4 Paper based electronic voting schemes
At first it may seem counter productive to use paper in an electronic voting system, but
the motivation for paper in electronic voting is simple: it allows the voter to perform an
encryption of her vote using nothing more than her hands. There are different ways of
accomplishing this feat and two systems that use paper are Preˆt a` Voter and Punchscan,
both of which are described in this section.
Furthermore, there are obvious benefits of preserving a ballot form that the voters are
familiar with, allowing them to fill this out using a method that they are familiar with
(namely a pen) and to allow them to do this in the privacy of a voting booth.
Three paper-based voting schemes of the same family (descendants of Chaum’s vi-
sual cryptography system) are presented in this section: Preˆt a` Voter, Punchscan and
Scantegrity. The main motivation for the development of all of these schemes has been
to provide end-to-end verifiability (Section 2.2.3) and in general this is achieved in two
parts. First the voter is given an encrypted receipt that she can use to check the inclu-
sion of her vote in the tally (voter verifiability) and second any interested party is able
to check that all those encrypted receipts are properly turned into plaintext votes and
that these in turn are tallied correctly.
2.4.1 Chaum’s visual cryptography system
The electronic voting system based on a receipt with visual cryptography proposed by
David Chaum in 2004 [17] marks the start of an evolution of systems where the voter
would create an encrypted receipt of her vote by splitting the ballot form in two19 and
destroying one half of it. In this scheme the voter interacts with a voting machine to form
her vote and a receipt is printed by the machine, detailing the choices that the voter has
made. This printout consists of two layers of see-through material onto each of which
“half” of the information has been printed such that when light passes through both
layers the eye perceives pixels that make out the letters in the names of the candidates
for which the voter has cast a vote.
18Trusted in this case not to break the secrecy of the election
19In Chaum’s visual cryptography scheme the printed receipt consists of two layers that are separated;
in later systems the ballot form may consist of a single sheet which is cut in two.

2.4. Paper based electronic voting schemes
Figure 2.2: A typical Preˆt a` Voter ballot form
In fact each pixel that the voter sees in the printout is made up by four “sub-pixels”,
two on each layer. When the two layers are separated each appears to have random
pixels printed onto it: this is in fact visual cryptography due to Naor and Shamir [60].
However, the seemingly random noise of pixels does in fact encode the contents of the
vote (see [17] for details). The voter chooses one of the layers as her receipt and destroys
the other. The voting machine submits the same part to a central repository and there
it can be decrypted and counted after the close of the election.
The disadvantage of the scheme is that it uses highly specialised printing onto two
layers of see-through material, a costly and error prone procedure. But building on the
same principles this system spawned two successors: Preˆt a` Voter and Punchscan, both
detailed below.
2.4.2 Preˆt a` Voter
Introduced by Peter Ryan [76, 81] as a simplification of David Chaum’s early electronic
voting scheme [17, 15] and developed [20, 55, 56, 85, 80, 36, 108] and tested [82, 83, 84]
in a series of papers, Preˆt a` Voter [87] is an electronic voting scheme based on a paper
ballot form with a candidate list in a random order.
The ballot form
In the typical Preˆt a` Voter ballot form [76, 20] (example shown in Figure 2.2) the
candidates are listed in some order on the left and a grid where the voter is able to mark
her choices is on the right. Between these two ballot form columns runs a perforation
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along which the voter is able to tear the form in order to detach the two columns from
each other. At the bottom right of the form is printed an encrypted value called the
onion. Where the name of each candidate appears in the list on the ballot form is
determined by the contents of the onion. This varies from one ballot form to another.
Voting ceremony and verifying the vote
When the voter has identified herself and been accredited as an eligible voter at the
polling station, she is allowed to blindly select a ballot form at random. She keeps it
hidden until she reaches the privacy of the voting booth. Here she makes her mark(s)
on the ballot form, tears along the perforation and destroys the left hand side carrying
the names of the candidates. What remains is the right hand side bearing her mark(s)
and the onion. As the candidate list order is different on each form it is impossible to
know the contents of the vote from the markings on this right hand side. We therefore
call this the encrypted receipt.
When the voter comes out of the voting booth with the encrypted receipt it is scanned
and a digital copy is submitted to what is called the web bulletin board. This is a publicly
available, append only, web resource. No-one is able to delete information posted to the
web bulletin board and only the election authority and trusted parties (see below) are
able to post to it. When the encrypted receipt has been scanned the voter is allowed
to take it home. Using a computer connected to the world wide web (WWW) she can
then look up her receipt on the web bulletin board. The voter can check that the digital
representation of the encrypted receipt on the web bulletin board matches her own paper
copy, rendering Preˆt a` Voter voter verifiable (see Section 2.2.3).
In order to guarantee the secrecy of the vote a set of trusted parties, tellers, are
used. Tellers should be selected so that as many of the voters as possible have trust in
at least one and that the tellers represent such disparate interests that they are very
unlikely all to collude. For example a teller could be run by each of the major political
parties, another by the United Nations and a third by the European Union. There are
two versions of Preˆt a` Voter that we identify by their years of introduction: 2005 for
the decryption mix network configuration and 2006 for the re-encryption mix network
configuration.
Preˆt a` Voter 2005
Much like Allium cepa (that is to say a common onion) the Preˆt a` Voter 200520 onion
has many layers. In the latter the layers are of encryption in a public key cryptography
scheme such as RSA and under each is hidden a nonce value gi. The sum of the hashes
of all nonces under all layers of the onion determines the cyclic shift θ of the candidate
list, as shown in Equations 2.4 and 2.5.
Each trusted party, teller, has a public key pair and two consecutive layers of the
onion are encrypted under this public key, again shown in Equations 2.4 and 2.5. The
20Preˆt a` Voter 2005 refers to the version of the system using decryption mix networks.
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decryption of the encrypted receipt into a plaintext vote is performed by a decryption
mix network of all tellers.
di := hash(gi) (mod v) i = 0, 1, 2, ..., 2k − 1 (2.4)
θ :=
2k−1∑
i=0
di(mod v) (2.5)
In Preˆt a` Voter 2005 all ballot forms are prepared and printed by a single election
authority and are then distributed to the polling stations [20], giving rise to the authority
knowledge, chain of custody and chain voting problems [82, 84, 55, 56] (see Section 2.4.7
for further information). In short all of these problems can be explained by the simple
fact that anyone who can see the ballot form before it is turned into an encrypted receipt
is able to use the information published on the web bulletin board after the election to
learn the contents of a vote without having to perform the otherwise necessary multiple
decryptions.
Preˆt a` Voter 2005 also suffers from some unfortunate problem regarding the robustness
of the system. As each layer of the onion is an encryption under a particular teller’s
public key only this teller is able to perform the decryption. The onion must thus be
decrypted by each teller in strict order. If one of those tellers is unable to perform
the decryption, either because of some accident (loss of the private key for example) or
because it is performing a denial of service attack, it is impossible to decrypt and tally
the election. Furthermore, the decryption mix network is quite powerful in finding any
teller that tries to cheat but it offers no method to recover from this.
Preˆt a` Voter 2006
To address these issues Preˆt a` Voter 2006 was introduced, using a re-encryption mix net-
work first with Elgamal [85] and subsequently with Paillier [80] encryptions. Both these
encryption schemes can be configured to use threshold keys and both are probabilistic,
meaning that two encryptions of the same plaintext do not necessarily look the same.
Thus it is possible to make the system much more robust and overcome or minimise all
of the problems with Preˆt a` Voter 2005 described above.
To ensure that no-one knows the contents of the ballot form (except the voter) the
system uses a combination of distributed creation of the onion and on-demand printing
of the ballot form. The process of preparing the ballot form is started by a clerk who
sets up two probabilistic encryptions of a known “starting value”: one under the public
threshold key of the tellers and one under the public key of a printing clerk (or booth
printing device). These two are then passed as a pair from clerk to clerk21, each of which
adds further randomness to the plaintext and to the randomness of the encryption.
This re-encryption mix network is supported by the threshold probabilistic encryp-
tion scheme used. When the initial clerk sets up the pair of encryptions, onions, they
contain the same random plaintext set by this clerk. This represents a candidate list in
21These entities can be the same as the tellers but as they are not necessarily so, they are named clerks
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alphabetical order. When the pair is passed from clerk to clerk each adds randomness to
the plaintext without revealing what randomness they add nor being able to learn the
plaintext, thus mixing the candidate list. This possibility to add to the plaintext is a
feature of the probabilistic encryption schemes Elgamal [26] and Paillier [65] used. When
all clerks have thus contributed to the random plaintext no subset of them can know
the plaintext without first decrypting. The re-encryption mix network is auditable.
The random plaintext of the pair of onions being the basis for the permutation of the
candidate list, the ballot form has been created in a distributed fashion. What remains
before the form can be used to vote is of course to print it onto paper. This is done by
decrypting the onion that has been encrypted under the public key of either the printing
clerk or of a booth device, which reveals the candidate list and allows the ballot form to
be printed. The remaining onion, that encrypted under the public threshold key of the
tellers, is used in the subsequent decryption of the encrypted receipt.
Unfortunately the printing raises a hard problem: how can the ballot form be printed
so that only the voter can know the contents of the ballot form? The form could be
printed on demand in the privacy of the voting booth so that it only exists in its full form
there, but that requires a printing device in the booth that has a private key. Anyone
familiar with private key infrastructures (PKI) understands that this becomes a non-
trivial key distribution problem. If, for example, anyone is able to steal the private key
from within the booth device, or the organisation responsible for loading the key into the
booth device steals it, the secrecy of the election is broken. It may be possible to devise
a scheme whereby the contents of the ballot form is decrypted by a group of trusted
parties, on demand, but again this raises the complexity of the system. Furthermore,
the booth device has to learn the order of the candidate list in order to print it and if it
is able to leak this information then again the secrecy of the election is under threat.
Instead of printing the ballot forms on demand within the voting booth, they can be
printed in advance by some election authority. This again gives rise to the authority
knowledge and chain of custody problems, both of which can be minimised using pro-
cedures. Whether to use the on-demand printing method or the pre-printing method
is the topic of current debate. If there is some technical discovery that can secure the
on-demand printing then this seems to be a very promising method of printing the ballot
form but until then it is likely that the secrecy of the ballot form can more easily be
safeguarded using procedures in the pre-printing chain of custody.
Voting in Preˆt a` Voter 2006 is done in exactly the same way as in the 2005 version,
but the decryption of the encrypted receipt is quite different. When the voters’ choices
with the associated onions are all published on the web bulletin board after the close
of the election they are then passed between the clerks22 in their re-encryption mix
network. Note that in this re-encryption mix there is no injection of randomness into
the plaintext, only into the probabilistic part of the encryption.
When a threshold set of the tellers agree that the encrypted receipts have been sa-
tisfactorily shuﬄed they are able to decrypt the final output batch of the re-encryption
mix network into plaintext votes. It is important that the encryption of the onion has
22This can be the same clerks used in the distributed creation of the ballot forms or a different set.
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Figure 2.3: Typical Punchscan ballot form
been done under a threshold key and that this key is shared by a set of tellers so that no
single entity is able to perform any decryption without the consent of at least a threshold
set of all entities working together. This ensures that only the output batch from the
re-encryption mix network be decrypted, safeguarding the secrecy of the vote and the
privacy of the voters.
2.4.3 Punchscan
Sharing the same mother system in Chaum’s scheme with a visually encrypted receipt
[17] it is not surprising that Punchscan [28, 68, 71] and Preˆt a` Voter have many similari-
ties even though they have had different development paths. Punchscan can be argued
to have a distinctly American flavour in the layout of the “native” ballot form on a single
sheet of letter size paper but there are also other differences.
Punchscan was originally introduced [68, 28] and subsequently developed [38, 27] by
David Chaum and a number of graduate students associated with him. Some analysis
of the system has been made by others [55, 56].
The ballot form
As Preˆt a` Voter has two columns to allow the voter to turn the ballot form into an
encrypted receipt (see Section 2.4.2) the ballot form in Punchscan has two pages. Figure
2.3 shows a typical Punchscan ballot form with both its pages overlain. The ballot form
has a number of elements. The first is the serial number printed at the top right corner
that uniquely identifies the ballot form. As can be seen in Figure 2.4 this is printed
identically on both pages of the form. The candidate list is printed on the top sheet in
alphabetical order or whatever order is stipulated by electoral law. The candidate list
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does not appear on the bottom sheet.
The native Punchscan ballot form23 uses indirection to achieve the same effect as the
random order candidate list in Preˆt a` Voter. On the top page of the ballot form, next
to each name in the candidate list is printed a random symbol, unique for the candidate
on the ballot form but assigned at random on each ballot form. Each symbol can also
be seen through the holes punched (hence Punchscan) through the top page, as they
are printed on the bottom page, again in a random order from left to right. There is
no connection between the symbols assigned to each candidate on the top page and the
order in which these symbols appear on the bottom page.
Voting ceremony
When the voter appears at the polling place she identifies herself to a poll station worker
and is subsequently allowed to choose a ballot form at random from a pile of ballot
forms, hidden from view (laying upside down on the table or in envelopes for example)
and proceeds to the voting booth. Using a thick bingo marker (bingo dauber) she marks
her choices on the two-page ballot form. This is done by marking the symbol on the
bottom page seen through the hole representing the desired candidate. As a thick bingo
marker is used a mark is made not only over the symbol on the bottom page but also
around the hole punched through the top page, meaning that both pages are marked.
Consider Figure 2.4. When the voter has indicated a vote for Lars the top page has a
mark around the fourth hole and the bottom page a mark over the character b. When
either page is considered without the other it does not indicate the contents of the vote.
Thus, when the voter has marked her choice(s) in the voting booth she creates the
encrypted receipt by separating the two pages and destroying one. She is free to choose
which page to use and which to destroy24. As can be seen in this same figure, the vote is
encoded into the position of the mark (numerically if you will, the index number of the
position of the mark: 0, 1, 2, 3, ...) and not into the symbol marked or the correspondence
between a candidate and a symbol on the top page.
In order to finally cast the vote the voter approaches poll station workers and allows
the encrypted receipt to be scanned and submitted electronically. She is allowed to leave
the poll station with the encrypted receipt, enabling her to look this receipt up on a web
bulletin board after the close of the election. Punchscan is thus voter verifiable as the
voter is able to verify the inclusion of her vote in the final tally.
Meeting of officials and the diskless workstation
In general, it may be argued, Punchscan employs procedural protection against most pro-
blems associated with electronic voting systems. To deal with the authority knowledge
problem (see Section 2.4.7) for example the system is heavily dependent on procedures.
23We say “native” here because as discussed in Section 4 both Punchscan and Preˆt a` Voter can use a
variety of ballot form configurations, including that of the other sister system.
24Procedural defences against some problems described in Section 2.4.7 may require this choice to be
made before the form is filled out.
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(a) The top page
(b) The bottom page
Figure 2.4: The pages of the Punchscan ballot form
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It is well argued by the developers [71, 28, 68, 38, 27] however that procedural defences
can be quite effective.
The trust in Punchscan is invested in a number of observers or officials, perhaps
nominated by each political party, constituency etc. These have a number of meetings
during the running of the election at which all the functions underpinning the electronic
voting system are carried out. The meeting of officials is responsible for safeguarding the
secrecy of the election while the accuracy of the election is audited by an independent
set of auditors. To help them achieve the necessary level of secrecy they use a so-called
diskless workstation, a computer that does not have any means of communication with
the world and thus no way of leaking the secret information.
When the officials come to the meeting they each bring with them the following:
1. A motherboard, graphics card, processor and other components necessary to as-
semble a working (diskless) computer that they have satisfied themselves do not
contain any malicious hardware or software and can thus be trusted not to leak
any of the secret information.
2. A copy of the Linux distribution and the necessary software, all of which has been
compiled by the official or the organisation he or she represents from code that has
been fully analysed.
3. A flash drive/memory stick portable media that can be connected using the USB
connector.
As each official has a complete set of the necessary components it is possible to ran-
domly select each component among those available, and thus there is a probability
attached to the choosing of a compromised component supplied by an official. Likewise
the Linux and software distribution can either simply be selected at random or all those
distributions provided can be compared to each other25 and as they should be exactly
identical a distribution is only used if it is exactly what all officials have brought to the
meeting.
As the workstation has no hard disk it is booted from the CD holding the Linux
distribution. The necessary software is already loaded into this distribution and can
accomplish all the functions of the electronic voting system. As the running of the
election software creates data that must be published onto a public web bulletin board
a memory stick (portable media that connects to the USB port: may have other names)
is used and the data is stored onto it. A series of similar sticks may be used to provide
backup of the data.
As described in the next section a large amount of secret random data underpins the
anonymisation and decryption of the encrypted receipts. The developers have proposed
a very interesting procedure whereby no database is created but all the necessary ballot
form data is created each time it is needed, i.e. in the meetings of officials. This is
25This requires the use of a computer to compute digital hashes on the contents of the read only media
on which the operating system copies have been brought.

2.4. Paper based electronic voting schemes
accomplished by officials entering a series of characters that they have selected autono-
mously, all these characters being hashed using some publicly available hash function
and the resulting hash being used to deterministically create the necessary data. This
means that these random character strings, passwords if you will, are all needed to create
the data and as it is not stored anywhere it must be recreated using the same passwords
each time — making it impossible for any subgroup of officials to create the data. There
are also some strategies for making sure that no official is able to stage a denial of service
attack by “forgetting” the password [38, 27].
The mixing scheme and its initial audit
Instead of using either a re-encryption (Section 2.3.6) or decryption mix network (Section
2.3.6) a new mixing (anonymising) scheme was introduced with Punchscan and lacking
a different term it is here called Punchscanian mix. Its most important difference from
the mix networks used in many electronic voting schemes is that it is not based on
cryptography as such, except the use of some publicly available hash scheme.
As has been shown in a previous section the vote is encapsulated in the position of
the mark on either page of the two-page ballot form and not in the symbol marked on
the bottom page or the correspondence between a candidate and a symbol on the top
page. The “decryption” of the encrypted receipt in Punchscan is thus the process of
figuring out which candidate a particular position corresponds to — or more accurately
to move the mark in a series of manipulations such that its final position corresponds to
a candidate list in the base (alphabetical) order and can simply be read off.
Originally Punchscan was explained using only two possible manipulations: no change
or inversion. While this is the case in a race with exactly two candidates it seems more
likely that full permutations must be employed. Therefore here the more general case
is presented and each manipulation is the application of a full permutation (it is quite
possible to represent the “no change” case as a full permutation and therefore this special
case is disregarded).
The decryption of the encrypted receipts is performed using a series of one or more
decryption tables (example shown in Figure 2.1) that have seven fields:
1. The input — this must be a full permutation of all the positions to facilitate the
application of full permutations, in the first input column of the first of any linked
decryption tables this is simply a permutation indicating the base order
2. The first permutation
3. The destination in the middle result where the permuted value is stored
4. A middle result (the first permutation applied to the input)
5. The second permutation
6. The destination in the output where the permuted value is stored
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Input Perm 1 Dest 1 Result 1 Perm 2 Dest 2 Output
1 H(O11) H(P11) H(L11) H(O12) H(P12) H(L12) H(O13)
2 H(O21) H(P21) H(L21) H(O22) H(P22) H(L22) H(O23)
3 H(O31) H(P31) H(L31) H(O32) H(P32) H(L32) H(O33)
4 H(O41) H(P41) H(L41) H(O42) H(P42) H(L42) H(O43)
5 H(O51) H(P51) H(L51) H(O52) H(P52) H(L52) H(O53)
Table 2.1: A Punchscan decryption table: commitments published on the web bulletin
board
Input Perm 1 Dest 1 Result 1 Perm 2 Dest 2 Output
1
2 O23
3 O31 P31 4
4 O42 P42 2
5
Table 2.2: A Punchscan decryption table: opened in the pre-audit
7. The output — a full permutation of all the positions, becomes input to any linked
decryption table
It is an important property of each decryption table that at each application of permu-
tations to the encrypted receipts the latter are randomly mixed. This is quite similar to
decryption or re-encryption mix networks where at the removal of a layer of encryption
or the re-encryption of the encrypted receipt are these mixed and the addressing in this
mix kept secret (until partially audited).
To create the ballot form data the meeting of officials uses the software running on the
diskless workstation. Any desired number of chained decryption tables are created and
their final result is stored in a printing table and this becomes the basis on which the
ballot forms are printed. The printing table must be safeguarded (probably using some
procedure) as its transportation to the printing facility, the printing and the transpor-
tation of the printed ballot forms to the polling station are all liable to chain of custody
problems (Section 2.4.7).
When the printing table has been created and stored onto the movable storage media
all the different values in the printing and decryption tables are committed using some
public hashing scheme and these commitments are also stored on the media. The printing
table must be kept secret and reliably destroyed when the ballot forms have been printed
but the commitments to the decryption table values must be reliably published on the
web bulletin board so that they are known by all before the start of the election.
As all underlying values have now been committed to the web bulletin board a pre-
auditing of some number of all created (but not yet printed) ballot forms is made. The
required number of forms (this may be any number) are selected at random or using
some deterministic scheme by independent auditors. The selected ballot forms are then
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completely opened, that is to say that the whole chain through the decryption tables(s)
and resulting in the printing table is revealed. If there is any malfeasance in the creating
of the ballot forms this will be detected by the auditors by some probability that depends
on the number of forms that are opened. Note that all values in the opened forms can be
checked by first ensuring that the revealed values do indeed correspond to the published
hash commitments and that they also result in the committed print table.
As an example of this pre-auditing we can use Table 2.1. Recall that before the pre-
audit takes place this table is represented on the web bulletin board simply by a set of
hash commitments and all values are thus hidden from view. Suppose form number 3
is selected to be opened. The meeting of officials uses their passwords to recreate the
decryption tables26 and publishes the information revealed in Table 2.2. Anyone is able
to use some software to check that the revealed values in Table 2.2 do correspond to
the hashes published in Table 2.1. Note that these hashes must be in some probabilistic
scheme so as to prohibit some trivial brute force attack against the decryption table.
In this example it is thus the case that
O31 + P31 = O42
for the first permutation and
O42 + P42 = O23
for the second permutation, arriving at O23 that, if this is the only decryption table,
should correspond to the permutation committed in the printing table. The purpose of
showing these complete paths through the decryption tables is to, with some probability,
attempt to find any ballot forms that have been created erroneously.
The decryption of the votes
As the consideration here is of Punchscan with full permutations it is necessary to think
of the decryption of the encrypted receipts as going from the last output column of the
last decryption table to the first input column of the first decryption table. This is
because the permutations must be applied in this order to the position of the mark on
the encrypted receipt to bring this back to the base order, indicating in plaintext the
intention of the voter.
When the encrypted receipts are collected electronically by the election authority they
are inserted at the correct place at the end of the particular decryption chain necessary
to decrypt that particular vote. When the election has closed a final meeting of officials
recreates the decryption data, decrypts all votes and publishes the plaintext votes to the
web bulletin board, which can then be tallied by any interested party. At this stage it is
important to note that the Punchscanian mix effectively hides the connection between
an encrypted receipt and its plaintext vote output after the decryption.
To further audit the decryption data a set of independent auditors now challenges the
meeting of officials to reveal exactly half of the data associated with the decryption of
the votes. In each decryption table and for each vote either the first permutation and
26Early on the collected decryption and print tables were called the punchboard by the authors.
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shuﬄe or the second permutation and shuﬄe are revealed. Each decryption table thus
contributes a certain amount of audited data, influencing the probability of finding any
error or discrepancy. Thus the larger the number of linked decryption tables used the
greater the probability of finding any error27.
It is interesting to note that any number of decryption tables can be linked and the
more decryption tables there are, the more data can be audited, influencing the proba-
bilities associated with detecting any errors or foul play in these tables. Furthermore, it
is quite easy to imagine that the secrecy of the vote (and the privacy of the voters) can
be safeguarded by a number of trusted parties, each providing one or more decryption
table(s). In the case where all tables are kept secret by a single meeting of officials this
secrecy does definitely depend on this meeting being procedurally prevented from leaking
any information that can connect the encrypted receipt to its associated plaintext vote.
In a configuration whereby the encrypted receipts are passed between trusted parties
(compare tellers in decryption mix networks, Section 2.3.6) the secrecy of the vote is
safeguarded if at least one trusted party is honest.
It is also interesting to note that in the case where a single meeting of officials has cus-
tody of all decryption tables these can create any number of new decryption tables that,
linked, have exactly the same resulting ballot forms as the previous table(s). These new
tables can then be committed before being audited using a challenge from independent
auditors. This procedure can be repeated any number of times resulting in more and
more data being audited each time and stops when all parties are convinced that the
meeting of officials has not committed any errors nor attempted to illegally influence
the election. This method allows extensive auditing of the accuracy of the election and
does not influence the secrecy of the vote.
2.4.4 Scantegrity
Building on the ideas introduced in the Punchscan system, where no cryptography is
necessary except a publicly available hash function, Chaum has introduced the Scante-
grity system28 as a complement to any optical scan system already available [18]. The
purpose of introducing the system has been to add verifiability to these optical scan sys-
tems that normally are not voter verifiable. It may be argued, however, that the system
is rather cumbersome to challenge, especially to quickly dismiss unfounded challenges,
which can easily be made and if made by a large enough number of people will disrupt
the election.
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Figure 2.5: A typical Scantegrity ballot form
The ballot form
An example of a Scantegrity ballot form is shown in Figure 2.5, where the original
optical scan29 ballot form is made up of the candidate list, in the base order stipulated
by relevant electoral law, and the “bubbles” that are filled to indicate the candidate to
which the vote is awarded. These can confidently be said to be features of most optical
scan system.
What has been added to the ballot form are two things: the chit and the symbols,
letters, inside the bubbles. The chit is shown in Figure 2.5 as the top-right corner but
could of course be any part of the ballot form. The main requirements on the chit is
that it contains the serial number of the ballot form, that the voter can verify that the
serial number on the chit corresponds to that on the rest of the ballot form (hence the
barcode in this example that stretches across the perforation) and that the chit can be
torn off.
As the candidate list is in the base order Scantegrity uses indirection to achieve an
encrypted receipt. The symbol associated with each candidate in the list is based on
Punchscan decryption tables (see Section 2.4.3) and thus the two systems are compatible.
27Quantifying this probability is hard at this level as it depends on the implementation.
28The work detailed in this thesis is based on Scantegrity but has at the time of printing been succeeded
by Scantegrity II [19].
29In an optical scan system the voter fills out a plaintext ballot form that is then interpreted by a
scanning device, simply by finding the presence of dark ink in a position or the absence of it. In
most systems the ballot form is first read and then automatically deposited in a ballot box, making
it possible to perform a manual count of the votes.
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The voting ceremony and voter verifiability
When the voter enters the polling station and identifies herself to poll station workers
she is allowed to take a random ballot form blindly from the collection of forms available.
The ballot forms have the same secrecy requirements as the Punchscan ballot forms as
anyone able to note down the mapping of symbols to candidates on a particular ballot
form is able to check the contents of the vote on the web bulletin board after the close
of the election.
In the voting booth the voter marks her choice by filling the bubble next to the
preferred candidate with ink, as stipulated by the optical scan system that she may well
have used in previous elections. When she is finished she takes a piece of note paper
available in the booth and writes down the character shown next to the candidate she
is voting for. The voter tears off the chit along its perforation and while she allows the
ballot form to be scanned and deposited into the ballot box, she takes the note and the
chit home as her encrypted receipt.
After the close of the election the serial numbers of all voted ballot forms together
with the symbols of their respective voted candidates are published on the web bulletin
board. In order to check that her vote is included in the tally the voter visits the web
bulletin board, looks up her serial number and verifies that the symbol shown is that
which she has noted down in the voting booth. Note that this does not say how she
voted, merely that her vote has been recorded as she cast it.
Challenging the election
If the voter is unable to find her serial number or if the symbol associated with her serial
number on the web bulletin board is not the one she has noted down in the voting booth
she can decide to challenge the election. In the ideal scenario only voters who feel that
they have truly been disenfranchised would challenge the election, but the system must
of course handle cases where voters who have other reasons than fairness to put forth
a challenge and be able to dispose of such malicious, or simply accidentally erroneous,
challenges.
When a challenge is put forward by a voter, which may well be through her political
party, directly to the election authority or through the media, the election authority
must decide whether or not to allow the challenge to proceed. If so, then the voter (or
her representative, in the form of a party official or lawyer for example) is invited to take
her chit to a place where original ballot forms collected during election day are held. In
this storage the forms are sorted by their serial number, allowing the election authority
to find the form in question without problem.
Those present now proceed to check the ballot form and this is done in two steps. To
start the first check the election authority finds the voter’s original ballot form30 and
places it in a special envelope through which only the chit corner is visible, i.e. the place
30If the ballot form cannot be produced this is evidence that the election authority has not been able
to guarantee the integrity of the election — given that it is impossible for a voter to forge a chit. A
forged chit that cannot be proven false would seriously compromise the trust in the system.
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where the chit has been torn off. The ballot form in its envelope and the chit are then
placed under a microscope and it is forensically shown that the chit definitely belongs to
the ballot form in the envelope. This is possible because of the naturally present fibres
in the paper on which the ballot form is printed, or perhaps by special threads laid into
the paper to achieve this purpose [18].
To start the second step of the ballot form check the election authority removes the
ballot form from the envelope and places it in another where the candidate list and the
associated symbols and bubbles are shown, but this is done face down so that no person
present is able to see the contents of the vote. This envelope is then placed in a container
with a number of similar envelopes showing ballot forms, these are thoroughly mixed
and for all the ballot forms now in this container the following are true:
1. There is one vote for each candidate in the container
2. Each ballot form in the container has the same symbol marked
All the ballot forms in their envelopes are now taken out of the container and placed
on the table and it is shown that even though they are all votes for different candidates
they are all marked with the same symbol. All the forms on the table can be examined
in detail to show that the position of their marks have not been changed at any time.
Although this may not be fully intuitive it is now the case that the election authority
has shown the voter that her ballot form is among those on the table and that all those
on the table have the same symbol marked. If this symbol does not correspond to the
symbol the voter has noted down in the voting booth it has been proven that the voter
has an incorrect recollection of the symbol she has marked. Note that the candidate
for which the voter has cast her vote has not been revealed to any person in the room,
although the election authority is quite aware of it.
Discussion
The main achievement of Scantegrity is that it adds voter verifiability to already existing
optical scanning voting systems. However, it does have two arguably severe drawbacks:
1. The election authority knows the votes of each voter, or invariably learns the vote
of a voter who challenges the election.
2. The two-step challenge process with its envelopes and shuﬄing has an unfortunate
air of a magic trick and it is arguably quite possible for the voter to feel that she
is being deceived by sleight of hand.
2.4.5 Scantegrity II
With the view to make the verifiability and challenging processes of Scantegrity more
practical, Scantegrity II31 [19] has replaced the necessity to forensically match a chit to
a ballot form with a clever way of using invisible ink.
31“II” both denotes that the system is the second with the same name and that the system uses Invisible
Ink.
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The ballot form
Similar to the original scheme, the Scantegrity II ballot form is an adapted optical scan
ballot form. The voter makes a choice by filling a bubble next to the desired candidate’s
name using a pen. Also like in the original scheme, this bubble contains a confirmation
value — but in this scheme it has been printed in invisible ink. Each bubble on the
ballot form contains a two character confirmation code that is invisible to the naked
eye32 but is revealed by the voter when she fills out the bubble to indicate her vote. The
bubble becomes dark when it is covered with a special pen and the confirmation code
is revealed as light characters within this dark bubble. This means that optical scan
machines will detect the mark and the voter sees the confirmation code.
The ballot form is similar to that in the original scheme, with a serial number printed
on the top. The bottom part of the ballot form is reserved for the voter to note down
the confirmation codes associated with the choices she makes on her ballot form33. The
bottom part is used so as to cause as few problems as possible when the sheet is fed
through the scanner.
The voting ceremony
The voter enters the polling station, identifies herself and is checked against the register
of eligible voters. If she is eligible to vote she is allowed to take a ballot form at random
from a pile. Note that the ballot form is not secret (as it was in the previous scheme) so
there is no need to hide it at this stage. She proceeds into a polling booth where she fills
out the ballot form using a special pen that develops the invisible ink in the bubbles,
both revealing the confirmation code within and marking the bubble.
When she is finished she notes down the confirmation codes associated with each of
her choices in the space on the ballot form reserved for this and exits the voting booth.
The part of the ballot form that holds the notes made by the voter also states the serial
number of the ballot form. This part is detached and when the ballot form has been
scanned an election official stamps it to indicate that it is a valid receipt.
Publishing auditing information
When the ballot form is scanned, the scanner reads only the serial number (which is
encoded in some form that the scanner can read, such as a barcode) and the position
of the marks on the form — in exactly the same way that it would read a form that
did not have the Scantegrity confirmation codes printed on it. This data is stored in
a database and tallied just as in previous elections. After the election the data in the
database is used to generate the confirmation codes associated with this form and these
are published on the web alongside the ballot form’s serial number (see [19] for details
on this procedure).
32A beautiful effect of this is that the ballot form is not secret before it has been used to cast a vote:
it is impossible for anyone to see and note down the confirmation codes associated with candidates
on the ballot form as they are invisible.
33This American style ballot form has a number of races on the same sheet.

2.4. Paper based electronic voting schemes
Auditing a vote and resolving disputes
A voter who wishes to verify her vote visits the official election website and enters her
ballot form serial number, which is printed on the piece of the ballot form that also
bears her confirmation code notes and that she has kept. This brings up a list of the
confirmation codes associated with the voter’s ballot form and she is able to check this
against the notes she made at the time of casting the vote. If these match up she can
be satisfied that her vote has been scanned, interpreted and tallied correctly34.
In the original Scantegrity scheme any dispute would have to be resolved in a cumber-
some procedure involving a chit matched to a paper ballot form. In Scantegrity II the
voter can only know the confirmation code associated with the candidate she voted for.
Therefore, the knowledge of a valid confirmation code for the ballot form in question
is all the proof the voter needs to challenge the election. It is then possible to show,
without consulting the physical ballot form (which is kept in an archive) if the confir-
mation code is valid and if it is the confirmation code that has been aggregated by the
election authority.
Discussion
The secrecy guarantees of Scantegrity II only holds if the invisible ink is truly invisible:
it must not be visible when the voter holds the form up against the light, nor must
there exist a way for anyone to see the confirmation codes without spoiling the ballot
form before it is used to cast a vote. Furthermore, if anyone is able to inspect the ballot
form after it has been used to cast a vote then this person is able to see what vote is
associated with that particular ballot form serial number. This does not associate the
vote with a voter but in a scenario where it could be associated with the voter this
breaks the secrecy of the election. A special mix of invisible ink that is only visible for a
short period of time, enough for the voter to note down the confirmation code, has been
envisaged as a solution to this problem [19].
2.4.6 Scratch & Vote
Scratch & Vote [4] uses the normal ballot form35 and homomorphic tallying in the back-
end to simplify the breaking of the link between encrypted receipt and plaintext vote.
The ballot form
The ballot form in Scratch & Vote is the same as in Preˆt a` Voter: on the left there is a
random-order candidate list and on the right a grid where the voter makes her marks.
On the right-hand side is, like in Preˆt a` Voter, an onion value contained in a 2D barcode,
but there is also a scratch strip covering an auditing value that the voter can scratch off
if she wishes to audit the ballot form. A ballot form where this value has been uncovered
34This is dependent on public verifiability of the system’s back-end, not described here.
35The authors show how it can be used both with the Preˆt a` Voter and Punchscan ballot forms.
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cannot be used to cast a vote36. The part of the ballot form that is covered with the
scratch strip has also got a perforation around it, making it possible to detach this part
from the ballot form.
The onion
The onion, printed as a 2D barcode on the ballot form, encrypts the candidate list order
as a series of Paillier [65] ciphertexts. This cryptography scheme is such that the plaintext
of two ciphertexts, encrypted under the same key, can be added together without first
decrypting the values. Scratch & Vote makes use of this by encoding the identity of
each candidate as 2M(i−1) where 2M is the number of votes the system can handle and
i is the index of the candidate in the canonical ordering. This is best illustrated by an
example37 (M = 28):
i Candidate 2M(i−1)
1 Adam 20
2 Bob 228
3 Charlie 256
4 David 284
Encrypting the value that identifies a candidate in the probabilistic Paillier encryption
scheme renders an encryption of the form EPKT (2
M(i−1), r) where PKT is the public key
of the tellers and r is a random value. Because the scheme is probabilistic (that is to
say that it incorporates this random value) multiple encryptions of the same plaintext
do not (necessarily) result in the same ciphertext.
Scratch & Vote takes advantage of this by forming the onion simply as a list of
encryptions of the identities of the candidates in the order that they are printed in the
candidate list on the ballot form. Continuing the previous exemple, a ballot form with
the following random candidate list order has the following values in the onion:
Candidate In the onion
Bob EPKT (2
28; r1)
Charlie EPKT (2
56; r2)
David EPKT (2
84; r3)
Adam EPKT (2
0; r4)
The voting ceremony
Voting takes place just as in Preˆt a` Voter described above. When the voter exits the
polling booth she has destroyed the left-hand half of the ballot form and she is carrying
the encrypted receipt. She approaches election officials who check that the scratch strip
is intact before tearing along the perforation, separating the scratch strip from the rest
36This is enforced procedurally by election officials.
37This example is from [4].
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of the encrypted receipt. The scratch strip must be destroyed to ensure that its values
cannot be known by anyone who knows which ballot form it corresponds to.
The remaining encrypted receipt is scanned and published on the web bulletin board.
The voter takes the receipt home with her and is able to use this to check for the inclusion
of her vote in the final tally (in exactly the same way as in Preˆt a` Voter).
Auditing a ballot form
Under the scratch strip the randomisation values (r1, r2 etc in the example above) that
have been used in the encryptions of the candidates in the onion is printed. In order
to audit the ballot form, which the voter is free to do for any number of ballot forms
before she casts her ballot, the voter scratches off the scratch strip and approaches staff
from a “helper organisation” in the polling station. These use a computer to check that
the onion is correctly formed and corresponds to the candidate list as it is printed on
the ballot form. This auditing method means that no trusted parties (tellers) must be
online to perform the audit of a ballot form (as they do in Preˆt a` Voter) and the voter
is free to choose any helper organisation to perform the audit.
As the public key PKT of the tellers and the M and i values are published before
the start of the election it is trivial for the helper organisation to audit a ballot form
for which the scratch strip has been scratched off. For the ballot form in the example
above, the top candidate is Bob and the onion value that corresponds to this position
in the candidate list is EPKT (2
28; r1). Looking up the published value for Bob, 2
28, the
public key of the tellers, PKT , and the randomisation value printed under the scratch
strip, r1, the helper organisation simply performs the Paillier encryption and compares
the resulting ciphertext to that in the onion printed on the ballot form.
Tabulation
After the close of the election all the encrypted receipts that have been cast are published
on the web bulletin board. The ciphertext for the voted candidate on each of these
ballot forms is now extracted. In the example above, if the voter has marked David
as her favourite choice38 then the encrypted value extracted from this ballot form is
EPKT (2
84; r3). In fact the example ballot form would be in the following form:
Candidate Choice
EPKT (2
28; r1)
EPKT (2
56; r2)
EPKT (2
84; r3) X
EPKT (2
0; r4)
As the candidate identities and the randomisation values are unknown and all we have
is the encryption of these values, it is not possible to know, without decrypting, what
candidate the vote is for.
38Which we would encourage...
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The ciphertexts representing the chosen candidates on all ballot forms are aggregated.
This is a fully, publicly verifiable process as the encrypted receipts are published online
and anyone can make, and check, the extraction of the ciphertexts. These ciphertexts are
then all added together, using the homomorphic property of the cryptography scheme,
to form a single ciphertext that contains all the votes. When all tellers agree that this
has been done correctly and that all votes have been added to the total, the single
ciphertext is decrypted by a threshold set of tellers, revealing the result of the election.
Various zero knowledge proofs are published along with this decryption to show that the
decryption has been done correctly.
Discussion
The homomorphic tabulation of the result of the election means that no mixing has
to take place and therefore this tabulation process should be faster (as it involves less
work performed by various parties) whilst remaining fully verifiable. However, it is not
possible to support STV or any other multiple-choice election method in this summation.
Furthermore, the ballot form, as in Preˆt a` Voter and Punchscan, remains secret in that
anyone who is able to see and note down its contents before it is turned into an encrypted
receipt is able to circumvent the cryptography and see the contents of the vote after the
close of the election.
2.4.7 Problems in paper-based electronic voting schemes
This section introduces known problems in paper-based electronic voting schemes. These
are not necessarily problems that stop the use of electronic voting schemes nor make
them any less secure — in most cases the problems are simply considerations that system
designers must be aware of when constructing their schemes.
Authority knowledge
The authority knowledge problem is not necessary unique to electronic voting but it
certainly is a problem that has thrown a spanner in the works of many otherwise quite
secure electronic voting systems. The problem occurs whenever the secrecy (or the
accuracy or privacy) of the system depends on some secret that the election authority
either creates or is able to learn at some point. This may pose a serious threat to
the democratic process if the election authority leaks information that compromises the
secrecy of the votes. Systems developers have chosen different ways of dealing with it
this problem:
• Make no change — Motivated by the argument that the election authority should
be trustworthy and can be depended upon not to leak this information. May be
acceptable in stable democracies but it seems that electronic voting should make
it impossible for an intimidating, hostile government to coerce voters39.
39This is merely a reflection and not within the scope of this thesis.
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• Add procedures — The motivation here is that procedures can be put in place to
minimise the risk of information being leaked. For example, if the ballot forms are
prepared and printed by the election authority this might be done on a “diskless
workstation” that has been put together by independently verified components
from a number of different sources and booted from a randomly selected Linux
distribution, all in the presence of observers from all participating political parties.
After the ballot forms have been printed the underlying information is destroyed.
• Distributed creation and on-demand printing — It has been shown how proba-
bilistic encryption schemes in re-encryption mix networks (see Section 2.3.6) can
be used to distributedly create the secret information needed resulting in a secret
that can only be “broken” if a number of parties with quite disparate interests
collude, providing safety in numbers. This secret is kept in its encrypted form
until it is printed within the booth in front of an individual voter. Unfortunately
this solution to the authority knowledge problem requires a substantial amount of
hardware: each polling station must have at least one ballot form printing device.
There are further problems described previously.
Chain of custody
Quite similar to the authority knowledge problem the chain of custody problem exists
when the secrecy of the election is based on a ballot form with secret content. However,
traditional paper-based schemes can in fact be said to be chain of custody systems [3]
because correct ballot forms must be printed and transported to polling stations, given
to voters, collected again, transported to counting facilities and finally counted properly
— all safeguarded by procedures rather than technology.
In electronic voting systems the main issue referenced as the chain of custody problem
is the transportation of pre-printed ballot forms from the printing facility to the polling
station. Anyone who is able to see the ballot form before they are turned into encrypted
receipts can circumvent all cryptography and find out the contents of a vote from the
information published after the end of the election. A number of procedural solutions to
this problem have been proposed, including the printing of a lottery-type scratch strip
over the ballot form identifier [82]. On-demand printing is also a suggested solution [85]
to the problem.
Chain voting
With an origin in traditional paper-based voting schemes, the chain voting attack is also
a problem that has the potential to be significantly magnified in an electronic voting
system. The traditional attack is possible in an election system where the ballot form
is a restricted resource. As an example let us assume that when the voter has identified
herself to poll station workers she is given exactly one ballot form. She is allowed to
go into the voting booth and when she emerges poll station workers are attempting to
make sure that she casts the form into the ballot box. Normally it is thus hard to leave
the polling station with a ballot form.
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The coercer who wishes to employ the chain voting attack must somehow smuggle
a valid ballot form out of the polling station, perhaps by posting some other piece of
paper into the ballot box. The coercer then fills out the ballot form to form a vote for
his preferred candidate(s) and approaches a voter. “If you use this ballot form and come
out with a new, blank one,” he says, “I will reward you.” The coerced voter goes into the
polling station, identifies herself, is given a ballot form and goes into the voting booth.
Here she takes out the ballot form given to her by the coercer and puts the new, blank
form in her pocket. When she emerges from the voting booth polling station workers
ensure she posts a ballot form in the ballot box.
When the voter comes out from the polling station with a blank form the coercer can
be quite sure that she has cast the ballot form he had given her in advance and he thus
rewards the voter. The voter may have spoilt the vote by drawing on the form but in
all likelihood she has at least been prevented from voting in accordance with her own
choices. When the coercer fills out this new blank form in the same fashion as previously
and approaches a new voter with the same offer, he has created a chain.
Consider electronic voting schemes that issue an encrypted receipt. If the voter is able
to smuggle a ballot form or an encrypted receipt out of the polling station he creates an
encrypted receipt of a vote for his preferred candidate(s) and gives it to the voter, noting
down the serial number and the marks on the receipt. Because of the voter verifiability
property of the electronic voting scheme the coercer can then check after the close of
the election that the voter has properly submitted his receipt as her vote. Previously
we saw that the voter could have spoilt the vote but in this case the coercer is given the
unfortunate power to check that the voter has complied.
Proposed solutions to the chain voting attack are mainly procedural:
• When the voter is given the ballot form the serial number is noted. When she
subsequently casts her vote it is checked that she is using the same ballot form.
• Ballot forms are locked into a large clipboard that is very hard to smuggle out of
the polling station. At the time of casting the vote poll station workers check that
the form has not been removed from the clipboard, which would be indicated by
a torn corner on the form40.
Randomisation attack
The randomisation attack is generally understood to be where a coercer entices a voter
to vote in a way that results in a receipt that looks in a specific way. For example, in
Preˆt a` Voter this may be to vote only for the candidate at the top of the form, resulting
in an encrypted receipt with a mark in the top position and no other marks. The coercer
has no way of knowing which candidate the voter has voted for but as the ballot form
is allocated to the voter randomly then the vote will also be for a random candidate.
A randomisation attack is thus where a vote is changed to a vote for a random can-
didate. If a certain number of votes are randomly (re)distributed this would benefit a
40This idea was presented by David Chaum at WOTE 2007 in Ottawa, Canada.
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candidate with a small number of original votes and certainly have a negative effect on
the number of votes given to candidates with a majority of the original votes.
In some electronic voting systems, particularly direct recording devices (DRE), the
voter interacts with a machine and tells it how she wants to vote. As the machine learns
the contents of the vote any malicious code running on that machine has an incentive
to try to change the vote. In other electronic voting schemes the machine never has the
opportunity to learn what candidate(s) the vote is for and even if it is able to change
the contents of the vote it cannot know what candidate it is removing a vote from and
to which candidate it is giving it. This is arguably a variant of a randomisation attack.
Denial of service attack
A denial of service attack can either be when someone is stopping a service provider
from providing its service or when a service provider is refusing to provide that service.
Systems distributed across the Internet are particularly vulnerable as in this context
the denial of service attack is most frequently constituted by a very large number of
requests being directed at one or more servers, drowning them in false requests and
stopping them from providing their service.
Some electronic voting schemes are vulnerable to denial of service attacks, in the first
instance because some systems are connected to the Internet. However, some systems
(for example Preˆt a` Voter, see Section 2.4.2) use a series of trusted parties that all
must provide a decryption service for the votes to be decrypted and become talliable.
Consider the case where such a trusted party plays along all the time through to the
decryption phase of the election and then simply refuses to do its job correctly.
There are many plausible solutions to the denial of service attack. For example, a
trusted party may in reality be made up of three different organisations working in
concert under a threshold crypography scheme. If one of these is unable to perform its
duty because of some accident or because it is performing a denial of service attack then
the two remaining can perform the necessary work without this lost party. A web bulletin
board is a particularly vulnerable Internet connected entity in the electronic voting
scheme and may be made robust using several boards using peer-to-peer technology to
share all published information quickly and efficiently.
The Italian attack
Although the origin of its name remains undetermined, the Italian attack [36, 108] is
possible in most election systems where the voter marks more than one choice. In order
to preserve vote and voter anonymity, most voting systems stipulate that a vote is spoilt
if any other mark is made on the form than the mark(s) required to indicate for which
candidate(s) the vote is cast. If this was not the case, a coercer might ask a voter to
sign his or her name on her ballot form, enabling the coercer to see the content of that
particular voter’s vote when the votes are subsequently counted in public. However,
there may be other ways in which the voter may “sign” a ballot form such that the only
one who can see this “signature” is the coercer.
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The Italian attack aims to “sign” a ballot form by repeating an unlikely voting pattern,
predetermined by the coercer, on a multi-choice ballot form. For example, in a Single
Transferable Vote (STV) election with many candidates and/or many races, the number
of possible ways a vote can be configured may be very large — enough so to allow a
coercer to assign unique permutations to quite a large number of coerced voters. When
the votes are subsequently counted in public, or, as in some places, even published, the
coercer can identify the ballot form assigned to a particular voter.
The coercer constructs the unique permutation given to a voter by first selecting the
candidate the coercer wishes to win and thereafter appending a unique series of choices.
In some instances, such as proposals by [36] and [108], the full permutation may not
be revealed for a ballot form and the coercer then selects a different strategy. Here the
coercer selects a unique permutation of candidates very likely to be eliminated first and
appends the candidate that he wishes to win. As the vote goes through the various
transfers more and more of these choices are revealed until the vote finally counts for
the coercer’s preferred candidate [90]. If it is possible to determine between what series
of candidates a particular vote is transferred, the signature permutation emerges and
the identification is trivial. However, although no proof is offered for this statement, it
intuitively seems that it may be possible to construct the permutation such that even a
statistical analysis of the transfers at various stages of the tallying process may reveal
the identity of a ballot form.
Everlasting privacy
One major theme in this thesis is the balancing act in the marriage of vote secrecy and
verifiability. Although it is important to be able to show at the time of the election
that the cryptography used in an electronic voting scheme is secure and thus ensures
that votes are not changed and that the anonymity of the votes is not threatened, this
is likely not enough to instill complete trust in voters and observers. The reason for
this is that some proof of the correct operation of the electronic voting system has to be
published and if the cryptography scheme in question had been broken, this proof would
either be meaningless and/or seriously threaten both the secrecy and the accuracy of
the election.
To illustrate the point, imagine an end-to-end verifiable electronic voting system that
might have been introduced ten years ago. Although this hypothetical system employed
state of the art cryptography, there may be “chinks in the armour” of that cryptography
scheme emerging among scientists. Now imagine that such a verifiable system was used in
an election 20 years ago and data about the election published at the time. (This data of
course replicated and stored in various repositories both by the state, observers and other
organisations.) It is now becoming quite possible that the scheme does not withstand
modern cryptanalysis or attacks by modern computer systems. Go back further, and
key lengths likely in use at that time soon become trivial for modern machines to break.
Now consider an end-to-end verifiable electronic voting system introduced and used
in an election today. It may be based on state of the art cryptography and use the
longest possible keys supported by modern computing, but it is impossible to say if,
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and if so when, the particular cryptographic scheme may be broken. In fact, it is not
impossible that the scheme is already broken: in cryptography we often have to rely
on probabilities. If it is secure today, then how long will it take before we consider it
insecure?
If we start by imagining something quite probable such as the phrase “the crypto-
graphy scheme and/or its keylength will be broken in 100 years” this implies that the
accuracy41 (that is to say how hard it is for someone to change votes without anyone
noticing) and secrecy of the electronic election will be completely ruined in 100 years.
This may not mean much to the candidates and political parties because they have been
(correctly) awarded their seats in the present. But many voters might worry about
what their grandchildren will think about them when they find out how they voted. In
most cases this probably does not deter a voter from following his or her own will, but
in some instances this may start to influence the group of candidates that the voter is
comfortable voting for42.
Now imagine that cryptanalysis is very fast these days and that may halve the expected
life span of the cryptography scheme in question to 50 years. This then means that the
voter’s children will find out and that the voter herself may well still be alive. Then
imagine that as the development of normal computers keeps going forward and faster
and faster machines are commonly available, the expected lifetime may again be halved
to 25 years. With supercomputing facilities available to states and many organisations,
we may have to limit the number of years we can hope for the scheme to be secure to
10 years. Then imagine that cryptanalysis on quantum computers soon may become
available and further reduce the effort needed to break the code.
We have now illustrated that voters may worry that even if the secrecy of the election is
guaranteed today, it may be broken tomorrow. This means that electronic voting systems
may have to be constructed in such a way as not to base the secrecy of the election on
the “unbreakability” of a cryptography scheme but on some other condition that will
(provably) never be broken. This is the concept of everlasting privacy introduced and
addressed by [59].
41Although it is rather too late to change the outcome of the election...
42This is only the case if encrypted votes are recorded against the names of voters in the published
election data. However, a coercer may require a photocopy of an encrypted receipt from the voter
and tell her that he will keep it until the cryptography is eventually broken.
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3 An implementation of Preˆt a` Voter
Building an implementation of an electronic voting system that has matured as much
as Preˆt a` Voter is important to test assumptions and scalability among other properties
of the system. This chapter is an attempt at passing on a large set of experiences from
this work ranging from the theoretical to the practical.
It is well known that implementing security mechanisms is very hard and our expe-
rience do not deviate: when we started building the first implemenation of Preˆt a` Voter
we had seen few implementations of paper-based, mixnet style electronic voting systems
and so much effort at the start of the project was spent on the translation of theory to
practice.
One issue that we focused on solving in this work has been that of implementing Single
Transferable Vote (STV). Implementing STV in Preˆt a` Voter requires that the candidate
list be completely permuted (not merely cyclicly shifted) and at the time of this work
there was no known setup of Preˆt a` Voter in which full permutations was supported
in re-encryption mixes1 (Section 2.3.6) and we were therefore forced to implement the
system using decryption mixes (Section 2.3.6). The contribution of this research has also
been in meeting various other quite difficult real-world election requirements: concurrent
polling stations, keeping a full paper trail, laying out a ballot form paper with a large
number of races and candidates and more, detailed in this chapter.
3.1 Introduction
The first version of the Preˆt a` Voter implementation was made specifically to enter the
International Student Electronic Voting Systems Competition (VoComp) [93] held in
Portland, Oregon in 2007.
The requirements for entry into VoComp remained in draft for several months and
all through the competition. However, it was clear that the objective for running the
competition was to encourage students and researchers in the electronic voting field to
make implementations of the systems that they work on. Four teams were selected and
took part in the final in Portland. It was made clear by the judges that their final
decisions were very hard to reach and although our team did not win the award for
overall best system, we did receive two others: “runner up” and Best System Design.
As part of a VoComp entry a team should try to run a (binding) student election, or if
necessary, some other election to test the system. Submission of papers detailing aspects
of the own system or analyses of competing systems were encouraged. The format of
the final itself was as follows:
1After this work several papers has been published on this topic, such as [36] and [108].
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1. Each team held a presentation of the own system and its strengths.
2. A demo session where judges and independent attendees were allowed to cast votes
and fill out questionnaires.
3. For each system all other teams presented a ten minute analysis after which the
defending team was given a 20 minute opportunity for rebuttal.
There were also invited and contributed talks given over the course of the three days.
The Preˆt a` Voter team was a joint team between University of Surrey and University
of Newcastle upon Tyne. From Surrey students (Joson) Zhe Xia, Phil Howard and David
Bismark (then Lundin) and advisors James Heather, Roger Peel and Steve Schneider
joined student Kieran Leach and advisor Peter Ryan from Newcastle. The development
meetings were held at Surrey and although some advice did come from Newcastle all the
code was eventually written in Surrey.
Another section in this chapter gives detail on the problems encountered and the
lessons learned from creating the implementation but it should be noted here that de-
velopment meetings were held weekly from October 2006 through to February 2007. As
this work progressed the team initiated discussions with the University of Surrey Stu-
dents’ Union (USSU) and it was negotiated that the Sabbatical elections 2007 would be
run on Preˆt a` Voter.
After the opening of the election and the casting of a few dozen ballots the decision
was taken by USSU to cancel the electronic voting and revert to a paper election. The
team discussed this with USSU but although it was unclear to the electronic voting team
the reasons behind the decision, the casting of electronic votes was discontinued.
USSU officials offered to use the pre-printed Preˆt a` Voter ballot forms to cast their
votes and the teams was given three hours the morning after the close of the election to
scan all these, which was also done. One property of the Preˆt a` Voter system is that it
asks the voter to clarify an encrypted receipt that it cannot understand or that does not
constitute a valid vote. The lack of these checks at the time of voting, when any mistakes
could be rectified by the voter, made it nearly impossible to make any useful inferences
from the scanned ballot forms. This was not necessarily because voters had spoilt their
votes but also because they did not adhere to the necessary marking requirements under
which the optical character recognition (OCR) would work.
3.2 Requirements
Although not part of VoComp, there were three important special requirements posed
by USSU:
1. Single Transferable Vote (STV) — The USSU elections use STV which means
that each voter ranks one or more candidates on the ballot form in the order they
would prefer them. In a number of rounds during the tally the weakest candidate is
eliminated and the votes distributed to the next choice in the list until a candidate
has gained a majority of the votes.
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2. Paper trail — USSU asked us to allow the original ballot forms to be placed in a
sealed ballot box so that they may be counted by hand after the election. This was
a requirement from the National Union of Students (NUS) to allow the electronic
voting trial to go ahead at the University of Surrey.
3. Remote voting via web interface — USSU was keen on using the electronic election
to encourage greater participation in the democratic process among the electorate.
After initially wishing for all voting to be done through a web interface they settled
on a requirement that those students on placement or otherwise unable to vote in
polling stations would be allowed to apply to do so remotely.
3.3 The system
The development of the system was driven by the requirements explained in Section 3.2.
In a reiterative fashion the group discussed the requirements and possible solutions to
these (which included inventions and the use of techniques already described theoreti-
cally) and the consequences of using any of these solutions. A discussion of the lessons
learned and the compromises necessary can be found in Section 3.5.
It was decided by the group that the nature of the system is such that all code written
as part of the project should be released under a suitable open source licence — the
release of code was also a requirement for entry to VoComp. Although some parts of
the system must be implementable in any programming language (for example in order
to be able to audit the mix network) this open source nature of the system indicated
that Java would be a suitable common programming language. As this was the language
most team members were familiar with it was decided that Java would form the basis of
the system. However, the feeling was that PHP supported by a MySQL database would
be more suitable to the simple serving of pages on a web server — both of these are also
open source projects.
3.3.1 The Java classes
During the first phase of the project, as the discussions on technical solutions where
only theoretical solutions existed were going on, work was done to specify the system
components. As all entitites in the system were to use Java it was only natural that the
ballot form would be encapsulated in a Java class hierarchy. A UML diagram of this
class hierarchy is shown in Figure 3.1. The requirements driving the development of this
hierarchy were:
1. Each printed ballot form has a single serial number (and barcode) but there may
be more than one race on the ballot form. This was represented by a ballot form
paper class which can contain any number of ballot forms.
2. Each ballot form has two parts: a candidate list (used in the creation of the ballot
forms) and a voting form where the voter’s choice(s) are stored.
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3. The candidate list and the voters’ choice(s) are both represented by a complete
permutation: the previous as a permutation of the index numbers from 0 (the
Permutation object) and the latter as a permutation of the symbols in question
(the CharacterPermutation object).
3.3.2 Networking
It was important to immediately implement support for the distributed mixing in Preˆt
a` Voter in the form of networking capabilities between the Java classes. The group
decided to use the native Java Remote Method Invocation (RMI) functionality. This
would allow the system to be set up on one machine or to be distributed over a network.
In Figure 3.2 is shown the following:
• The Web Bulletin Board acts as a server in most communication (except when it
itself connects to the Teller). The Web Bulletin Board has a database from which
it serves data as required to other components of the system and into which it
writes all data collected from the system.
• The Registry module allows a poll station worker to look up a voter in the
table of registered voters and this is done by the Registry module submitting
a voterLookup RMI call to the Web Bulletin Board which performs the search in
its database and returns the data necessary for the poll station worker to verify
the identity of the voter in the form of a Voter object. When this lookup has
been done, the poll station worker can either assign a ballot form to this voter or
cancel a form previously assigned. These operations are assignFormToVoter and
cancelFormForVoter respectively. Assigning a ballot form to a voter2 primes this
ballot form for submission in the database. The Web Bulletin Board will therefore
later accept a submission of this ballot form from the Booth module. If a voter
reveals the ballot form or makes a mistake, the ballot form can be cancelled, which
allows another form to be assigned to this voter. The Web Bulletin Board keeps a
record of all ballot forms in its database, providing a full audit trail of ballot form
assignments and cancellations. It goes without saying that a ballot form cannot
be assigned to more than one voter and that each voter can only be assigned one
ballot form.
• The Booth and Audit Machine modules are principally the same in that they both
run on a computer connected to the scanner(s) which reads in the right-hand side
of ballot forms. If the ballot form as submitted contains any voter-made mark the
Booth module is invoked and asked to submit the vote to the Web Bulletin Board
(postBallot), which it attempts in all cases except if the scanning and OCR
processes have failed, in which case it cancels the ballot form (cancelForm). If the
scanned ballot form contains no mark, this is treated as a ballot form audit and
2Keep in mind that this assignment is done on ballot form serial number and a property of Preˆt a`
Voter is that this does not leak the vote.
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Figure 3.1: Ballot form class diagram
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the serial number of the ballot form is submitted by the Audit Machine module
to the Web Bulletin Board (auditForm). This causes the Web Bulletin Board to
call each Teller in turn (audit) to reveal the values encrypted into the ballot form
onion and then return a Receipt object to the Audit Machine, which contains the
ordring of the candidates on the ballot form. This is printed and the voter is able
to compare the ballot form as it was given to her with the ballot form printed.
All the primitives etc required to truly verify the correct construction of the ballot
form are stored in the database and immediately available via the Website.
• The Remote Booth module builds on the Booth module and is used to connect
the Remote Voting Applet to the Web Bulletin Board.
• The Teller acts exclusively as a server and its duty is to implement a series of
secrecy and security requirements put in place by the organisation running a par-
ticular Teller3 to ensure that the secrecy and integrity of the election remains
intact. The Teller must therefore, for example, keep track of which ballot forms
it has agreed to audit during the election phase and subsequently not allow these
to be decrypted as part of the result tallying4. After the close of the election
the Web Bulletin Board is instructed to submit a batch of votes5 to the Teller
(processVote) which returns a once decrypted and shuﬄed batch of encrypted
votes. These are stored in the database and the batch is passed to the next Teller.
The return batch from the final teller contains the plaintext votes. When this has
been done the Web Bulletin Board audits each batch at each Teller6 by asking it
to reveal a set of links (reveal).
• The Administrator module is only run once and this is done before the start of the
election. The module is started on a so called diskless workstation, that is to say a
computer which lacks a hard drive or any other method of storing data, and used
to construct the ballot forms. The ballot form print run is output to a printer,
as seen in the UML diagram, and SQL inserts for the non-secret data are created
and stored on a memory stick. This is done in the presence of election auditors to
ensure that no secret data is stored, except in the form of printed ballot forms.
3.3.3 Teller
The Teller module must be treated as a black box where inputs in an exactly specified
format, i.e. batches of encrypted votes, are submitted to it and output in a similarly
3Remember that several Tellers are used in Preˆt a` Voter and that each must be run by a separate
organisation to ensure that a broad spectrum of views are represented.
4This is possible because the RSA onions as implemented always look the same when they arrive at the
Teller. Please note that because of time constraints this check has not currently been implemented.
5The system supports dividing the full batch of encrypted votes into smaller batches but this has so
far not been used.
6This process is actually started by the Web Bulletin Board collecting random values from the Tellers
in such a way that the bitwise XOR of these random values cannot be controlled by any one Teller
and is used as the indicator to what links shall be revealed.
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Figure 3.2: UML data flow diagram
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well-specified format, i.e. batches of encrypted votes, is returned. The reason for this
is that ideally several different implementations of the Teller module should be present
in a Preˆt a` Voter system and they should all be run by different organisations. It is
important that the Teller does not malfunction and the judged likelihood that in a set
of several different implementations of the module, at least one should perform its task
correctly, and without leaking any secret information, is high7.
The Teller’s main duty is to accept a batch of encrypted ballot forms from the Web
Bulletin Board, to remove its layer of encryption from each of these, to shuﬄe the full
batch and then return it to the Web Bulletin Board8. The Teller must remember the
permutation it has applied to the batch when it shuﬄed it9 so that it can subsequently
answer audit requests from the Web Bulletin Board to prove that it has not malfunctio-
ned or tried to do so (“cheat”). The Teller should keep track of which encrypted ballot
forms it helps to audit during the election phase and not allow these ballot forms to be
used in the voting because their secrecy is removed. It should also ensure that it is not
somehow tricked into revealing (leaking) any secret data, i.e. the permutation of the
ballot forms in the shuﬄe. Any such secret information that is revealed weakens the
secrecy of the election10 and as the secrecy of the election is based on at least one of the
Tellers functioning correctly without leaking any information, it is important that Tellers
are run by different organisations and that these implement the module themselves.
3.3.4 Web bulletin board
The Web Bulletin Board can “boot” in any election state and reads and validates this
state from the database at startup. This functionality has been put in place to ensure
that a Web Bulletin Board server freeze could be rectified simply and quickly with a
reboot11. The following describes the Web Bulletin Board as it has been implemented.
At the time of start-up the Web Bulletin Board reads in public keys of other system
components from its database and it accepts its private key from the operator. It then
starts its own server and binds it to the local RMI registry. The web bulletin board now
polls the Teller instances specified in the database12 and if they respond it performs a
handshake, meaning that the Teller is validated by the Web Bulletin Board using the
public key of the Teller stored in the database. If the handshake is successful the Web
Bulletin Board monitors the presence of the Teller and if this connection ever fails it
starts trying to reconnect until the connection has been resumed13.
7Dependent on the number of tellers of course but this number should be adjusted to achieve a desired
likelihood — in effect trading complexity (more tellers) for security (a larger number of tellers can
leak information before breaking the secrecy of the election).
8This is generally done twice for each batch and each Teller.
9One strategy for shuﬄing the encrypted ballot forms is actually to sort them by their newly revealed
encrypted values.
10Note that it does not necessarily weaken the integrity of the election
11Not that this has been necessary yet.
12These have been specified in the pre-election phase when the diskless workstation was run in the
presence of election observers.
13This may seem inefficient but remember that Preˆt a` Voter 2005 is based on decryption onions using
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In the database is also specified all the Registry, Booth and Audit Machine instances
that are able to connect to the Web Bulletin Board. These connect on demand and
a connection is not monitored by the Web Bulletin Board, but the credentials of each
connecting instance is checked at the start of each connection.
In the Web Bulletin Board GUI is also included options that allow the operator to
initiate the process that collects random values from the tellers which is used as the
decryption mask in the auditing of the mixing performed by the Tellers. The random
values are collected by the Web Bulletin Board as it asks each Teller in turn first for an
encrypted commitment to a random value and then for the value itself. The commit-
ments are published by the Web Bulletin Board before it starts asking the Tellers for
the cleartext values. These are then published as they are revealed by the Tellers. The
Tellers must thus commit to values before they are able to see the values given by the
other Tellers, ensuring that they cannot conspire to create a mask which would fail to
reveal cheating in the mix by the Tellers. Furthermore, the commitment is signed by
each Teller using its private key, making the process auditable. The mask is created by
doing an exclusive-or on the bits of all the random values collected by the Web Bulle-
tin Board. As the length of the random values collected by the Web Bulletin Board is
lower than the number of links to audit, the mask is repeated so that it includes all the
encrypted votes.
The Web Bulletin Board GUI also contains functionality to allow the operator to do
a (Single Transferable Vote) tally at the click of a button.
3.3.5 Registry
The Registry module is made up of a simple GUI in which the operator can enter a
University Registration Number (URN)14, causing the module to submit a voterLookup
request to the Web Bulletin Board. This returns information about the voter (if she is
a registered, eligible voter) which is displayed on the screen for the operator to verify.
If the operator accepts the eligibility of the voter she asks the voter to extract a ballot
form at random from a box in such a way that no-one, including the voter, can see the
contents of that, or any other, ballot form. The voter must then fold up the corner of
the form to allow the operator to see its serial number. The operator presses the button
in the Registry GUI which says “Assign ballot form” and an input box asks for the serial
number of the form. Submitting this causes the module to call the Web Bulletin Board
(assignFormToVoter), asking it to assign the ballot form to this particular eligible voter.
This means that the ballot form can be used to vote and that the ballot form cannot
be assigned to any other voter at a subsequent stage. A complete audit trail is kept
in the Web Bullein Board’s database and it will not allow a vote to be entered into
its database without it first being assigned by poll station staff to an eligible voter.
This does arguably only give any form of election integrity if we trust that the election
RSA and thus for all election-phase auditing and for the final decryption the tellers must be online.
14This version of the system was built specifically to handle a University of Surrey Students’ Union
election but the search term could be substituted for any other term available in the database of
eligible voters.
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authority does not maliciously assign forms to voters and submit votes in their names
but to combat this threat it is possible in Preˆt a` Voter to publish the complete list of
voters who have voted after the close of the election together with their encrypted votes
without this threatening the secrecy of the election15.
If the voter accidentally spoils the ballot form and realises this before it is scanned
and submitted, the voter can return to the poll station worker who uses the GUI to
cancel the ballot form (cancelFormForVoter) on the Web Bulletin Board16. This adds
the cancellation to the audit trail, ensuring that the ballot form cannot be used to vote.
This in turn makes it possible to assign another ballot form to the same voter which
was previously assigned this ballot form. Depending on the polling station procedures
the cancelled ballot form is either shredded, given to the voter to take home or placed
in a sealed box and a new form is assigned using the previous procedure.
3.3.6 Booth
The Booth module is implemented in Java and and is loaded on a computer in the
polling station. When a ballot form has been scanned this data is submitted by the
Booth module to the Web Bulletin Board (postBallot) and it receives back a Java
object of type Receipt. This contains either an error report which is printed and given
to the voter, indicating any reason why the vote could not be submitted or an encrypted
receipt which is printed and given to the voter. The encrypted receipt is digitally signed
by the Web Bulletin Board and is taken away by the voter for her to use to check the
correct inclusion of her vote in the final tally after the end of the election.
If the Booth is able to read some data (specifically the ballot form serial number) but
fails in some other part of the process, it performs a cancellation of the form on the
Web Bulletin Board (cancelForm) which returns a “cancellation receipt” that the user
keeps. The voter is given a new ballot form by the poll station staff when showing the
cancellation receipt — and the Registry module allows the voter to be assigned a new
ballot form when the old one has been cancelled.
3.3.7 Audit Machine
For practical reasons the Audit Machine module is run on the same laptop as the Booth
module although it has been developed in such a way that it can be deployed separately
from the latter. If a ballot form is scanned without any voter-made marks detected on
it, the Audit Machine module is invoked and this makes a request to the Web Bulletin
15This only holds as long as the cryptography does. Please see Section 2.4.7 for a discussion.
16In the literature it is envisaged that the Web Bulletin Board only acts as a method of publishing
scanned votes that are to be counted. However, we have opted to also use it as a repository for
encrypted ballot form data, specifically the contents of the onions. This means that a reference to
this data can be printed on the paper ballot form rather than complete onion as envisaged in the
early literature. We also charge the Web Bulletin Board with keeping track of cancelled ballot forms
in order to stop cancelled ballot forms from going back into circulation. If such a form was used to
cast a vote this would be picked up after the close of the election but in this setup we are able to
prevent such mistakes.
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Board (auditForm) for the ballot form to be opened by the Tellers. This causes the
Web Bulletin Board to pass the onion(s) of the ballot form to the tellers in order. These
perform the decryption of their layers of encryption and return the secret values needed
to recreate the onion. All this is stored on the Web Bulletin Board and immediately
becomes available on the Website but the Web Bulletin Board returns to the Audit
Machine module simply a receipt which recreates the order of candidates on the original
ballot form. The voter is able to match the two forms and thus gain proof of the ballot
form being correctly formed.
As the ballot form has been audited and all its secret information revealed it cannot
be used to cast a vote. Instead the Web Bulletin Board allows another ballot form to
be assigned to the voter as the audit trail shows that the original ballot form has been,
in effect, cancelled.
The receipt which shows the order of the candidates is signed by the Web Bulletin
Board and therefore the values published on the Website can be used to recreate the
order of the candidates and this can be compared to the original ballot form (signed by
the Administrator module) as well as the audit receipt.
3.3.8 Website
The Preˆt a` Voter Website module contains functionality17 for any interested party to
download election information or perform a check on a particular encrypted receipt.
The Website works against a non-secret, public database, into which data from the
Web Bulletin Board database is exported. No secret information is held in the original
database so this division has been made simply to make the Web Bulletin Board more
robust to hacking and denial of service attacks.
A voter who has an encrypted receipt can enter the serial number of this ballot form
on the Website and see a depiction of the encrypted receipt such as it is stored in the
database. The voter can compare the ballot form as it is shown online with the signed
encrypted receipt which she holds in her hand. This comparison ensures that the vote
which is counted on behalf of that voter after the close of the election is the vote that
she cast18.
A voter who has audited a ballot form can bring up the details of this ballot form by
typing in its serial number on the Website. This includes the order of the candidates
in all the races on the ballot form as well as all the values used to create the onion(s).
Anyone with the technical knowledge, or some third-party software, can check that
these values do “add up” to the correct ballot form candidate order. The purpose of
17Although not completely functional at the time of writing.
18Strictly the act of comparing these alone does not ensure this: but if the public verification of the
system is performed correctly then this check on the input to the mix network ensures that the
correct decrypted vote is in the batch of decrypted votes. Furthermore, in order to ensure that no
trust has to be placed in the election authority, which runs the Web Bulletin Board, the complete
list of all encrypted votes and the mix network should be distributed to several other organisations
who publish this data and allows voters to check for the inclusion of their correctly formed vote in
the data set that is under the control of this third party organisation.
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this exercise is to instill, in the voters, trust that the ballot forms, although all different,
are all correctly formed and using them ensures that their votes are not only correctly
counted but also verifiable.
3.4 Testing and trials
3.4.1 Newcastle trial 2008
A trial was held at Newcastle University in Newcastle-upon-Tyne on the 13th of May
2008. The purpose of the trial was to evaluate an electronic voting system from a
usability perspective as part of the joint AROVEv project at Newcastle University,
London City University and Toulouse University in France.
The election
In order to entice random people to vote in the election and make it worth while to
fill out quite lengthy questionnaires, the main race on the ballot form was which of
three charitable organisations would get the available pot of money. Two more races
were printed on the ballot form and were questions relating to the voter’s confidence in
electronic voting systems. The three charities were Barnardo’s, Oxfam and UNICEF.
Each charity was invited to send campaigners who would work to get people to vote and
to vote for their charity.
Room layout
Outside the polling station that had been set up in a very large room close to ground
level in a building at Newcastle University were a number (namely three) representatives
of the invited charities and they asked passers-by to enter the polling station and take
part in the trial so as to secure an amount of money for the charity without giving
anything other than a few minutes of their time.
When the voter entered the polling station she immediately encountered a “registra-
tion desk” where she was briefed by officials from the trial. They informed the voters
that they should first fill in a short pre-voting questionnaire before voting and then
verifying their vote (the latter if they wanted to, this was voluntary). Finally they were
asked to fill out a longer post-voting questionnaire and, if they felt so inclined, leave their
contact details so that officials could get hold of them the following day for a follow-up
interview. Note that very few people agreed to take part in such an interview.
Issues
A number of voters left the voting booth either without detaching the left hand side
candidate list from the right hand side of the ballot form or without destroying the
previous. A number of people appeared to have found that they could only safeguard
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the secrecy of their votes by taking the candidate list with them as they might not have
trusted the available method of destroying the list.
Some people who had not “clicked” that the protected receipt does not leak the
contents of the vote because the candidate list is in a random order were keen to put the
protected receipt upside down on the scanner so that its content would not be visible
to the attendant at the scanning station. We believe it would be beneficial to include
in the instructions on how to vote a single sentence that says that the protected receipt
resulting from the splitting of the form does not show the contents of the vote.
Technical issues
Using scanners. It is unreasonable to expect people who have never seen the scanning
equipment19 to immediately be able to use it. Therefore an attendant is required to help
with the alignment of the receipt on the scanner, starting the scanning process and so
forth. The presence of an attendant and that this attendant is able to see the protected
receipt made some people uncomfortable — but interestingly it was very easy to explain
to people that the vote is not revealed by the protected receipt and that the attendant
could therefore not learn anything from seeing this.
Pre-election testing. In preparation for the election a new ballot form had to be
constructed and this is, in this version of the system, a fairly complicated procedure.
However, the new ballot form was printed and the optical character recognition (OCR)
software was adjusted to be able to read this form. Before going to Newcastle there were
a number of ballot forms fed through and the success rate was 100% both for votes and
for audit. The hour before the election further tests were made in the polling station
with a 100% success rate. However, minutes before the opening of the election scan
errors started to occur and soon no ballot forms could be read at all. After lengthy
search and consulting with other developers, it was determined that two parameters
specifying where the OCR software should look for the barcode on the ballot form had
not been changed although the barcode had moved a very short distance on the new
ballot form. If the ballot form is completely clean in the area between the old barcode
position and the new position this would not cause any problems. However, if there
was a stray pixel, a tiny smudge or crease in this area the OCR of the barcode would
fail. Finding and rectifying this problem unfortunately took two hours after which the
election could start.
Lessons
The purpose of the trial was for Human Computer Interaction (HCI) researchers to
gather statistical data on the use of an electronic voting system (i.e. Preˆt a` Voter).
Unfortunately there seems to have been some problem with the way this statistical data
19Although the equipment used was off-the-shelf HP printer/scanners that the general public may well
recognise.

Chapter 3. An implementation of Preˆt a` Voter
was collected and it was reported that the data was not useful. However, from a usability
perspective a number of lessons could be drawn simply from running the test election:
• Enticing members of the public to cast (honest) votes in a trial election is difficult
but offering charities part of a sizeable pot of money in return for their campaigning
in the vicinity of the polling station seems to be quite effective in drawing people
in. The charities have an opportunity to earn a lot of money for their cause in
a few hours work — work quite similar to that which they normally undertake.
Voters are able to contribute to a good cause simply by donating ten minutes of
their time and do not have to give money directly. At the same time, if there
are several different charities in the race, voters feel the election is quite real (as
opposed to, say, voting for their favourite cartoon character) since the winning
charity will benefit. This sense of “reality” also entices voters to follow protocol,
which in Preˆt a` Voter terms perhaps mainly refers to hiding the ballot form, tearing
it and destroying the left hand side.
• The current version of the Preˆt a` Voter implementation was without any problem
able to handle a fairly large number of printer/scanners, decryption and mixing
etc on a single laptop, keeping the cost of running a polling station to a minimum.
More lessons are enumerated in Section 3.5.
Summary
The trial at Newcastle in 2008, although failing to provide the desired statistical data,
was useful and this is a highly recommended way of running non-binding trials of elec-
tronic voting systems on a small scale.
3.4.2 Demonstrations
After the completion of the first implementation of Preˆt a` Voter it has been demonstrated
at a number of occasions, including:
• Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (WOTE) 2007, Ottawa, Canada
• International Student Electronic Voting Systems Competition (VoComp) 2007,
Portland, Oregon, USA
• Frontiers of Electronic Voting 2007, Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany
• Vote-ID 2007, Bochum, Germany
The two main comments received at these occasions were regarding the usability of
the system, more precisely the following two aspects:
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• The optical character recognition (OCR) of the voter’s mark(s) on the ballot form
was dependent on the voter filling out the form using seven segment display type
symbols, something that some categories of voters may find hard not only to
understand but also to execute. Furthermore, the OCR process was rather fragile
and often misinterpreted the voter’s mark(s) (leading to a re-vote) or was unable
to interpret them at all.
• The pre-printed ballot form that is filled out, turned into an encrypted receipt
and then scanned into the system as a vote is unfortunately very hard to use in
systems with large number of races or candidates, i.e. in constituencies with very
large ballot forms. Many countries around the world do have very large ballot
forms and several politicians have expressed a disappointment with the fact that
the hardware requirements would prohibit their use of Preˆt a` Voter.
More lessons are enumerated in the next section.
3.5 Problems
This section contains descriptions of the problems encountered in making the Preˆt a`
Voter implementation, possible solutions and alternatives.
3.5.1 Single Transferable Vote
Practically, First Past The Post (FPTP) is much easier to scan in and interpret than
Single Transferable Vote (STV). We looked at a number of different methods of construc-
ting the ballot form so that it could be reliably scanned in and translated into the correct
electronic representation.
One early suggestion was of a grid where the candidates are named in permuted order
on the y axis and each position, i.e. first, second, third and so on, were listed on the
x axis. The voter would tick one candidate in each of the positions and this would be
scanned in. We concluded that this would be too confusing for the voter.
The group also explored different ways of allowing the voter to input her choices
through a computer based interface. This would include the ballot form being aligned
onto a screen within the voting booth. On the ballot form would be printed the candidate
list and a machine readable onion or serial number — simply a bar code. The voter
would then be able to on the computer drag and drop the words “first (1st)”, “second
(2nd)” and so forth next to each candidate on the paper candidate list. The computer
in the booth would then submit to the web bulletin board the ballot form serial number
together with the choices made, print a receipt and the voter could shred the candidate
list.
This method seemed very promising as it would assist the voter, be accessible and in
essence could be the same in the voting booth as it would be online for those voting
remotely. However, in this implementation each polling station would require a number
of booths, each equipped with a computer, a barcode scanner and a printer. As the
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USSU elections were to take place in four polling stations around campus this would
require quite a lot of equipment at a fairly high cost. Furthermore, this setup would also
require the voters to handle indirection, that is to say the association of each candidate
to a symbol (such as a letter or number) and then the marking of this symbol elsewhere,
something we were keen to avoid.
We finally made experiments with a paper based ballot form where the ranking was
made using a seven segment display, quite similar to that of digital clocks. This method
made it possible to have only one computer, one scanner and one printer in each polling
station as the voters were able to fill out their forms in secret in booths before scanning
them in. The seven segment display would aid Optical Character Recognition (OCR) of
the contents of the vote. The experiments went well in that scanning and OCR errors
were few and this was therefore selected as the input method.
As a result of this method of accepting the voter’s choices into an electronic form the
OCR had to be done at the time of scanning, a receipt must printed with those choices
and the voter given the opportunity to check this receipt and reject it if was not the
same as the intended vote. This check could be done in public as the candidate list had
been removed and it was a matter of checking that the system had correctly interpreted
the vote. In our implementation the voter checked the receipt and if it did not match
the intended vote, the ballot form was cancelled and the voter issued another form.
3.5.2 Four concurrent polling stations
In order to deal with a number of concurrent polling stations where all eligible voters
were able to cast their vote in either one we built a registration module which would
connect to the central database and assign a particular ballot form to a particular voter.
If this form would be voided or cancelled for any reason it was possible for the poll
station worker manning this module to cancel the first and assign another form. The
operator used the voter’s University Registration Number (URN) to search for the voter
and then typed in a ballot form serial number to assign the form to that voter. The
result of this is that when a voter correctly identified herself at a polling station she
would be able to cancel any previously cast vote and cast another, making it impossible
to vote twice.
3.5.3 Full permutations rather than cyclic shifts
Original Preˆt a` Voter [76, 20] uses cyclic shifts (although full permutations are possible
and fully envisaged) and in Preˆt a` Voter 2006 [85] this cyclic shift makes it possible
to inject the voter’s choice into the onion before it is passed through the re-encryption
mix network. As the choice is injected into the onion this means that the onions in a
batch cannot be partitioned according to the attached choice. Unfortunately, we have
not discovered a way to inject the permutation that represents the voter’s choice in
STV into the onion in this way. Instead this choice must pass through the mix network
together with the associated onion and thus these may be partitioned according to the
attached choices.
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If the candidate list is only cyclicly shifted then it is possible to use data on logically
consistent votes (for example by looking at the popularity of the candidates in opinion
polls) and try to match this information to the choices in a receipt. If a match between
the first three candidates for example is made with the voter’s “1”, “2” and “3”, then
it can be determined with high probability that the vote is for those candidates in that
order. This matching is possible because the order and distance between candidates in
the shifted candidate list does not change with the cyclic shifts and therefore the voter’s
marks might only correspond to a single, logically consistent vote.
To combat this we were not able to use cyclic shifts but had to use full permutations.
This in turn meant that we could not use the re-encryption mix network of Preˆt a` Voter
2006 but had to revert to the decryption mix network of original Preˆt a` Voter. The latter
suffers both from the chain voting and the administrator knowledge problems [90].
3.5.4 Paper trail
In Preˆt a` Voter as defined by the literature the voter is allowed to leave with the right
hand half of the ballot form as an encrypted receipt. When this half had to be left in
a ballot box this meant we were required to print another receipt for the voter to take
away.
The process thus became as follows:
1. The voter is assigned a ballot form
2. The voter fills out the ballot form in secret and detaches the two halves
3. The encrypted receipt is scanned
4. A receipt is printed
5. The voter checks that this receipt is correct
6. If it is correct then the voter staples the two halves back together and these are
put in the ballot box20
3.5.5 Allowing the vote to be spoilt
Something that appears to have been overlooked by many constructors of electronic
voting systems is the (arguably) democratic right to spoil a vote. In order not to
comply when being subject to the chain voting attack for example, the voter’s last
resort is to void the ballot by making some mark on it or filling it out erroneously. In
some places around the world voters take this opportunity to perhaps “send a message
of discontent” rather than casting a vote. Furthermore, in countries where voting in
20Please note that this step is necessitated by the USSU requirement that a human readable audit trail
exist against which the electronic voting system can be checked — it is a serious threat to election
secrecy and should therefore be removed as soon as confidence in the system has been established.
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elections is compulsory (such as Australia) voters may take the “right” to spoil their
vote without anyone knowing quite seriously.
However, in our implementation we used OCR and had to make sure that what the
machine interpreted is what the voter intended. This OCR thus had to take place
immediately after the scanning of the ballot form and a receipt printed which the voter
was able to check against her own ballot form half. This meant that the OCR software
had to communicate to the voter that it had received something that did not make sense.
Also, it would disregard marks outside the voting grid itself that might void the ballot
form in other circumstances and only interpret the numbers within the grid21.
3.5.6 More than one race on a ballot paper
The USSU election for which the implementation would first be put in use had seven
races: president, four vice-presidents and two referenda. Traditionally, and for the sake
of simplicity, all current races have always been printed on the same ballot form. In
Preˆt a` Voter the form consists of a candidate list to the left and a grid for the voter to
insert the choice to the right. In the implementation we had to have seven such forms
on a single piece of paper. Because of the small number of candidates in each race this
was in fact possible.
In order to cope with this we had to add one level of abstraction: that, which popularly
is a ballot form, became a ballot form paper, consisting of seven ballot forms. Each of
these ballot forms would have its associated onion and so forth, but be referenced by a
single serial number, that of the ballot form paper. When a voter was assigned a ballot
form by a clerk this in fact meant assigning a ballot form paper. When the polling
station software would submit the vote to the web bulletin board it would do so with
one serial number (that of the paper) and seven permutations representing one vote in
each race.
We devised the system such that when a vote was submitted in this fashion each
permutation would be assigned to its ballot form in the database. In the decryption
and tallying phases no reference would again be made to which paper a ballot form
might have been printed on, which meant that the simplicity of original Preˆt a` Voter
was regained in these phases.
3.5.7 Partition according to number of choices
Another way that the votes may be partitioned as they go through the decryption mix
network is by the number of choices the voter has made. To comply with the general
principle of STV the voter must be able to rank any subset of all the candidates available.
Some voters may prefer to give support to only one candidate while others may rank all.
The batches of onion rank pairs can be partitioned according to the number of choices
21In order to allow a voter to spoil the vote we discussed the possibility of inserting a STOP TRANS-
FERRING candidate in each race, which, whenever given the first rank by a voter, would lead to
the vote not being tallied. This would also be a solution to the partitioning of the votes according
to the number of choices made by the voter, see Section 3.5.7.

3.6. Summary
made. Any such information leaks have a negative impact on ballot secrecy and should
be avoided.
The solution that we discussed but because of time constraints did not implement was
to include a STOP TRANSFERRING candidate (just as in Section 3.5.5) in the list.
The voter would then make her choices and when she is finished continue ranking all the
other candidates randomly, but starting with the STOP TRANSFERRING candidate.
Alternatively this can be done automatically.
If the rest of the candidates are ranked randomly (but no votes are transferred to
them because the STOP TRANSFERRING candidate appears before them) then the
receipt will not be exactly the same as the voter filled it in. Although it is possible to
explain why this is, this certainly makes it less straightforward for the voter to see why
the receipt encrypts her vote.
3.6 Summary
Developing the first implementation of Preˆt a` Voter has been an amazing journey: from
a series of theoretical papers to a first version system which has proven itself to be quite
usable. The gap between theory and practice is immense but bridging it satisfying.
In our work with this version of the Preˆt a` Voter implementation we have focused on
the issues relating to implementing STV elections in electronic voting systems and our
contribution here is to the understanding of this problem. Other practical issues that
we have looked into is the problem of having a large number of races and candidates in
a paper-based system (this is explored further in Chapter 5).
3.7 Contribution
This chapter is a case study into the implementation of an end-to-end verifiable elec-
tronic voting system. We found that because of the Italian attack, implementing Single
Transferable Vote in a system where the secrecy of the vote is based on a cyclic shift,
such as Preˆt a` Voter, is impossible without decreasing the coercion resistance of the
system significantly. The case study also focuses on practical aspects of implementing a
verifiable voting system in the form of often difficult and unforeseen requirements from
the organisation holding the election. In this case this was in the form of the requirement
to keep the original ballot forms as a paper audit trail and the requirement to run four
concurrent polling stations where voters are allowed to choose any one.
We also gave some detail in this chapter on our exploration of the possibility of inten-
tionally spoiling a ballot form, which is important for the system’s coercion resistance
as well as to those voters who do not wish to cast a vote but who are required to do so
by law.
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3.8 Future directions
The next version of the system must aim at implementing Preˆt a` Voter 2006, the re-
encryption mix network version. This setup is more advanced in the theoretical security
and accuracy features that it provides but uses cryptography which is more complicated
to implement in the way envisaged in the theory. There is no doubt, however, that the
next version of the system will not only be very usable but will also be based on the
most recent results in end-to-end verifiable electronic voting systems research.

4 Component based electronic voting
systems
4.1 Introduction
It appears that each researcher in the field of Electronic Voting Systems contributes to
some particular aspect but re-builds the whole system when they wish to implement
this rather specific contribution. The idea presented in this chapter is that in order to
build an e-voting system we simply add certain distinct pieces together — and in order
to improve on a particular system we swap one distinct piece for another that fits into
the same slot. In short, we are proposing that we start thinking about electronic voting
systems as being component based.
A benefit of this thinking is that for each component slot, i.e. a place in a layer
where a component of the system can be slotted in, it is possible to define the method
of assessing the computational complexity of that component as well as performing a
threat analysis. Similarly, if we agree that all components of an electronic voting system
should be verifiable and/or auditable then it is possible in this configuration to define
for each component a method of verification or audit. When an author then makes
changes to one or more components it is possible to in effect “re-run” checks on those
components or to employ the same verification method on a different component.
4.1.1 Domains captured
As the reader goes through the description of the different layers, she may realise that the
components in those layers are not strictly components from a computer systems design
perspective. Instead, the components capture the full spectra of the design and imple-
mentation of an electronic voting system — in other words they capture the following
domains:
• Computer system domain
• Human (user/voter) domain
• Legislative domain
We do not make distinctions between components in the hierarchy that we propose,
that is to say that we do not treat components from different domains differently. To
a developer of electronic voting schemes this will be perfectly natural as her overview
of the system is total. When she considers all the components then they must all fall

Chapter 4. Component based electronic voting systems
into place and completely make up the (correct) system. In fact, it is the duty of the
developer to ensure that a component that is put forward does fulfill all the requirements
on that component.
Others may look differently on the component based electronic voting system. A pro-
grammer (implementer) may look only at those components that are implementable in
software. Similarly someone who might be consulted on the legal implications on the
configuration of an electronic voting system may only consider components from the le-
gislative domain. Both these nontechnical developers are examples of people who must
be able to trust that the system as a whole depends on each of their respective compo-
nents and that the configuration of their components are reflections of the requirements
and conform to the restrictions of those same components.
4.1.2 Cascading changes
When a system is considered to be component based we believe that changes can easily
cascade down the different layers, all the way down to the implementation. In a trivial
sense this might simply be that when the developer changes the structure of a component
this automatically becomes a list of changes for the implementer to make in the actual
code. However, it is easy to see that changes made to one component will only result
in changes to the implementation of that same component and not to surrounding or
distant components, restricting the work needed to implement the changes.
4.1.3 Discussion on the reach of the proposed methodology
The scheme proposed here is an extension of that published as [52], which has been
a foundation to schemes such as that proposed by Popoveniuc and Vora [70]. This
scheme is offered as is and it is conceded that it is not in a complete form. The ideas
presented here (such as the proposed components and the domains into which they fall
and that the model captures, the relationships between those components and the types
of relationships components may have) are in some cases not fully explored and require
further research before being fully functional.
For example, the types of relationships shown in Figure 4.1 have proven hard to use
in the examples given in this chapter and may have to be reconsidered (such as has been
done in [70]). This is why they are not used in the example — but the examples are
still given to help show the foundation that this chapter hopes to give to component
based electronic voting systems. Similarly, the example decomposition of the Punchscan
system in Section 4.4.1 is given as a precursor to a more in-depth analysis that may
become possible in the future.
4.2 Component hierarchy
We suggest that an electronic voting system is made up of parts from four comparatively
separable and distinguishable layers, each of which builds on the services provided by a
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Table 4.1: Layers and components
Layer Components
Human layer Voter registration
Ballot form configuration
Polling station layout and management
Verifiability front-end
Election layer Election method
Election management system
Voter-ballot box communication channel
Computational layer Cryptography scheme
Anonymisation strategy
Tallying procedure
Physical layer Hardware authentication method
Publishing strategy
Transfer method
lower level layer. We propose to name these layers of the model as follows:
1. Human layer
2. Election layer
3. Computational layer
4. Physical layer
The physical layer enables the reading in of voter choices and the transfer and publi-
shing of the same. The computational layer contains that which is chiefly encapsulated
in software and which relies on the physical services of the lower level. The election level
encapsulates all those options and configurations relating to the election system being
implemented by the two lower levels. Finally the human layer deals with those aspects
of the electronic voting system which face the voters.
The layers and components are shown in Table 4.1. We will now go through these
layers from the bottom up so as to first provide a solid foundation and then explain how
all the aspects of electronic voting systems may fit into this model.
4.2.1 Physical layer
The physical layer supports all other layers with a physical (or semi-physical, see below)
infrastructure to facilitate different hardware based aspects of the system. We divide
the physical layer into the following components:
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Hardware authentication method
The different physical components of the electronic voting system must, in some cases,
be identified using some authentication strategy, for example an asymmetric key pair
and a public key infrastructure (PKI) with established trust among voters.
Publishing strategy
Voter verifiable electronic voting systems depend on the information that voters need to
perform the verification being delivered to them in a way that they can trust. An obser-
vation is that a single source may be an unreliable publishing strategy but a combination
of web sites, newspapers and other independent outlets may be more reliable.
Transfer method
All electronic voting systems capture some information from the voters and transfer it
to some repository, be it central or distributed, before the information is interpreted and
tallied. In this slot fits methods for transporting such digital information from polling
stations to such repositories, for example Secure Socket Layer (SSL)1 over the Internet
or storage on flash drives that are manually distributed.
4.2.2 Computational layer
In the computational layer are defined all the components that are performed explicitly
by software. These include the following components:
Cryptography scheme
The cryptography scheme employed probably underpins much of the operation of other
components in this layer so there is an intra-layer dependence. However, the cryp-
tography scheme is more easily defined in its own component after which the other
components of this layer (and others that may rely on it, although restricting the use
of the cryptography scheme to the computational layer only would greatly simplify the
definition of a scheme in this model) may refer to it. One example of this may be where
the cryptography scheme employed is Elgamal and re-encryption mix networks are used
as anonymisation strategy in that component.
Anonymisation strategy
Electronic voting schemes that are both “receipt free” and voter verifiable must use some
anonymisation strategy to break the link between an encrypted receipt and the plain
1By choosing to consider SSL part of the physical layer in our model, we are able to reduce the
complexity of higher layers. It is acknowledged that other models may not place SSL in the physical
layer.
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text vote2. This strategy is captured in this component although it most likely is heavily
dependent on the cryptography scheme defined in the previous. However, in some cases
the anonymisation scheme may rely on “any” cryptographic scheme and so changing the
cryptography scheme component does not necessarily interfere with the anonymisation
strategy component. One example of where this is true is where the anonymisation
strategy is a re-encryption mix network. It is logical that the cryptography scheme may
be Elgamal or Paillier and one scheme may be removed and the other slotted in without
this requiring the anonymisation strategy to change.
Tallying procedure
The tallying procedure component is simply an encapsulation of the procedure and
software that performs the tallying of the decrypted votes. This may seem like a trivial
component at first glance but when the component properties that we introduce below
are considered it appears that a verification strategy and computational complexity
analysis for example is done better across this component than across some external
“election administration” software3.
4.2.3 Election layer
This layer is very much derived from the laws that govern the election. It seems likely
that when this layer is implemented it may result in some components not being turned
into code and others may be external software. As an example of the latter we can
take that the implementation of a component may actually be a formal specification of
a piece of software that can successfully audit an election. This is then published and
any number of interested parties may write their own piece of software.
The election layer consists of the following components:
Election method
This component contains a specification of the election method that is used. If the model
is scrutinised as a whole it may be beneficial to have in one part of it the specification
of the election at such a high level.
Election management system
All schemes require an election to be set up by some clerks or civil servants — or
politicians or some trusted third party. This component is, much like the previous,
2Schemes that use the homomorphic property of an underlying cryptographic scheme to tally wi-
thout doing decryption simply breaks the link between encrypted votes and tally without presenting
decrypted votes.
3We note here that it is hard, if not impossible, to place cryptography in its own component — in this
case the tallying algorithm may, in some systems that do not first decrypt votes into plain text, be
highly dependent on the cryptography scheme used.
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incorporated into the model for completeness although it does require to communicate
with other components.
Voter-ballot box communication channel
This may seem like a much more low-level component but in fact it is included in this
layer to enable high-level definition of the secrecy of the election. In other words it is
possible to describe here the full procedure that the voter goes through to cast a vote in
a way that is understood not only by the developers of the system but also the general
public. This definition may then be used as reference when other components at lower
levels in the model are composed.
4.2.4 Human layer
Although some components in the previous layer have become human readable and in
fact only serve to further the understanding of the lower layers (or, arguably, define the
lower layers in a human readable way, which then cascades down) this layer deals with
all those aspects of the electronic voting system that are facing the voter. Therefore the
components we expect to find in this layer are:
Voter registration
The procedure for and timing of voter registration along with the criteria that makes a
voter eligible to register are all enshrined in the law relevant to the use of the implemen-
tation of the modelled system. They are included in the model in this component so as
to provide completeness. As mentioned in Section 4.1 the completeness of the system is
entrusted to the electronic voting system developer and so a change in this component
must trigger any necessary changes to other components — and these may of course be
components that are eventually implemented in code.
Ballot form configuration
The ballot form configuration is very important in any electronic voting system and
it seems likely that this component has links to other components, for example the
cryptography component in the computational layer.
Polling station layout and management
This is another component that is directly derived from the applicable national and
regional legislation. If the component is precise, by which we mean it is directly derived
from legislation which sets out exactly the layout and management, then this may dictate
the configuration of other components in the model. If it on the other hand is permissive
then this would imply that only a few guidelines are given and that if necessary the layout
and management of polling stations may be adapted to suit the electronic voting system.

4.3. Component properties
Verifiability front-end
To present a unified verifiability front-end to voters and concerned groups, this com-
ponents acts to capture the requirements of such a front-end at a high level and thus
restrict other components that must comply therewith.
4.2.5 Component interaction
As has now become abundantly clear it is impossible to make all components of an
electronic voting system fully autonomous — and we simply are not striving to do that.
Instead, by making each component as distinct and autonomous as possible and then
providing links between components we can reach some compromise between all the
good properties brought by a component based model and the necessity of component
interaction.
The links we propose are not communication links as such, in fact we regard the
communication between different implemented components to be modelled at a lower
level. This is supported by the fact that only some components at this level of abs-
traction are implemented and only some of those communicate — in fact some of these
components become entangled in an implementation, for example the cryptography com-
ponent which is used in an implementation of the anonymisation strategy component in
the computational layer.
The component links that we propose are of only two kinds and each link is a unidirec-
tional vector. The link carries some fact attached to it and it either defines a restriction
by one component on another or a permission given by one component to another.
The links are not very complex and can easily be illustrated in a graph, an example
of which is shown in Figure 4.1. If the underlying fact or facts are coded in some way
(perhaps just a unique numerical reference) within the imposing component then the
link can easily be shown in a graph by using an arrow with a name corresponding to
that code (reference).
4.3 Component properties
The components in this model of electronic voting schemes have a number of properties
that can be defined much easier than similar properties for the system as a whole. The
properties that distinguish one component from another include:
4.3.1 Layer and slot into which it fits
The hierarchy of components is determined before the model is set up for a particular
electronic voting system, and logically declaring the different parts of “a” system before
filling in those slots with a particular implementation does seem to restrict the developer
in some sense but on the other hand it does result in a system that can be more easily
explained and developed. From a verifiability perspective such a system could also have
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Figure 4.1: Component restriction and permission
associated with each component slot methods for checking that those components are
correct.
4.3.2 Origin, requirements and constraints posed by the slot
This set of properties describe the requirements on the component which fits into the
slot. As the requirements come from the model, rather than being made up on the fly
by the developer of the component, it is possible to change between two components.
4.3.3 Verification strategy
Because of high verifiability demands in electronic voting systems (see Section 2.2.3) the
requirement on every single component of the component based electronic voting system
is that there exists some verification strategy.
This may be one of the most attractive aspects of the component based methodology.
By providing some overview of the verifiability of each component the developer can
show that the full system is verifiable. By slotting one component out and another in,
the same verification strategy can still be in place, reducing the work needed to compose
a new component for a particular slot.
As an example of this we can mention the anonymisation strategy component in the
computational layer. Let us say that a decryption mix network makes up this strategy
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(using the cryptography defined in the cryptography scheme component). The verifi-
cation strategy on this component is a variant of zero knowledge proof. If a developer
slots this anonymisation strategy component out and replaces it with a re-encryption
mix network instead, the verification strategy remains the same.
The requirement to have a verification strategy for each component is not restricted
to components that are implemented in code but is applicable also to components in the
election and human layers. For example, a component in the human layer may have a
verification strategy which mandates a group of auditors to check the work performed
in a procedure described by the component.
4.3.4 Location in the system (authority-close or voter-close)
A component has a particular position in the system as a whole and this may be described
by whether it is close to the voter, and controlled by her, or if it is close to an election
authority and controlled by them.
One example of this might be the ballot form component in different versions of Preˆt
a` Voter. In Preˆt a` Voter 2005 [20] the ballot form is quite authority-close in that it is set
up by an election authority before the election and this authority holds all information
needed to decrypt the receipt. To combat kleptographic attacks [82] Preˆt a` Voter 2006
[85] introduces re-encryption mixes whereby the creation of the decryption information
is distributed among a number of trusted parties. The form is printed on demand by
the voter in the booth and can thus be regarded to be voter-close.
4.3.5 Threat analysis
Each component, just as it has a verification strategy, can have a threat analysis attached
to it. This analysis holds for any component that is slotted into the same place. The
output of such a threat analysis is a number of requirements on the component.
4.3.6 Computational complexity analysis
Seemingly more dependent on the particular component, the computational complexity
analysis property of the component is part of the computational complexity analysis of
the complete system. By decomposing the system into smaller parts this analysis also
becomes much easier, aiding the implementation onto hardware. For example, consider
that an encrypted vote in a particular system may consist of a number of layers of
encryption and that each encryption and subsequent decryption of such a layer takes
a certain amount of processor time. The difference between two different encryption
schemes, in regard to the processor time needed, may be substantial and this is then
magnified by the number of votes cast in the election.
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4.4 Examples
In this section we apply this model to two already existing schemes, in the first instance
Punchscan [71, 28, 68] and in the second Preˆt a` Voter [20, 76, 82, 85]. These decom-
positions are included to illustrate that the model would be applicable to schemes that
already exist and that the further development of those schemes could be done in a
component based methodology.
4.4.1 Punchscan: an example decomposition
Punchscan relies heavily on a central election authority to set up, manage and guarantee
the safety, security and reliability of the voting system. The anonymisation strategy can
be audited using a zero knowledge proof method.
Human layer
Voter registration The voter returns a form delivered to her house by local govern-
ment. When she is registered a polling card is delivered by post.
Ballot form configuration The ballot form is made up of two pages, the first has holes
through which the second can be seen. On the first page is printed the races and the
candidates in those races. Next to each candidate can be found a symbol which matches
a symbol on the second page, visible through one of the holes. To vote the voter marks
both pages using a bingo marker over the second page symbol which corresponds to the
candidate she wishes to vote for.
Polling station layout and management When the voter enters the polling station
her name is checked against the register. She identifies herself using the polling card.
Verifiability front-end Voters can check their receipts on a web site as well as in the
local media. The audit of the full election can be viewed online or through media reports.
Election layer
Election method The local representative is elected by first past the post and thus
each voter gives her vote to a single candidate.
Election management system Before election day the election authority which over-
sees the election calls a meeting of election officials and representatives of the different
political parties. In this meeting the election is set up on a diskless workstation running
trusted, audited software. The output of this process is a database which is kept secret
by the election authority for the purpose of decrypting votes after the election together
with instructions to a print company which will print the ballot forms.
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Voter-ballot box communication channel The voter is allowed to fill out the ballot
form in the privacy of a voting booth. Before leaving the booth she is able to create the
encrypted receipt, making it hard for anyone to capture information from both layers of
the ballot form. The encrypted receipt is scanned (with the aid of poll station workers)
and transmitted electronically.
Computational layer
Cryptography scheme Although no cryptography as such is used in Punchscan, the
vote is hidden behind a number of random translations that are in turn captured in
a number of interlinked decryption tables. There exists one translation for each of the
two pages in each decryption table (the translation may be the identity mapping) and
a number of decryption tables may be linked together.
Anonymisation strategy The decryption tables are set up in advance such that when
a ballot form is made into an encrypted receipt, the application of all the translations for
that form in all decryption tables reveals the voter’s intention. In order to anonymise a
plaintext vote the full batch of encrypted receipts are secretly mixed after the application
of each decryption table. The decryption is audited by making the authority commit to
the decryption of a batch and then challenge it to reveal a number of (but not all) links
between the input and output batches. By not auditing all links the full link from an
encrypted receipt through to a plaintext vote is broken at some stage.
Tallying procedure The encrypted receipts are published to the web, the election
authority applies its decryption tables and anonymisation strategy and publishes the
result of each step. When the plaintext votes appear at the end the authority, and
anyone wishing to check the result, can perform the tally.
Physical layer
Hardware authentication method Each polling station machine is issued a crypto-
graphic key pair and an identity.
Publishing strategy All encrypted receipts received by the central repository are pu-
blished, in some predetermined batch mode, to a publicly accessible read-only online
resource.
Transfer method Communication between the polling station and the central reposi-
tory is encrypted using SSL.
Component relationships
As described above components can either pose restrictions on other components or, in
order to explicitly specify the space in which developers have to manoeuvre, can grant
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other components permissions. We continue this example by showing these relationships
between the components of Punchscan above.
As we are aware that the anonymisation strategy is heavily influenced by the election
method, i.e. it may be simpler to implement an anonymisation strategy for a first past
the post election than STV, we make it explicit that the election method is first past
the post:
Permission Election method to Anonymisation strategy
First past the post. The election method is first past the post and no other
election method is used in this constituency.
The end-to-end verifiability of Punchscan is based on a number of items of data
being created and committed to before the election. Therefore the publication strategy
component must allow for this publication4:
Requirement Anonymisation strategy to Publishing strategy
Pre-committed values. Election data will be created in a series of meetings of
election officials before the start of the election and this data will be committed
to by these officials. The publishing strategy must be able to publish a set of
these commitments.
No cryptography is used but the verifiability of the anonymisation strategy is heavily
dependent on a hashing algorithm:
Requirement Anonymisation strategy to Cryptography scheme
Hashing algorithm. A well-known, secure message digest (hashing) algorithm
must be available.
The relationship between these components are shown in Diagram 4.2. Please note
that the relationships between the components may be different for decompositions
of other systems or using different components. Working with the component based
model, the developer uses both existing relationships and the changes in relationships
to correctly integrate a new component.
4.4.2 Changes to cryptography component in Preˆt a` Voter
In the original Preˆt a` Voter [20] the cryptography scheme component is RSA, providing
services to the anonymisation strategy component, which consisted of a decryption mix
network. This system suffered from the authority knowledge (or chain voting) problem
[82] and thus the next version [85] slotted out the RSA cryptography component and
slotted in an Elgamal cryptography component5. This new component was able to
support a re-encryption mix network in the anonymisation strategy component and this
in turn meant the the ballot form could be printed on demand in the booth, affecting
the ballot form component.
4This is quite similar to a use case in traditional modelling of information technology systems.
5Substantial other changes were also made to the scheme at that time.
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Figure 4.2: The relationship between the components in the Punchscan decomposition.
4.4.3 Using Punchscan style ballot form in Preˆt a` Voter
Quite interestingly we can show in this section that the “traditional” Preˆt a` Voter [20]
ballot form is completely interchangeable with the “traditional” Punchscan [68] ballot
form (this has also been shown by [92]). The ballot form is thus a prime candidate for
a component in the electronic voting system decomposition.
The ballot form in Preˆt a` Voter, shown in Figure 4.3, has a randomly ordered candidate
list in the left of two columns. The right column consists of a grid where the voter
marks her choice(s). Below this grid is printed the onion which encapsulates the order
of the candidate list under a number of cryptographic layers. When the form is torn
along a vertical perforation between the two columns and the left column shredded, the
encrypted receipt remains. The onion value uniquely identifies the ballot form.
The Punchscan ballot form consists of two pages, shown in Figure 4.4, on the first
of which is printed the candidate list in the canonical order. Next to each candidate
on this page is also printed a symbol which corresponds to the same symbol shown,
through holes in the first page, on the second page. The voter marks her choice using a
bingo marker. This makes a mark on both pages at the same time and when one page
is randomly selected and the other shredded, what remains is an encrypted receipt. The
ballot form serial number printed in the top-right corner uniquely identifies the ballot
form.
In both schemes the encrypted receipt is scanned and transmitted digitally. We can
now describe both these forms as a component with the following configuration:
Layer and slot into which it fits
Human layer, Ballot form configuration slot.
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Figure 4.3: The Preˆt a` Voter ballot form
Figure 4.4: The Punchscan ballot form
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Origin, requirements and constraints posed by the slot
The ballot form must list the candidates in the race for which it is valid on one half
of the form. The other half must accept the voter’s intention. If the two halves are
separated one remaining half must not reveal the candidate(s) for which the vote was
cast but must be decryptable to reveal this information.
The form must be printed on paper, security paper is permitted. It must be scannable
and shreddable.
Verification strategy
A reference printed on the form must uniquely identify it so that the voter may search
for it in an online resource after the close of the election. During the election the voter
may also use this reference to audit a form which will not be used for voting.
Location in the system (authority-close or voter-close)
The ballot form is created in advance by an election authority, distributed under guard
to safeguard the secret of the form and picked out at random by the voter.
Threat analysis
The ballot form must never be seen by anyone other than the voter before one half
is removed to form the encrypted receipt as this may remove the system’s coercion
resistance [82]. The ballot form is therefore to be distributed within an envelope that
some physical procedure must guarantee that only the voter may open within the booth.
Computational complexity analysis
Creating the ballot form involves creating some decryption information, applying it a
number of times over and then printing the form.
4.5 Discussion
This section provides a quick overview of some of the caveats with the component based
model that we have foreseen.
4.5.1 Impossible to have strict boundaries between components
Defining electronic voting schemes as component based systems provides researchers
with the opportunity to focus development on a particular component or to compare
two different components that fit the same slot to determine which is best. However,
when the component based model is turned into an implementation there may be com-
plications. If an implementation is made of one particular component based model and
one or more components are changed in the model then cascading these changes to the

Chapter 4. Component based electronic voting systems
implementation may not be trivial. For example, the implementation of the mixing
strategy may be heavily dependent on the cryptography scheme used and a change of
the latter most likely results in the change of code in the earlier.
4.5.2 Restrictions on the developer
Placing restrictions on the developer brings framework and structure and it also enables
the re-use of components (both as specifications and as code) and the extension of
schemes by subsequent developers.
4.5.3 Requirements must come from the model
A developer of a component may look at the technical contribution of that component
and make up the requirements of the component from that. This is easy to do but
then suddenly the resulting system does not contain components that may be re-used
or changed easily. Therefore it is important that the electronic voting system developer
looks at the system as a whole and fully defines the requirements on each component
before proceeding to create those components.
4.6 Summary
We have presented a component based methodology for developing electronic voting sys-
tems which aims to model all aspects of the system, not only technical. By not changing
the complete system we hope that developers may be encouraged to look in depth on
a particular component or set of components, providing a complete threat analysis as
well as verification strategy for each. The model presented here consists of four layers
in which components ranging from the very technical underpinning the communication
of various parts of the system to the very non-technical collating requirements from
legislation are situated.
4.7 Contribution and future directions
The contribution of the work presented in this chapter is to introduce a hierarchy of
components, organised in layers, that is able to hold information about all aspects of an
electronically tallied election. The intention has therefore been to allow the structured
collection of all the information necessary to run an election, using an electronic voting
system, in a particular country. Such a repository of information, although a model,
is not readily translated into code (i.e. the implementation of an electronic voting
system) and the intention of the model presented here therefore cannot be to replace
more traditional component modelling of those parts of the system that are in fact
implemented in code. Instead it is acknowledged that such modelling should be done of
a subset of the components introduced here. The justification for the approach taken
here is that the modelling, in this way, of even non-technical aspects of running the
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electronic election will make it more straightforward to build models of (implementable)
systems that meet the requirements set out in law.
Another approach to a component based view on electronic voting systems is intro-
duced by Popoveniuc and Vora [70] when they show that Preˆt a` Voter, Punchscan, the
Chaum visual cryptography based system [17] and Scantegrity II [19] are composed of
front-ends and back-ends with similar properties where components can be interchanged
between the system (as in the example above).
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5 Simple and secure electronic voting
with Preˆt a` Voter
Implementing Preˆt a` Voter as it is described in a series of papers [76, 20, 82, 83, 85, 80, 55,
56, 108, 54] has an associated set of fairly hard problems that were not within the scope
of these papers, such as reliable optical character recognition (OCR), multi-page ballot
forms in elections where there are many candidates contending many different races,
chain of custody issues relating to pre-printed ballot forms, key distribution problems
relating to on-demand printed ballot forms and so forth.
Our impression is that politicians and civil servants, in Europe and probably around
the world, are concerned with the accessibility and applicability of electronic voting
systems to a higher degree and cutting-edge security technology to a lesser degree than
seemingly realised by researchers in the electronic voting field. Consider for example
the impossibility for a civil servant in a country in continental Europe where there may,
for example, be 28 candidates in each of seven races contended on the same ballot form
to implement Preˆt a` Voter 2005 or 2006 — the ballot form is simply too large to be
scanned.
Further anecdotal evidence suggests that a major contributor to decisions to use elec-
tronic voting in Europe is to simplify the process. For example when the City of Ham-
burg, Germany, changed its electoral law it almost became a necessity to use some form
of electronic counting of the votes as this would take days and weeks to do by hand [94].
The decision was taken to implement a completely new system based on Anoto pens1
and although this system was very accessible and had some procedures to safeguard the
accuracy of the election, it seems it lacked sufficient technical guarantees of this.
We suggest that when implementing a real-world electronic voting system it is neces-
sary to, to some degree, use the age old accessibility measurement “would my grandmo-
ther understand how to vote”. Please note that we do not suggest that the grandmother
in question necessarily understands what technology, procedures and cryptography pro-
pagate and secure the vote, but we do suggest that she understands how to cast her
vote and that she be not unnecessarily alarmed by some feature of the electronic voting
system and as a consequence starts to doubt the secrecy of her vote or the accuracy of
the tally.
This Chapter proposes a configuration of the Preˆt a` Voter electronic voting system
in its later guises with emphasis on usability, accessibility and simplicity. In practical
terms this means giving the voter help forming her encrypted vote when there are many,
1This type of pen writes as a normal pen but when used on a paper with a special, invisible, reference
grid, a camera at the tip of the pen registers the strokes made by the pen and digitises these.
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many candidates and races by allowing her to safely use a computer to form the vote.
5.1 Introduction
In this section we describe the properties of end-to-end verifiable systems and introduce
the procedure/technology concept.
5.1.1 End-to-end verifiability
The will to elect leaders and representatives stem from a mass of people, equal, who
have organised and created states and institutions to serve the population. From this
philosophical point of view some may say that once leaders were first democratically
elected, they created election authorities and thus these are trustworthy and able to run
fair elections for the people. Others are more reluctant to place such trust with such
authorities. Consider for example some of those states in the world today that wish to
disguise an undemocratic rule by holding general elections that are unfair. The most
effective weapon against this at the disposal of the world’s truly democratic nations is
election observation.
However, election observation is a very blunt instrument with tremendous organisa-
tional and budgetary requirements. Although essential, election observation can only
function as an audit of the procedures in place to safeguard the election and it is impos-
sible to know, or prove, that the audit is sufficiently complete to allow conclusions to be
drawn about the secrecy and fairness of the election.
This suggests that it would be more beneficial, if it was possible, to audit the election
as a whole rather than some subset of the procedures involved. The ability to audit
the whole election and (perhaps mathematically) prove that the outcome is exactly as
indicated by the voters on election day has been given the name end-to-end verifiability
and there exist many systems aiming to do this [4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 17, 20, 25, 28, 30, 46, 51,
63, 64, 71, 73]. There may be other ways of achieving this but we consider end-to-end
verifiability a combination of two other: voter verifiability and public verifiability.
Voter verifiability The voter is given a receipt which she can use to check after the close
of the election that her vote has been included in the tally. In order for the system
to be coercion resistant the receipt must not reveal the vote.
Public verifiability Any interested person or organisation can, perhaps using software,
check that all the encrypted receipts are properly decrypted into plain text votes
and that these are tallied correctly.
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5.1.2 The procedure/technology mix
We confess that we would rather employ a technological solution to security issues in
electronic voting systems than a procedural one2, but here feel obliged to introduce the
procedure/technology mix. This is simply the mix of technology, procedures and people
that constitutes any electronic voting system.
In the previous section we claimed that the use of end-to-end verifiability would render
the auditing of procedures and people obsolete. This is certainly true regarding the
correctness of the outcome of the election, it is simply possible to prove whether the
reported outcome is correct or not and if not, find the source of the error.
However, the secrecy of the election is, of course, a kind of property that once leaked
cannot be “proven” back to secrecy. Furthermore, end-to-end verifiability is unfortu-
nately very hard to achieve with technology only. Consider for example a theoretical
system, the accuracy and secrecy of which depends on each voting device having its own
secret key. The distribution of these keys are in fact a procedural solution to both the
accuracy and secrecy problems!
Furthermore, the registration of eligible voters and the identification of voters in the
polling places are, in many places, heavily based on procedures (identity cards are, for
example, checked by poll station staff and compared to the list of eligible voters.
It therefore seems logical that the secrecy of the election is safeguarded by some
mix of technology and procedures and we advocate a use of procedures to increase the
accessibility of the system where a technological solution would reduce it.
5.1.3 Definitions
Web bulletin board To facilitate the verifiability of the system a web bulletin board
is used to publish data at different steps throughout the election process. The
web bulletin board is mostly seen as append-only, meaning that it is not possible
to remove information from it or change anything that has been published [37].
Furthermore only some of those involved in the system are able to write to it. The
web bulletin board is also where the voter goes to check that her vote has been
included in the final tally. It is also an important property of the web bulletin
board that it displays the same information to anyone who reads information from
it. Further work on the append-only web bulletin board can be found in [37, 53].
Teller A teller is a trusted party given the opportunity to take part in the running of
the election system by performing a shuﬄe. The trust placed in a teller is not such
that it would be able to change the outcome of the election. Instead the probability
that at least one teller is honest is the mechanism safeguarding the secrecy of the
election. Thus it is important to select a reasonable number of tellers such that
they represent sufficiently diverse interests. One way of selecting tellers would thus
2Based on a personal feeling that technology is less liable to coercion than procedures (that is to say
people).
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be to use a number of political parties: the probability that they would all work
together to change the outcome of the election should therefore be small.
Clerk The clerks are involved in the setting up of the ballot forms. It may be beneficial
to the security of the system to allow different organisations to be clerks and
tellers, but in some cases it is possible for the tellers to fulfill the duties of the
clerks without compromising the secrecy of the system.
Encrypted receipt The voter takes part in the creation of the encrypted receipt and thus
knows that it encapsulates her vote. The voter is allowed to retain the receipt and
after the close of the election she can check that it appears correctly on the web
bulletin board, thus verifying the inclusion of her vote in the final tally. As the
receipt is encrypted it does not reveal the vote it encapsulates and therefore cannot
be used to coerce the voter or by the voter to prove to a vote buyer how she voted.
Coercer A coercer attempts to influence a voter to vote in a particular way (or spoil her
vote or abstend from voting) by threat or reward. An electronic voting system is
coercion resistant if it is possible for the voter to vote however she wishes without
the coercer being able to check or find out whether she has complied with his
request or not.
5.2 Simpler Preˆt a` Voter
5.2.1 Motivation
Our work with the first Preˆt a` Voter implementation and the subsequent demonstrations
have resulted in the identification of two main problems impeding the progress toward
the running of a general election:
1. OCR. The Optical Character Recognition (OCR) used in the first version of the
system was not very robust and in order to interpret the marks as successfully
as possible, it required the voter to use a seven segment display (like those you
see in LED clocks) and a thick pen. Although all agreed that the success rate of
the OCR can be increased there was strong opposition from those with particular
experience of implementing voting schemes against the seven segment display. It
was felt that these were too cumbersome and hard to understand. We realise that
this is not acceptable in a general election3 as such a voting system is used rarely
by voters and this would introduce a large proportion of errors.
2. Scanning. The sheet-feed scanning of the ballot form is evidently very hard to use
in elections where there are a number of races and/or a large number of candidates
— election law may also stipulate that all races and candidates are printed on a
single sheet, making this sheet immensely large. Furthermore, the layout of the
3The first version of the implementation was intended as a working prototype.
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ballot form would require that all candidates and their “boxes” were printed along
the vertical axis of the paper, further limiting the number of races and candidates
that can be printed on any piece of paper. Unfortunately, although that version
of the Preˆt a` Voter implementation did support many concurrent different ballot
forms it did not support the spanning of a single race over more than one ballot
form.
The motivation for this configuration of Preˆt a` Voter is thus simplicity, accessibility
and the accommodation of very large number of candidates. As the reader will see in
the following sections this introduces some procedural safeguards where technological
safeguards have previously been envisaged [86, 80]. We argue that this is not only
necessary but that it is so important to include as many voters and introduce as few
errors as possible in the voting process that the procedure/technology mix must be
adjusted.
5.2.2 The voting ceremony
In the polling station there are a certain number of voting machines placed in voting
booths. The secrecy of the election is based on these voting booths providing proper
privacy to the voter and the voting machine similarly being unable to leak the intention
of the voter. Thus there are poll station workers and guards keeping the area under
surveillance in order to ensure that the machines cannot be tampered with4.
The voter is able to enter the polling station without first identifying herself to the poll
station staff and she can enter a voting booth so as to interact with the voting machine5.
It is important that she is not required to identify herself before she can interact with
the machine because this makes it harder for the poll station staff or machine to connect
the will expressed in the interaction with the machine to a particular voter.
The main purpose of the voting machine is to help the voter express her will in the
election, the difficulty of which depends on the election system in place and the abilities
of the voter. As the voter is interacting with a computer to make her choices the
accessibility of the system is in itself an important area of research. It thus serves little
use to go further into the details of how the voter interacts with the system to indicate
her choices and it is sufficient to say that she may do so using her sight, touch and/or
hearing and a touch screen, mouse, voice or other input device(s). At the end of the
interaction the voting machine prints a vote in plain text (see Section 5.3.5) which the
voter takes away and casts.
Interacting with the machine in the voting booth the voter is able to produce some
number of votes. This must be a number greater than one so that the voter is able to
create one vote that correctly captures her intention and some number of other votes
that she can choose to audit, see below. Any malicious code running on the voting
machine can therefore not determine whether a vote that is constructed on the machine
4Note that the accuracy is not threatened by this leak of information: but the privacy of the election
is.
5This interaction is described below.
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will be audited or if it will be cast. It should therefore be disinclined to attempt to
alter the vote because there is some likelihood that it will be found out and the machine
taken out of commission.
When the receipt is printed by the machine the voter can read it through and ensure
that it is the vote she indicated to the machine. The vote she is going to cast she turns
into an encrypted receipt by tearing it along the perforation. Any or all of the other
votes she may have created she is able to have audited by approaching an auditing desk.
The barcodes on these ballot forms are scanned in by poll station workers and the forms
are decrypted and the information printed. The voter is now able to check that the
printed information does correspond to the vote she has just audited. If so, she will
grow more confident that the vote she will submit is also correctly formed.
Finally the voter approaches a submission desk with the encrypted receipt she wishes
to submit. She identifies herself to poll station workers who check her inclusion in the
list of eligible voters. The barcode on the encrypted receipt is scanned and the contents
of it is electronically submitted to a central repository. Note that no submitted data
must be kept secret to safeguard the secrecy of the election: it is already encrypted.
After the close of the election, this, and all other encrypted receipts, will be decrypted
as described in Section 5.3.8.
The voter can now leave the poll station with her encrypted receipt and after the close
of the election she can use a website to check for the inclusion of her vote in the tally.
She does this by entering the serial number of her encrypted receipt and comparing the
image of the receipt served by the website with the actual receipt. If the marks on these
match exactly she can be confident that her vote is included in the tally.
5.3 Technical foundation
5.3.1 Coping with Single Transferable Vote
In order to support Single Transferable Vote (STV) [104, 89] and other schemes where
the voter expresses a ranking or awards votes to more than one candidate we employ
the multiple-onion approach introduced by [36]. We provide an overview of the scheme
here.
A numerical representation of a candidate is encrypted under a probabilistic threshold
public key cryptography scheme. There are many different such encryptions for each
candidate and as these are encrypted under a probabilistic scheme they do not look
alike. We call these encryptions onions. A set of onions are associated with each ballot
form and the voter’s choices, as expressed on the ballot form, are translated into an
ordering of these onions. If the voter wishes to cast a vote for the candidates in the
order C, E, A, D, B then this is encoded by ordering the constituent onions thus:
OC , OE, OA, OD, OB, Ostop
Note that these are encryptions and which candidate they represent is therefore hid-
den. The stop onion Ostop is used to ensure that the length of the vote is not dependent
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on the number of choices expressed by the voter. A vote only for candidate C, for
example, is thus constituted by an onion OC , the stop onion and thereafter all other
onions in a random order:
OC , Ostop, OA, OE, OD, OB
After the close of the election the first constituent onion of each cast vote is decrypted
and the vote given to the indicated candidate. This initiates the applicable STV protocol
which removes candidates and redistributes the votes according to the next choice in
order in a number of rounds until the required number of candidates have been elected.
Each time the vote is redistributed the next choice is decrypted. In our example the
first candidate is decrypted thus:
C,OE, OA, OD, OB, Ostop
If candidate C is subsequently eliminated and his or her votes redistributed, the onion
representing candidate C is appended, the plaintext representation of C removed and
the next onion decrypted, thus:
E,OA, OD, OB, Ostop, OC
This is now a vote for E. When a decryption reveals the stop onion the vote is removed
from further redistributions. Each redistribution round contains a re-encryption shuﬄe
so as to hide the ordering of the candidates in the vote, please see [36] for details. This
configuration thus limits the impact of an attack popularly called the Italian attack [36]
where the ordering of the candidates carries some message to a coercer.
5.3.2 Pre-creation of onions
A source of potential threats to the secrecy of the election pointed out in early papers
describing end-to-end verifiable systems [76, 15, 82, 47, 83, 85, 84, 77, 78] was that the
voting machine must select random values and errors or predictability in the pseudo-
random number generator may render the cryptography useless. Furthermore, the voting
machine might use “random” values from a list shared with a culprit or values such that
a hash thereof would signal to a culprit the contents of the vote and/or the identity of the
voter. To remove this problem we do not require the machine to select the randomness
used in creating the candidate list.
The ballot form pre-creation process is started before the the election by a set of
clerks (as described in [85]). In order to incorporate the STV strategy introduced above,
the first clerk sets up two sets of onions, OL and OR (the candidates are listed in the
base/alphabetical order) for each ballot form:
OL OR
OLA ORA
OLB ORB
OLC ORC
OLD ORD
OLE ORE
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OR is encrypted under the public threshold key of the tellers and OL under the public
key of a particular voting machine (see below). Thus OLA and ORA contain the same
plaintext but are encrypted under different public keys, meaning that the voting machine
alone can decrypt OL and a threshold set of tellers must work together to decrypt OR.
The pair is denoted thus:
(EPKM (OL), EPKT (OR))
As a probabilistic encryption scheme such as Elgamal [26] or Paillier [65] is used, it
is possible to change the appearance of the encryption by injecting randomness into the
encryption without changing the plaintext. We take advantage of this property in the
next step in which we wish to ensure that no-one knows the order of the candidates in
OL or OR.
The following procedure is now performed by each clerk in turn. One after the other,
an onion pair (OL, OR) is taken by the clerk from the web bulletin board. The order
of the constituent onions is now permuted by the clerk based on a random value that
it selects6. The clerk stores this random value in its internal database7 to be used for
auditing at a later stage. For example the order of the constituent onions may now be:
OL OR
OLC ORC
OLB ORB
OLE ORE
OLD ORD
OLA ORA
Note that each OLx and ORx still correspond. In order to hide the re-ordering perfor-
med by the clerk, it injects randomness into the encryption of each constituent onion.
This randomness is also stored in the clerk’s internal database. This process is called to
re-encrypt the onions and results in a set of constituent onions that cannot be related
to the previous set without first performing a decryption, in our example:
O′L O
′
R
O′LC O
′
RC
O′LB O
′
RB
O′LE O
′
RE
O′LD O
′
RD
O′LA O
′
RA
The clerk now writes (O′L, O
′
R) to a new column, its middle column, on the web bulletin
board. The process is repeated on (O′L, O
′
R) and (O
′′
L, O
′′
R) is written to a third column,
the clerk’s output column.
6The clerk can choose this value however it wants: the secrecy of the system is based on a number of
clerks performing this operation and thus if at least one clerk is honest the secrecy is safeguarded
7Each clerk must keep its database secret, but the secrecy of the system is only jeopardised if all clerks
leak their databases.
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N o Setup Clerk 1 Clerk 2 Clerk 3
1 (OL, OR) (O
′
L, O
′
R) (O
′′
L, O
′′
R) (O
′′′
L , O
′′′
R) (O
4
L, O
4
R) (O
5
L, O
5
R) (O
6
L, O
6
R)
2
3
...
Table 5.1: The pre-creation web bulletin board
The whole process is now repeated by each clerk in order for all (OL, OR) pairs on the
web bulletin board, as shown in Table 5.1. The result of this process is a final column
containing (OL, OR) pairs where the order of the constituent onions are unknown to all
parties and can only be found out if all clerks collude or a decryption is performed.
Note that the initial creation of the onions and the re-encryptions of the same must
be audited to ensure that the clerks do not break the link between two onions by injec-
ting different random values into the plaintext. Here we do this by randomly auditing
complete re-encryption chains but it may also be possible to do with zero-knowledge
proofs, as done in [85].
5.3.3 On-demand distribution
As stated previously the purpose of creating the onions before the election is to ensure
that no single entity has undue influence over their creation. In order to make use of the
onions, however, they must be distributed to the polling stations and voting machines.
The foundation of this distribution is the assignment of a private key to each electronic
voting machine. It follows logically that this private (secret) key must be loaded into the
machine and it must be ensured that it cannot be extracted from the machine. It is thus
plain that the secrecy of the election is based on safe and secure creation, distribution
and use of private/public key pairs. This is normally called a Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI). Furthermore the voting machines may require the use of some elements of tamper-
proof hardware to ensure that no covert channels, leaking the choices made by the voter
(very much like a camera in the voting booth would), exist. We do not cover these topics
here.
As discussed in the introduction, we are here opting for a procedure/technology mix
with higher emphasis on procedural solutions than may have been employed in previous
schemes. One such procedural solution is the use of a PKI as described above.
When the voter interacts with the voting machine (see next section) the machine
requires the OL set of onions to produce a vote. There are two ways of distributing
these onions to the voting machine: either using a network (Internet) connection or by
pre-loading a batch of onions.
Network connection
If the voting machine is equipped with a network connection and it is able to connect
to a central repository over this network, it can fetch the required onions on demand.
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The main disadvantage to this approach is that the network connection must be made as
secure as possible but can be used to carry covert communication by a tampered/infected
machine to an accomplice. As the running of the election is based on the availability of
the network and the servers on this network this makes the system arguably fragile.
The main advantage to this on-demand distribution is that if the clerks are online
during the election phase they are able to create any number of onions as required by
the machines. This means that only the exact number of onions required has to be
created which reduces storage demands.
Pre-loading of batch
Before the election, as described in the previous section, the clerks create a certain, large,
number of onions for each voting machine. These onions are then8 stored on some mobile
media (hard drive, flash drive, CD or DVD etc) and transported to the polling stations
and loaded into the appropriate machines. The foremost advantage of this setup is that
no network is required to run the election, eliminating an arguably very fragile part of
the system. Furthermore, if no network is required then the machine in the voting booth
becomes fully autonomous.
The main disadvantage of course is that a very large number of onions must be created
by the clerks in advance and distributed “by hand” and when a voting machine runs out
of onions it may be a lengthy process to replenish its store.
We include both these options here to show that the system is quite adaptable to the
particular circumstances under which it is used. Note that the voting machine has no
need to communicate with the outside world, only to receive prepared onions from the
clerks.
5.3.4 Touch screen interface
To accommodate for elections with many races and/or races with many candidates the
proposed configuration of Preˆt a` Voter has two major differences to previous versions:
(a) the receipt is created by a voting machine and (b) the receipt is printed in the
minimal form presented in the next section.
Preparing the machine
Before the voting machine can be used it must be loaded with the definition of the
election, its races and their candidates. This is a detail of the implementation9 and as
such is not defined in detail here: the scheme presented here only requires the machine
to be loaded with this information in advance of its use. This means this scheme is
compatible with many different scenarios, from a single election with a number of races
where all voters are able to cast (a) vote(s) to constituency based voting where a voter
may only be eligible to vote in a subset of all the defined races.
8After performing audits to ensure correctly formed onions.
9Please note that we have not made an implementation of this system at the time of writing.
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Creating a vote with the machine
This is an example of a possible interaction with the voting machine. The steps involved
can be different in appearance, order and number and are adapted to the election.
Approaching an idle voting machine, the voter is greeted with a message asking her
to touch the screen to initiate the voting process.
Springfield Local Election
Tap screen to start
A list of races is shown with indicators to whether or not a vote has been created in
each race. The voter selects a race by tapping the screen10.
Select race
Mayor Not voted
Sanitation Commissioner Not voted
A list of the candidates in the selected race is shown and the voter is able to tap a
single candidate or a number of candidates in the preferred order. A “Clear” button is
available on the screen, which clears all choices made and allows the voter to start over.
A “Proceed” button allows the voter to return to the list of races.
Vote for Sanitation Commissioner
Shmoikel Krustofsky
Apu Nahasapeemapetilon
Ray Patterson
Homer Simpson
Selecting her favourite candidate, the voter completes the vote for the race and clicks
the “Proceed” button to return to the race selection screen.
Select race
Mayor Not voted
Sanitation Commissioner Voted
The voter is able to return to any race and re-create her vote. A “Proceed” button
on the race selection screen allows her to go to a summary screen. Here the voter can
select either of two buttons: “Go back” or “Print vote”.
Summary of your vote
Mayor Not voted
Sanitation Commissioner Homer Simpson
When the voter is finished and presses the “Print vote” button, the machine displays
a final message whilst printing the vote (shown in the next section).
Thank you
Please take your printed vote
10Or using some other input method, depending on the abilities of the voter.
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5.3.5 The minimalistic encrypted receipt
The purpose of the minimalistic encrypted receipt is to enable the printing of many races
on the same receipt and to aid the voter in checking the receipt on the web bulletin board.
To achieve this we wish to print as few candidates as possible on the receipt. We first
introduce the traditional Preˆt a` Voter ballot form and its associated encrypted receipt
before showing the alterations we propose to these.
The Preˆt a` Voter ballot form and encrypted receipt
The ballot form in Preˆt a` Voter consists of two columns: in the left the candidates are
printed in a random order (based on randomness unique for the form) and in the right
the voter makes her marks in a grid corresponding to the candidates in the left column.
For example:
Ballot form
Sanitation Commissioner
Homer Simpson
STOP
Apu Nahasapeemapetilon
Ray Patterson
Shmoikel Krustofsky
lk3j92784
If a voter makes her marks in the right hand side grid and then detaches and destroys
the left hand column, the remaining encrypted receipt does not reveal her vote. However,
a value called the onion, printed at the bottom of the grid, can be decrypted to reveal
the vote. In this example an encrypted receipt may be:
2
3
1
lk3j92784
It has been envisaged that the Preˆt a` Voter ballot form is a single page, which contains
all races in the election and all the candidates in each of those races. The voter makes
her mark on the paper and detaches and destroys half, producing an encrypted receipt
which is subsequently scanned and then handled electronically. It is quite clear that in
an election with many races and many candidates, it is not possible to print all on one
piece of paper that can also be fed through a scanner after the marks have been made
by the voter.
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The minimalistic encrypted receipt
The traditional Preˆt a` Voter ballot form is printed onto paper before the election (or
on demand before they are used [85, 54]) and as the voter uses a pen to fill out her
choices, naturally all candidates must be available on the ballot form. In the scheme
presented here a computer is used to create the vote after which the ballot form is printed.
Therefore, it is possible to print only the candidate(s) that the voter has indicated a
vote for.
In our example, when the voter makes her marks using the touch screen she may
indicate her choices thus (note that the candidates are listed in the alphabetical order
on the screen):
Vote for Sanitation Commissioner
Shmoikel Krustofsky
Apu Nahasapeemapetilon
Ray Patterson 1
Homer Simpson 2
When the voter presses the “Print receipt” button the voting machine retrieves the
necessary onions and decrypts these (see above) to find the ordering of the candidates.
Let us assume in our example that the machine retrieves the onions with serial number
27344, decrypts these and finds that the candidate list has the following order:
27344
Homer Simpson
STOP
Apu Nahasapeemapetilon
Ray Patterson
Shmoikel Krustofsky
The machine now prints the following filled-out Preˆt a` Voter ballot form, note that
only the candidates which the voter has indicated are printed and that these are printed
in the order dictated by the onions:
Ballot form
Sanitation Commissioner
Homer Simpson 2
STOP 3
Ray Patterson 1
1, 2, 4
27344
In this example we are only able to avoid printing two candidates, but in a race with
many more candidates the same number of choices made by the voter would drastically
reduce the number of candidates that must be printed. The index numbers 1, 2, 4 of the
candidates printed are displayed at the bottom right together with the serial number
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27344. These values can be printed in the form of a barcode (see below) which allows
them to be read in quickly. Note that these numbers together with the choices indicated
above by the voter is all that is needed to represent the vote.
The voter now checks that the printed vote is truly a representation of her intended
vote, simply by reading the candidates’ names and the number assigned to each. If the
vote is not correctly printed she can discard the it (by shredding it for example) and
produce another11. If she is happy with the vote and wishes to cast it, she detaches
the two columns from each other and destroys the left hand one. What remains is an
encrypted receipt:
2
3
1
1, 2, 4
27344
The voter approaches a desk manned by poll station staff, identifies herself and allows
the barcode on the encrypted receipt to be scanned. When poll station staff are satisfied
that the barcode has been scanned and electronically transmitted to the web bulletin
board they stamp the encrypted receipt with an official stamp so as to indicate that it is
the receipt of a vote that has been cast in the election. A mark is placed in the register
to indicate that this voter has cast her vote12.
All votes submitted in this way are collected on the web bulletin board.
The barcode
All previous versions of Preˆt a` Voter has required an encrypted receipt to be scanned in
and interpreted to form a digital representation that could subsequently be decrypted.
This OCR process has been shown to be a significant weakness to the scheme: it results
in many errors13.
In this scheme we reduce the amount of work in the scanning process to the recognition
of a barcode. These are printed in such a way as to be simple to read and recognise and
they can contain check numbers etc to aid the correct interpretation of them.
In order to record a vote the system must read the following information from the
encrypted receipt:
11The ability to print a vote in plain text on the machine and check that it is correct serves to audit
that the machine works correctly [9]. The voter is thus free to print any number of votes, either
with the choices she truly wants to vote for or, if she is actively auditing the machine, for other
candidates. If the machine prints the vote incorrectly the voter may be discouraged from alerting
officials if she has to show a “real” printed vote. Furthermore, as no proof exists of what instructions
the voter has given the machine, raising an alarm if the mechine prints an incorrect vote is hard.
12In some places, such as the United Kingdom, the law requires that the ballot form serial number is
noted against the name of the voter: that is quite possible to do in this scheme.
13Note that these errors did not mean that a vote was cast for a different candidate than indicated by
the voter — but that the vote had to fill out another ballot form as the first could not be correctly
understood by the system.
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1. The serial number (27344)
2. Which candidates are shown on the ballot form (1, 2, 4)
3. The marks made by the voter (2, 3, 1)
To enter this information into the barcode, we simply concatenate them:
27344|1, 2, 4|2, 3, 1
When this information is scanned by poll station staff it is submitted to the web
bulletin board. Here the appropriate constituent onions are retrieved:
27344
ORSimpson
ORSTOP
ORNahasapeemapetilon
ORPatterson
ORKrustofsky
The appropriate onions are selected (numbers 1, 2 and 4 in our example) and re-
ordered in the correct order as indicated by the choices (2, 3 and 1) — thus the onions
are placed in the following order:
27344
ORPatterson
ORSimpson
ORSTOP
Note that of course the contents of these onions are unknown! Therefore the system
now holds an encrypted vote submitted by this voter.
5.3.6 Auditing a vote
We here argue that it is safe to allow a voter to use a voting machine to create the vote,
because she may create any number of votes and audit some of these. If the voting
machine attempts to cheat it cannot be sure that the vote will not be audited and its
cheating thus found out. A malfunctioning machine will thus be found with a high
probability and taken out of commission.
The first audit that a voter does of a vote printed by the voting machine is simply
to read it. If the machine has committed an error (or something worse) then the marks
printed would not match the intention of the voter. If this is the case she can simply
destroy the vote and create another one — until she receives one that correctly indicates
the vote she wishes to cast. Note that the voter may have performed some “human”
error while interacting with the machine and not spotted this until the vote has been
printed: this gives her another chance to spot such a mistake and to rectify it.
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The second audit of the ballot form that can be performed on any vote is the checking
of the barcode. This is simply done by the voter allowing the barcode to be scanned by
a machine available in the polling station which shows the contents of the barcode in a
human readable form. Such machines can also be supplied by independent organisations.
The voter then simply checks that the information shown by the reader corresponds to
the information printed in the right column of her vote.
Finally, if the voter decides to audit a created vote14 then the constituent onions
OR shall be retrieved from the web bulletin board (where they are marked as audited,
ensuring that no vote can subsequently be cast with these onions) and decrypted by the
tellers. The full candidate list is then displayed to the voter who compares it to the
printed vote.
The purpose of this audit is first to find any machine that may malfunction or that
has been compromised. Secondly the audit functions to convince voters that the system
is working correctly and that the vote will be decrypted correctly.
5.3.7 Checking the receipt
The voter is allowed to take home the scanned and stamped encrypted receipt. She
can then, at any time, visit the web bulletin board on the web and search for the serial
number printed on the receipt. When she calls up her receipt she should see an exact
replica of the receipt she holds in her hands. If this is the case then the voter can be
certain that her vote has been included in the final tally. If the receipt is not found on
the web bulletin board or if the version she finds there does not match the one she has
in her hand, she can accuse those in charge of running the election of malfunction or
fraud and she has proof in her receipt that she has cast a vote which is now missing or
has been changed.
5.3.8 Decryption and tallying
At this stage the web bulletin board contains a list of all encrypted votes that have been
cast, in the form of a number of ordered onions. A detailed specification of how the
decryption is performed is available in [36] but we provide an overview here.
As shown in the pre-creation of the onions (Section 5.3.2) the appearance of the
onions can be changed without altering the plaintext hidden within. We make use of
this same method to break the link between the encrypted receipt (and thus the voter)
and the plaintext vote. This is achieved by allowing the tellers to perform a number of
re-encryption mixes before decrypting the onions and starting the STV protocol.
An example re-encryption mix network for a mere three votes is shown in Table
5.2. Each teller reads all votes on the web bulletin board as a batch, performs two
re-encryption mixes and writes each of the resulting batches to the web bulletin board.
When a threshold set of the tellers have satisfied themselves that the votes are thoroughly
14Note that the voter can print any number of votes and therefore she can create a vote with completely
different choices to the vote she subsequently intends to cast.
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Row Cast Teller 1 . . .
1. (OB, OA, OS, OC) (O
′
A, O
′
B, O
′
C , O
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′′
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′′
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′′
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′
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′
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′
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′
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′
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′
C) (O
′′
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′′
A, O
′′
S, O
′′
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...
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C ) (O
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A , O
2n
B , O
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C , O
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...
Table 5.2: The re-encryption mixes of the encrypted votes
mixed, they perform the threshold decryption of the first constituent onion of all votes
in the final batch. These partially decrypted votes go into the first round of the STV
algorithm.
5.3.9 Note on securing the machine using procedures
It is important to note that the accuracy of the election, that is to say the trustworthiness
of the outcome of the election, is safeguarded not by procedures but by the cryptographic
properties of the system. The result of the election is thus as trustworthy as in previous
configurations of Preˆt a` Voter [20, 85], because they all rely on the same verifiability.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter we have introduced a variant of Preˆt a` Voter that uses a touch screen
type interface to help the voter form her vote. This is a possible complement to the
normal paper based voting in the original system that aims to be accessible for those
unable to cast a paper ballot. We have also shown the minimalistic encrypted receipt,
a method of printing a Preˆt a` Voter style encrypted receipt that aims to solve problems
with races with a large number of candidates and OCR issues.
5.5 Discussion
The main advantages of the proposed scheme is that the voting machine is able to guide
the voter through a potentially very complex voting procedure involving any number of
races and any number of candidates in those races. The voter turns the plain text vote
into an encrypted receipt and the scanning of this receipt is very fast because only a
barcode has to be scanned.
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The main disadvantage to this configuration of Preˆt a` Voter is that the voting machine
must learn the voter’s intention in order to produce the receipt. The secrecy of the
election is thus safeguarded simply by procedures that ensure that the machine does not
leak any information. As discussed in the introductory sections of this paper there is a
necessity to alter the procedure/technology mix so that it is possible to make the system
more accessible and remove a large proportion of the errors associated with the filling
out of the ballot form.

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6.1 Introduction
Electronic voting machines have, because of their dependability on correctly written
code and the correct execution of (human) processes, become heavily criticised, mainly
for failures that have occurred in elections in the USA during the first decade of the
21st century. Such direct recording equipment (DRE) that lack the verifiability of the
systems discussed in this thesis are liable to manipulation without detection [48].
A measure that has been proposed as an extension to already existing machines is
the Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) [58]. This is a procedure whereby the
DRE prints the vote in a human-readable form behind a sheet of glass and displays it to
the voter in the voting booth. This allows the voter to check that the vote is correctly
formed and when this check is complete the printed vote is automatically dropped into
a sealed ballot box. If the voting system is subsequently challenged, the printed votes
in the box can be counted and compared to the electronically tallied result.
However, paper is not necessarily a simple solution. There are problems, such as:
• Paper audit trails are not invulnerable to corruption.
• It is not clear how any conflicts between the computer and paper audit counts
should be resolved.
• Humans are notoriously bad at proof-reading, especially their own material, and
hence bad at detecting errors in a record of their choices [24].
• Even if the voter does notice a discrepancy with the paper record created at the
time of casting, it may be tricky to resolve, especially without undermining the
privacy of the ballot.
• It is not clear under what circumstances the audit trail should be invoked.
Verifiable schemes such as Preˆt a` Voter (Section 2.4.2), VoteHere [61], and PunchScan
[28], provide higher levels of assurance than even conventional paper based elections
and certainly far higher assurance than systems that are dependent on the correctness
of (often proprietary) code. However, the arguments as to why the systems offer high
assurance are highly technical (mathematical) and therefore it seems probable that the
general public must trust experts to examine the system and it is yet unclear if they
do trust experts in this way. During trials of verifiable systems it may therefore be
beneficial to add conventional auditing mechanisms to support public confidence.
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One possible path to common understanding of the system is supplementing a cryp-
tographic scheme with a conventional paper audit trail backup that we refer to as a
Human Readable Paper Audit Trail (HRPAT). The addition of a HRPAT to Preˆt a` Vo-
ter was first described in [79], which we here extend so as to achieve several properties
(described below) in addition to the fundamental verifiability property of the HRPAT.
As discussed by Ryan in [79], introducing a mechanism such as a HRPAT may in-
troduce certain vulnerabilities not present in the original scheme. However, it may be
argued that it is worth introducing such risks, at least during trials and early phases
of deployment, with the view to remove the paper trail when the system has “proven
itself”.
This chapter details some recently proposed changes to [79] that gives rise to a number
of additional auditing possibilities. This maximises the reassurance of having a conven-
tional mechanism as a backup while minimising threats to ballot privacy. Once sufficient
levels of trust and confidence have been established in a verifiable, trustworthy scheme
like Preˆt a` Voter, we would hope that the scaffolding of an HRPAT could be cast aside.
The scheme presented here extends Ryan’s scheme with a number of technical benefits
(besides the confidence building aspects). It can provide a robust counter to the danger
of voters attempting to leave the polling station with the left hand part of the Preˆt
a` Voter ballot form. This shows the candidate order and so could provide a potential
coercer with proof of the vote. A number of possible counter-measures to this threat have
been identified previously, for example the provision of decoy candidate lists [82, 84], but
the mechanism here appears to be particularly robust. The procedure we propose here
involves the officials verifying that the voter submits the component of the ballot that
carries the candidate order at the time of casting.
The approach proposed here enables a number of additional auditing procedures to
be introduced that significantly increase the assurance of accuracy, assuming that the
integrity of the paper audit trail can be ensured. We also show how the integrity of the
human readable paper audit trail can be verified in this scheme, something safeguarded
only by procedures in previous schemes.
6.2 The scheme
This section presents the HRPAT Preˆt a` Voter ballot form with its onions and how they
are created and printed. Then the on-demand printing of the candidate list and the
casting of ballots is described. The last part of the section details the decryption of the
encrypted receipts and how the HRPAT is used to verify the electronic election.
6.2.1 The ballot form and its use
The usual Preˆt a` Voter ballot form is modified to comprise two overlaid pages. The
bottom page has the usual two portions: the left hand portion carries an onion and a
serial number. The top page overlays the right portion of the bottom sheet and carries
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POST
onionL
serial
RETAIN
onionR
Figure 6.1: The ballot form in two pages
RETAIN
onionL onionR
serial
Figure 6.2: The ballot form complete
RETAIN
candidateB
candidateC
candidateA
onionL onionR
serial
Figure 6.3: The ballot form with candidates printed
RETAIN
candidateB
candidateC X
candidateA
onionL onionR
serial
Figure 6.4: The ballot form with marks
POST
candidateB
candidateC X
candidateA
onionL
serial
RETAIN
X
onionR
Figure 6.5: The marked ballot form in two pages
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another onion value. The top page has a carbon layer or similar on the back to ensure1
that marks applied to the top page transfer to the bottom page. The layout of the ballot
form is shown in Figure 6.1. This means that when the top page is aligned over the right
column of the bottom page, as is the case when the voter receives the ballot form, the
ballot form looks as shown in Figure 6.2. When the voter makes her mark in the right
hand column of this complete form the mark is made on both pages.
The reader will notice that there are no candidate names printed in Figure 6.1. This
is because we are incorporating the on-demand printing of ballot forms introduced in2
[85]. When the voter has identified herself to the poll station workers she is allowed to
randomly choose a ballot form such as that in Figure 6.2. At this stage onionL and
onionR are concealed (for example by a scratch strip) so that they cannot be read by
either the poll station worker nor anyone else at the polling station. The other value,
serial, is noted in the register next to the voter’s name.
The voter takes the form into the voting booth where she makes onionL visible and
then allows a machine to read this value. The machine decrypts the onion, as will be
explained later, and from this computes the candidate list, which it now prints in the
left column of the ballot form. The result is depicted in Figure 6.3.
The voter now makes her mark(s) on the form in the privacy of the voting booth and
the result is exemplified in Figure 6.4. She then detaches the top page from the bottom
and the result is shown in Figure 6.5. The voter places the page marked POST into
an envelope through which only the serial number is visible and then leaves the booth
carrying the envelope and the top page, which will constitute her receipt. She now
presents herself to the vote casting desk and hands over the envelope and receipt. The
poll station worker checks that serial is the same as the one previously assigned to the
voter. Once this is done, the serial number is detached and discarded and the envelope
containing the lower page is placed in the ballot box. The page marked RETAIN ,
which acts like a conventional Preˆt a` Voter receipt, is scanned, a digital copy posted to
the WBB and handed back to the the voter to keep as her protected receipt.
The serial number serves a dual purpose here: firstly it counters chain-voting attacks
as suggested by Jones [45]. Secondly, it serves to verify that the voter does not retain
the lower layer of their ballot form. This is a useful spin-off of the HRPAT mechanism:
in the standard Preˆt a` Voter, there is the possibility of the voter retaining the left-hand
(LH) portion of the ballot form, along with her receipt, to prove to a coercer how she
voted3.
6.2.2 Cut-and-choose
Early versions of Preˆt a` Voter used preprinted ballot forms and so, for the election to
be guaranteed accurate and to instil trust in the voters, randomly selected ballot forms
1See Section 6.2.5 for details on resolving any disputes about this.
2It is possible to alter the methods described here and use pre-printed ballot forms — fulfilling a lower
secrecy level.
3Although procedures may be in place to stop voters from doing this it is very hard to do so without
violating vote secrecy.
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are audited before, during and after the election. That is to say they are decrypted and
shown to have been correctly printed [21, 82]. Such random selection is performed by
suitable auditing authorities but may also be supplemented by the voters themselves.
One mechanism to provide such a cut-and-choose protocol to the voter while maintaining
control on the number of ballots issued to each voter, is to have a double sided form, one
side of which (selected at random by the voter) is used to cast the vote and the other
is automatically audited [84, 85]. However, any such “cut-and-choose” mechanism only
allows forms that are not used to be audited.
In the scheme presented here, we add a paper audit trail to Preˆt a` Voter. As has been
described above, the candidate list is printed on the bottom page of the ballot form
and this page is placed in a ballot box and provides the human readable paper audit
trail. Because of the properties of the relation between the two pages as described in
this section, it is possible to audit the printing of the candidate list of any number of
forms, that were actually used for voting, after the close of the election. The device
or authority printing the form would thus be caught with a probability proportional to
the number of forms audited. Hence the HRPAT method shown in this section has this
further audit application. This auditing mechanism can be used with either pre-printed
or on-demand printed forms.
6.2.3 Generation of the encrypted ballot forms
We describe a distributed, parallel construction of the onion pairs, analogous to the
Paillier construction presented in [80]. Suppose that we have L clerks. They will be
responsible for generating I onion pairs, where each onion pair will carry the same
seed/plainext.
We further suppose that we have an Elgamal public key for the tellers PKT and public
keys for the booths PKBk , where k indexes the booths. Both of these public keys will
have the same modulus. We provide the construction for a single booth key; we simply
replicate the construction for other booth keys. Denote the public key of the booth in
question as PKB.
The jth clerk generates I sub-onion pairs:
{θTj,i; θBj,i}
Where:
θTj,i := {sj,i, xj,i}PKT
and
θBj,i := {sj,i, yj,i}PKB
The first term is an encryption of the j, ith seed under the teller’s public key. The
second term is the encryption of the same seed value under the booth’s public key. The
randomisations x, y, used for these two encryptions should be independent.
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All of these sub-onions are all posted to a WBB in cells of an L×I matrix (L columns,
I rows) — one pair in each cell. To audit these, an independent auditing entity chooses
for each row a randomly selected subset of the cells in the row, say half. For these
selected cells the clerks reveal the s, x and y values. The auditor can check that the
encryptions match the posted sub-onion values and that the two seed values are equal for
each pair. The auditor can also check that the s values are consistent with the required
distribution.
Assuming the posted material passes the audits, the “full” onions are formed by
taking the product of the remaining, un-audited pairs row-wise. This step is universally
verifiable. Let Ai denote the set of indices of the pairs selected for audit in the ith row.
Then the “full” onions for the i th row are computed as:
ΘTi :=
∏
j∈A¯
θTj,i
ΘBi :=
∏
j∈A¯
θBj,i
To create the proto-ballots, suppose that we have paper ballot forms that initially just
carry index values from I, each form will carry a unique index value. We now introduce
two new processes P1, P2. P1 takes a form with index i, looks up Θ
T
i on the WBB,
re-encrypts it and prints the result on the right-hand (RH) portion of form. This now
constitutes the ΘR,i for the ballot form. It then covers this with a scratch strip. Once it
has finished a batch of these, they are shuﬄed and passed on to P2.
P2 looks up the appropriate Θ
B
i , re-encrypts this and prints the resulting value, ΘL,ion
the LH portion of the ballot and covers it with a scratch strip.
We perform audits on a randomly selected subset of the resulting proto-ballots. For
the selected ballots, the onions are revealed and P1 and P2 are required to prove the
re-encryption link back to the onion pair on the WBB. Audited forms are discarded.
Our construction ensures that it would take a corrupt booth or access to the paper
audit trail and a two-way collusion, of P1 and P2, to link the R (receipt) onions to the
candidate lists. The index value on the ballots can serve as the serial number, and is
removed at the time of casting.
6.2.4 Anonymising Tabulation
Anonymising tabulation proceeds as for Preˆt a` Voter 2006 (Section 2.4.2). We outline
it here for completeness. The encrypted receipts scanned in the polling station are
published on the web bulletin board and all voters are able to check that their receipts
appear there. When all tellers are satisfied that the election has ended and all electoral
rules have been followed they start the decryption process, which is shown in Table 6.1.
The first teller, T1, takes all encrypted receipts and injects the voter’s choice(s) into the
onionR, using the homomorphic properties of exponential Elgamal. We call the onion
with the injected choice(s) onionI . Suppose:
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Inject Re-encryption Plaintext
onionR choices onionI mix network onionIn Decryption vote
OR2 ⇒ OI2 OI5 ⇒ V5
OR1 ⇒ OI1 OI2 ⇒ V2
OR4 ⇒ OI4 OI3 ⇒ V3
OR5 ⇒ OI5 OI4 ⇒ V4
OR3 ⇒ OI3 OI1 ⇒ V1
Table 6.1: Decryption of the encrypted receipts
onionR = (α
r, αs · βr) (mod p)
Then:
onionI := (α
r, αv · αm · βr) (mod p)
The index number v indicates the position of the X on the receipt. In effect, we are
multiplying onionR by the encryption of v with randomisation r = 0. The result is:
onionI = {v + s, t}PKT
Thus, the I onion is the encryption of the v index plus the seed value. The offset φ
of the candidate list printed on the ballot form is computed as φ := s (mod n), where n
is the number of candidates. The candidate order is cyclically shifted upwards from the
canonical ordering by φ. Thus, v + s (mod n) gives the index of the candidate chosen
by the voter in the canonical ordering of the candidates.
No mixing is performed at this step: the I and R onions are posted side-by-side on the
WBB. That each onionI is correctly formed with respect to onionR is thus universally
verifiable.
A set of mix tellers now perform a sequence of re-encryption mixes. Each mix teller
takes the full batch of onionIs, re-encrypts each onion, shuﬄes the batch and outputs to
the next mix teller. The output batch from each teller is published onto the web bulletin
board. The last output batch we call onionIn .
When all mix tellers have performed their re-encryption mixes, the independent au-
ditors confirm that the mixes have all been performed correctly. This might be done
using partial random checking [44], or perhaps Neff’s proofs of Elgamal shuﬄes [62]. If
the auditors confirm that the mixes are correct, we can proceed to the decryption stage.
If problems are identified with the mixes, corrective actions can be taken. Thus, for
example, if one of the mix tellers is identified as having cheated, it can be removed and
replaced. The mixes can be re-computed from that point onwards and re-audited. We
might routinely re-run the mixes and audits, in any case, for additional assurance.
Once we are happy that the mixes have been performed correctly, a threshold set of
the decryption tellers take over and cooperate to decrypt each onionIn . No mixing is
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required at this stage and each step of the decryption can be accompanied with a ZK
proof of correct (partial) decryption. The final, fully decrypted values can be translated
into the corresponding candidate values using:
candidatei = (s+ v) (mod n))
Such re-encryption mixes are known to provide anonymity against a passive attacker.
Against an active attacker, who might have some capability to inject or alter terms
entered into the mix, we have to guard against ballot doubling attacks: to identify a
particular voter’s choice, he injects a term that is a re-randomisation of the voter’s
receipt. If unchecked, this will result in two decrypted receipts with the same adjusted
seed value. We will in any case have procedures in place to guard against ballot stuffing
that will help counter such dangers. An additional measure is to run (threshold) PETs
(plaintext equivalence tests) against the terms in the mix prior to decryption (see [46]).
6.2.5 Audit of the paper trail
We now have a number of possible strategies for auditing the election. One scenario is
to perform a full, manual recount of the election using the HRPAT and simply compare
this with the cryptographic count. In practice, due to inevitable errors with manual
counting, this will differ from the electronic count, even if the latter is exact and correct.
If the difference is small and well within the winning margin, this could probably be
disregarded.
An alternative is to take a random subset of the HRPAT ballots and, for each of these
forms, the auditor requires the appropriate booth to decrypt the onion and so reveal
the seed s. The tellers are required to provide ZK proofs of the correctness of their
decryption steps. From the seed value s it computes the candidate order and checks
that this agrees with the list printed on the ballot.
This audit serves to catch any cheating by booths that might not have been detected
earlier during any cut-and-choose audits. The advantage of these audits is that we are
checking the candidate orders on ballot forms actually used by the voters to cast their
votes rather than just on unused ballots.
We can now perform some checks of correspondence between the paper audit trail and
the decrypted ballots posted from the tabulating mixes. For each selected paper ballot,
the auditor now computes the adjusted seed value:
s¯ := v + s
It should now be able to find a matching value amongst the decrypted outputs of
the tabulation process on the WBB. Failure to find a matching value casts doubt on the
conduct of the election. If the auditor finds an adjusted seed value in the tabulation that
differs slightly (i.e. by less than n) from the closest seed value from the paper audit trail
this may be indicative of corruption. This might be due to some manipulation of index
values in the paper audit trail or the electronic records. Further investigation would now
be required, firstly to establish that the paper ballot has not been manipulated.
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For ballots selected for audit for which the above check fails, we can perform a diag-
nostic check: we perform PET checks of the paper ballot onion against the posted receipt
onions. If a match is found, and the corresponding index posted against this onion on
the WBB agrees with the index of the paper copy, this would indicate that this receipt
had been corrupted in the mix/tabulation phase without being detected in the audit of
that phase.
We can also compute amended onions from the paper audit trail by folding the index
into the LH onion in the same way that we formed the I onions. We refer to these as
J onions. These J onions will have different randomisations from the corresponding I
onions computed previously. However, as long as all computations have been performed
correctly, the sets of onionI , onionIn and onionJ contain the same plaintexts. In other
words, The J onions should be related to the I by a series of re-encryptions and shuﬄes.
We could test this hypothesis by performing a full PET matching of the I and J onions
or, perhaps more realistically, performing some spot checks on a random selection.
6.3 Analysis
In terms of the accuracy guarantees we will see that this scheme provides stronger
guarantees that Preˆt a` Voter 2006, assuming the integrity of the paper audit trail. If
the paper audit trail is vulnerable to manipulation, then the HRPAT mechanism could
undermine the assurance of accuracy of the original scheme.
Assuming the integrity of the paper audit trail for the moment, the additional auditing
possibilities introduced by this HRPAT mechanism means that it will be significantly
harder to violate accuracy in an undetectable way. For example, the fact that all actually
voted ballot forms can be audited for correct construction means that it is essentially
impossible for votes to be incorrectly encoded in receipts undetected. In previous ver-
sions of Preˆt a` Voter, and indeed similar schemes, these checks are probabilistic and
require assumptions of lack of collusion between ballot creating processes and auditing
processes.
6.3.1 Linking the receipt onions to the candidate lists
The fact that in this scheme, the ballot forms carry linked onions on both portions does
create potential threats against ballot privacy. Thus, for example, if the adversary is
able to link the L and R onions for a ballot form and is able to access the paper audit
trail, then he will be able to compromise the secrecy of that voter’s ballot. This could
be achieved with the collusion of the P1 and P2 processes. It is of course difficult to
gauge whether this is a good trade-off, and this judgement will probably vary according
to circumstance and perceived threats.
The link between LH and RH onions is cryptographically protected and cannot be
directly re-established without access to a threshold set of tellers’ keys. However, there
is a danger that if booth keys are compromised it may be possible to obtain the seeds
for some ballots and link these to the decrypted values posted on the WBB. The coercer
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Re-encryption
onionL mix network onionM
OL2 OM2
OL3 OM1
OL1 OM4
OL5 OM5
OL4 OM3
All tellers
Table 6.2: Another re-encryption mix of onionL
still has to link the HRPAT ballot to the voter who used it. He can do this if he can
establish the link between the two onions. However, our construction ensures that it
would require a collusion of the P1 and P2 processes to reveal these links.
We see that the HRPAT mechanism does introduce some threats against ballot privacy
that are absent in conventional Preˆt a` Voter. However, we have striven to ensure that the
threshold to exploit such vulnerabilities is quite high. It is a delicate trade-off to establish
whether the introduction of such vulnerabilities is justified by the added assurance and
confidence resulting from the HRPAT mechanism.
6.3.2 Voter choices differ between pages
As the voter makes her marks on the form in the privacy of the booth, it is possible for
a malicious or coerced voter to introduce different marks on the two pages in order to
try to introduce inconsistencies between the paper and electronic records and so seek to
discredit the election. To resolve this and to prove that the marks were made differently
on each sheet by the voter the tellers can take the list of onionL and run them through
a re-encryption mix to form a list of onionM , as shown in Table 6.2. It is then possible
to use the PET strategy to prove which onionM contains the same information as the
onionL, the extension of which is that the bottom page is valid but the voter’s mark
does not match. If the tellers, when prompted, find that onionL with the voter’s choice
Vbottom does not have the same plaintext as onionR with the choice Vtop injected then
they prove that onionL has the same plaintext as onionM to show that the marks are
different on each of the pages.
6.4 Summary
We have presented a mechanism that can be incorporated into Preˆt a` Voter to generate a
plaintext paper audit trail. This has a number of benefits: firstly there is the confidence
building effect of having a paper audit trail as a safety-net. Secondly it provides a
number of additional auditing possibilities: spot checks of correspondence between the
paper ballots and decrypted ballots as well as checks on the correctness of the candidate
order printed on the ballots by the booth devices. Note that these checks are applied

6.4. Summary
directly to the candidate orders used by the voters, rather than on unused, audited forms
as with the cut-and-choose audits.
A further benefit is to provide a mechanism to ensure that voters do submit the
portion of the ballot that carries the candidate order, so countering dangers of voters
attempting to smuggle these out to prove their vote to a coercer.
On the other hand, the HRPAT mechanism presented here does introduce some threats
against ballot privacy that are not present in conventional Preˆt a` Voter. Evaluating this
trade-off requires more systematic ways to evaluate voting systems than exist at present.
Besides, it is likely that such trade-offs will be highly dependent on the context. For
example, in the UK, it is required by law to maintain a link between voter id and ballot
forms. Thus, in the UK, a mechanism along the lines proposed would not only be
acceptable but would probably be required.
Another issue to be borne in mind, is that the paper audit trail may be vulnerable
to manipulation. This is true of conventional pen and paper voting, but here it may be
particularly problematic as such manipulation may serve to cast doubt on a completely
valid electronic count. Again, this is a delicate trade-off against the comfort factor of
having a paper audit trail fall-back.
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7 Remote voting using paper-based
schemes
7.1 Introduction
Postal ballots are becoming increasingly common around the world, in constituencies
large and small. The motivations for this include allowing those unable to visit the
polling station (such as those in the military stationed overseas; expatriates; those less
abled) to cast votes from a remote location and to widen participation.
The normal procedure for postal ballots is that the materials (including ballot forms
and a number of envelopes) are sent to registered voters, who have requested it, in
the post. The voter is instructed to fill out the ballot form in private and to place it
in an envelope. This envelope is then put in another envelope on which the identity
of the voter is printed: the voter signs this envelope. This multi-layered document is
subsequently posted, in yet another envelope, to the election authority.
At the election authority a number of clerks open the outermost envelopes of the
received ballots. This reveals the identity of the voter who has posted the ballot and
when the clerks have checked that she is eligible, the signed envelope is opened and the
contents dropped into a ballot box. When all ballots have been dropped into the ballot
box this is shaken so that it is infeasible for anyone to guess the identity of the posting
voter. The contents of this ballot box can now be tallied together with ballots collected
in polling stations.
The most obvious flaw in this process is the fact that the voter is not offered the
secrecy of a voting booth. We consider a voting booth the only method of ensuring
that voters are able to cast secret ballots. When sending a ballot from home, a coercer,
someone in the home or an external vote buyer for example, may require to be present
when the ballot form is filled out and there appears to be no way to stop this. As with
traditional paper-based voting schemes the voter must also place trust in people and
procedures to ensure that the election is fair and accurate.
The description of the postal ballot procedure described earlier may be a best-case
scenario — many places offer, in our view, even less secrecy and security.
Some electronic voting schemes that use paper based ballot forms, such as Preˆt a`
Voter and Punchscan, use a voting booth as a mechanism to safeguard election secrecy
[82, 83]. However, it seems immediately clear that as these ballot forms do consist of
paper it is possible to send them in the post, delivering the same level of secrecy (based
on trust in people and processes) as traditional postal ballots.
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7.1.1 Properties of the scheme
The aim of this scheme is to show that it is possible to use the verification of Scantegrity
together with a set of procedures to ensure that voting by post using Preˆt a` Voter and
Punchscan can go some way toward protecting the secrecy of the vote and enabling
more voters to correctly check that her vote is included in the tally. Both Preˆt a` Voter
and Punchscan can support postal voting simply by allowing the voter to post in the
encrypted receipt but because it is impossible to enforce the destruction of the secret
part of the ballot form (i.e. the candidate list on the Preˆt a` Voter ballot form) a majority
of voters would, we feel, be left with a piece of paper in their home which can, together
with published election data, prove how they voted. This scheme thus aims to use a set
of instructions, envelopes and procedures to destroy as much of this paper as possible
at the time of voting.
Fairness. The proposed scheme does not impact on the fairness of the underlying voting
systems as the fairness of those systems is based on the correct function of an election
authority (to ensure that a proper register of eligible voters is kept). The proposed
scheme also does not cause any partial information to be released before the close of the
election.
Integrity. The proposed scheme does not impact on the integrity of the underlying
voting systems but this is arguably at a very high level.
Privacy. The proposed scheme is intended to enhance the privacy of the underlying
voting systems when they are used for postal voting. The original systems have high
privacy assurances as votes are posted in to the election authority in their encrypted
forms and the proposed scheme makes this as practical as possible whilst maintaining a
high privacy level.
Verifiability. The proposed scheme adds to the underlying voting systems further ve-
rifiability which was not previously avaiable in the postal voting setting.
Receipt-freeness. In the postal voting setting it is very hard to ensure that a voter
does not create something that works as a receipt, perhaps by taking a picture of the
filled-out ballot form before it is made into an encrypted vote and posted to the election
authority. The proposed scheme can not guard against such adversarial behaviour on
the part of the voter. However, a goal of the proposed scheme is to use procedures to
ensure that as little “compromising” paperwork as possible remains with the voter after
the time of voting. This helps remove paper that the voter should destroy but may, for
any number of reasons, not have.
Coercion-resistance. Any voting done by post meets only low coercion resistance re-
quirements as the system does not help voters to withstand coercion by, for example,
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stopping them from voting together with someone else (by requiring the use of polling
booths) and to take pictures of the ballot form. The proposed scheme cannot do any-
thing to influence whether voters choose to vote in the company of a coercer (of any
variety) but it attempts to remove as much “compromising” paperwork as possible from
the majority of voters.
7.1.2 Threat model
We realise that it is impossible to stop voters from creating evidence of their vote when
they vote remotely, such as a photocopy of the ballot form after they filled it in but before
it is posted to the election authority. This is inherent to all remote voting schemes as it is
only possible to procedurally ensure that voters are not coerced by asking them to attend
a supervised polling station where they are allowed to vote in secret. The threat model
here is thus the same as for all remote voting schemes: but the aim with this scheme
is, among other things, to ensure that as little evidence as possible of the contents of
the vote remains in the voter’s possession after she has voted. If she therefore does not
create separate evidence (such as a photocopy) before she votes and she complies with
the procedures described here, she will not have in her possession evidence of her vote
that can be incriminating or that she, for any other reason, can present to a coercer.
Modelling the capabilities of a coercer in the postal voting setting seems almost su-
perfluous because a postal (or online) voting system does not attempt to be coercion
resistant or to help the voters to remain so. The proposed scheme gives a voter who
wishes to preserve the secrecy of her vote ample opportunity to do so, but it cannot
limit the capabilities of the coercer. Instead the capabilities of the coercer seem limit-
less: he can interact with the voter both before and during the voting takes place and
is therefore able to bribe, threat or otherwise entice the voter to vote in a particular
way. Even if the underlying systems (especially with this proposed scheme added on)
aim to be receipt-free, a coercer who can be present at the time of voting does not need
a receipt after the act of voting.
Furthermore, in the postal voting setting we cannot assume anything about the be-
haviour on the part of the voter: as she is not actively stopped from behaviour that
threatens the secrecy of her vote she is able to do anything to comply with a coercer’s
demands: by free will or under pressure. It is unrealistic to assume that a majority of
voters who may be under pressure from a family member, religious leader, local party
official or the like is able to find a private place to create and post the vote. All these se-
vere privacy and secrecy threats are inherent to all postal voting and this scheme cannot
influence them.
A number of further threats apply to various remote voting schemes, such as the
faking of a voting credential (in the registration of a voter or perhaps the faking of a
signature on a postal ballot). We here try to ensure that the (coerced) voter cannot
create “evidence” of system malfunction when no such malfunction exists, but it may
be possible to create faked votes — for example in order to cast doubt on the level of
trust that should be vested in the system.
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7.2 Techniques that do not work
It has been proposed that both Punchscan and Preˆt a` Voter are able to handle postal
ballots simply by asking the voters to post in the encrypted receipt instead of having
it scanned. However, in this section we go through a number of configurations of both
systems and show why they are not as secure as immediately thought.
7.2.1 Punchscan
In the case of Punchscan the immediate technique to handle postal ballots is to allow
the voter to mark her two-page form in the comfort of her own home using the required
dauber1. The voter then separates the two pages, chooses one and posts this to the
election authority. This page is scanned but kept secret by the authority. After the
close of the election a meeting of the election officials generates not the page that the
voter has posted to the authority but its twin. In short, the page published on the web
bulletin board will be the same as the one the voter has still got.
It seems that this will provide the voter with a way to verify the inclusion of her vote
in the tally, just as with those votes collected in polling stations. However, in polling
stations the page that the voter is going to keep is scanned and immediately published
onto the web bulletin board. In the postal ballot case the other page is scanned and
the first is generated from this. This means that if the voter deliberately marks the two
pages separately, the “receipt” will not match the page published on the web bulletin
board. As there is no way of detecting whether this is because the ballot form has been
maliciously altered by the authority or the voter has marked the pages differently, the
page kept by the voter cannot be regarded as a useful receipt.
Furthermore, there are issues with the chain of custody of the page that has been
posted in by the voter. When the authority receives the page a clerk will take it from
its envelope and scan it. The clerk, who has seen this page, will be able to tell from the
other page, published on the web bulletin board, how the voter has voted.
7.2.2 Preˆt a` Voter
It was noted quite early [20] that Preˆt a` Voter may be able to handle postal ballots
simply by allowing the voter to fill out the normal ballot form in her home, tear along the
perforation and then post the right-hand part to the election authority, but the authors
were cautious as they realised this would impact on the coercion resistance of the system.
Postal voting with Preˆt a` Voter has the advantage over traditional postal ballots that
the vote is encrypted when it reaches the election authority and the receiving clerk thus
has no way of discerning the voter’s choice(s). However, this does not offer the voter a
receipt. Furthermore, it weakens coercion resistance even further as the destruction of
the left-hand side of the ballot form, the randomised candidate list, cannot be enforced.
Those voters who are able and willing to safeguard the secrecy of their vote will fill out
1A bingo marker.
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the form in secret and, as soon as possible thereafter, destroy the candidate list — but
some may be unable to do so for reasons already explained.
In order to provide the voter with a receipt that she can subsequently use to check
the inclusion of her vote in the tally, this scheme may be extended with a carbon paper
which is overlaid the right-hand side of the ballot form. When the voter makes her marks
on the ballot form these marks are thus made on two overlain sheets of papers. When
she has made her marks and detached and destroyed the left-hand side of the form what
remains are two copies of the encrypted receipts. The voter posts the original and keeps
the carbon copy. It is quite clear that a malicious voter could mark the original and
the carbon copy of the encrypted receipt separately and thus achieve the same attack
as described in the previous section.
A further extension to address the destruction of the candidate list is as follows. When
the voter has marked her form she detaches the carbon copy and keeps this for her own
record. She then tears along the perforation and separates the two sides of the original
ballot form. The left-hand side, the one carrying the names of the candidates, is placed in
an envelope which has a window through which a serial number printed underneath the
candidate list is visible. The voter then places this envelope together with the encrypted
receipt in another envelope which has her identity printed on it. She signs this envelope
and posts it to the election authority.
When such a postal ballot is received the clerk checks that the voter is eligible and
registered and if so, it is checked, without opening the envelope, that the candidate list
posted in by the voter is the one that matches the encrypted receipt. If this check is
passed then the candidate list is shredded without being taken out of the envelope2 and
the encrypted receipt is scanned and submitted to the web bulletin board. However, the
voter might attack this solution by placing not the candidate list but another piece of
paper onto which the serial number has been printed into the innermost envelope.
7.3 Adding Scantegrity to postal ballots
The Scantegrity system [23] proposed by David Chaum seeks to add a certain level of
verifiability to all paper-based election systems, be it votes that are collected in a polling
station and scanned (immediately or in a central location) or postal ballots. In essence
the system is based on a chit, a corner of the ballot form, which holds the serial number
of the form and is torn from it by the voter before the form is submitted. At the time
of casting the voter makes a note of the randomly assigned letter that represents the
choice she has made. After the close of the election the authority publishes the serial
numbers of all ballot forms used together with the letters chosen by the voters. This
does not leak any information about the contents of the vote but the voter can check
that the published letter matches her note. If it does not, the voter can challenge the
election through a procedure which proves that the chit matches the ballot form and
that the correct letter has been marked on that form, without revealing the contents of
the vote. See Section 2.4.4.
2That this happens this way can only be ensured by the use of election observers.
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The Scantegrity approach immediately works with postal ballots and we simply pro-
pose the addition of the chit to both the Punchscan and Preˆt a` Voter ballot forms that
are to be used as postal ballots. All the actions the voter must undertake in order to
vote by postal ballot are thus as follows:
The voter marks her choices on the ballot form and separates it into two, by detaching
the pages or the columns from each other. In the case of Punchscan she randomly selects
one page to keep — her receipt. She then detaches the chit from the receipt and puts
this in a safe place, along with a note of the choice(s) she has made at each position on
the form. The part of the form that must be destroyed is placed into an envelope that
has a window through which the serial number of this part can be read.
Along with this envelope the encrypted receipt is placed in yet another envelope which
bears the voter’s identity. Having sealed this envelope the voter signs it to indicate to
the election authority that she has cast her vote in accordance with the rules and so
forth. With this signature she might also assure the authority that she has filled the
form out in private and that she has not been asked to vote in a particular way by
anyone — this, naturally, is part of election law of each particular constituency (but
does not provide any formal level of assurance). This envelope is placed in an envelope
which is pre-printed with the address of the receiving election authority and when this
has been sealed it can be dropped in the nearest post box.
When the election authority receives the ballot, its outermost envelope is opened by
a clerk who verifies the identity of the voter and her signature. If this check passes then
the envelope is stripped off. The next check that must be performed is that the serial
number of the part of the ballot form that has been placed in the innermost envelope
matches the serial number of the encrypted receipt. This procedure is necessary to
ensure that the voter returns the part of the ballot form that must be destroyed. In
order to make this as secure as possible the election authority has placed a rubber stamp
onto the serial number of both parts of the form. If the serial numbers match, then the
clerk shreds the envelope containing the discarded part of the ballot form and scans
the encrypted receipt, causing it to be posted to the web bulletin board. The original
encrypted receipt is then filed according to its serial number so that it may be retrieved
with relative ease at some future point. If the serial numbers do in fact not match then
local legislation must determine if the vote is spoilt.
The voter is now able to visit the web bulletin board and call up her encrypted receipt,
using the serial number printed on her chit. She can compare this to her notes and if
they correspond she can trust that her vote is included in the tally.
In the case where the voter finds that the online representation of her encrypted
receipt does not match the notes she made at the time of voting, she may use her chit
to verify that her receipt was scanned correctly. She, or her representative (it may be
necessary to limit the number of such checks as this can be done without compromising
the correctness of the audit of the election) can take the chit to the election authority.
Under the scrutiny of independent auditors and media coverage the election authority
can retrieve the encrypted receipt from the archive and show, perhaps using a microscope
or any level of forensic equipment required by the auditors, that the chit and encrypted
receipt were once one piece of paper.
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When it has been shown that the chit matches the encrypted receipt the auditors can
check that the contents of the encrypted receipt does match its electronic representation
published on the web bulletin board. In Scantegrity, which uses plain-text ballot forms,
this check is rather tricky, please see [23, 22] for details. However, in the case of Preˆt
a` Voter and Punchscan, where the receipt is encrypted, it is safe simply to show the
receipt to the voter or any representative that she might have mandated.
We have thus modified the Punchscan and Preˆt a` Voter voting procedure by adding
Scantegrity. Instead of keeping her actual encrypted receipt and checking that it is
represented correctly on the web bulletin board the voter is able to challenge the election
and have this checked in any case where she may realise that there may have been errors
in the scanning process — or someone has maliciously changed her vote3.
7.4 Summary
As electronic voting is becoming mature it is important to remember an old set-up that
has allowed voters who have been unable to attend the polling station during election
day to take part in the democratic process, namely the postal ballot. Arguably the
greatest drawback of postal ballots is that the amount of trust that voters must place
in people and processes (not to mention the postal service). Using Scantegrity in the
paper based electronic voting schemes Preˆt a` Voter and Punchscan provides practical
and safe auditability in the remote setting. We have introduced a series of instructions
and procedures that can be put in place to make voting by post as safe as possible.
7.5 Discussion
As we feel that postal ballots are inherently less safe than ballots collected in a polling
station, and in view of what we perceive to be an ever growing desire to use postal ballots,
our starting point for this work has been to make this process as safe4 as possible. We
believe we have achieved some progress toward this goal by forcing the destruction of
the appropriate parts of the ballot form. It also seems that although the reliability of
the election system rests on a number of procedures we have been able to remove some
potential leaks of information which may compromise the secrecy of the election.
However, it is immediately clear that we have been unable to solve the most serious
problem with postal ballots, namely the inability to protect the voter, and even the
electoral system, from coercers who may have a completely different level of access to a
large number of private homes than it may to voting booths that are under the scrutiny
of observers.
3Polling booth based schemes such as Preˆt a` Voter provide the voter with a way of proving that this
has taken place but this scheme does not.
4That is to say be as little error prone as possible and helping to safeguard the secrecy of as many
votes as possible.

Chapter 7. Remote voting using paper-based schemes
7.6 Future directions
As we are proposing a set of procedural safeguards for the postal ballots in Preˆt a` Voter
and Punchscan, it is interesting to note that further procedural safeguards can be added
in order to make the duties of the voter simpler and as reliable as possible. For example,
if each part of the ballot form has an edge that is cut in a way that is different from the
other part, then the envelope can be designed only to reasonably hold the required part
of the form. Alternatively, each part of the form may be coloured differently and the
colour of each envelope correspond to this.
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In Chapter 3 An implementation of Preˆt a` Voter we present our work with the first
implementation of the end-to-end verifiable electronic voting system Preˆt a` Voter. Star-
ting with a set of requirements put forward by the University of Surrey Students’ Union
we describe and explain design decisions and results from building a working version of
the system. This work was undertaken primarily in order to enter VoComp, where we
competed as one of four teams in Portland, Oregon, in the summer of 2007. Several
requirements, such as the necessity of using Single Transferable Vote and allowing a
number of concurrent polling stations, required a lot of thought and resulted in a set of
important lessons.
In Chapter 4 Component based electronic voting systems we have introduced a hierar-
chical, component-based model for electronic voting systems. This model consists of four
layers that each builds on the previous: physical, computational, election and human
layer. The purpose of the model has not been to mimic other system modelling tools
but to allow the capture and storage of information from a number of different fields
in a structured way that enables developers to quickly and thoroughly adapt systems
to various new requirements. One significant difference to established component based
models of information technology systems is that we here propose that such “soft” parts
of the system as applicable law is modelled as components that pose requirements on
other components of the system.
In Chapter 5 Simple and secure electronic voting with Preˆt a` Voter we address two
significant problems in paper-based verifiable electronic voting systems: the optical cha-
racter recognition (OCR) of the marks made by voters on ballot forms is very difficult
and has a certain error rate and the scanning of immensely large ballot forms, such as
those used in countries where the number of contested races and the number of candi-
dates in each race are very large, is incredibly hard. Preˆt a` Voter was designed to be
used with ballot forms that are small enough that they can be scanned using a standard
computer scanner and OCR remains error prone. The system we propose allows a voter
to use a computer to form her vote, enabling her to use functions such as sorting of the
list of candidates and searching for desired candidates to easily form her intended vote.
The computer then prints a reduced Preˆt a` Voter receipt which contains a bar code that
can easily and without error be scanned when the vote is cast, reducing the amount of
paper needed to print a receipt and removing the need for OCR.
In Chapter 6 A human readable paper audit trail we extend a previous proposal to
add a paper audit trail to Preˆt a` Voter in order to instill confidence in voters. Such
a paper trail may add verifiability to other systems that are not verifiable, but it may
also introduce a number of vulnerabilities. Our proposal therefore is to use the scheme
in Preˆt a` Voter only until it has been agreed that the verification methods available in
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Preˆt a` Voter do work. However, we extend the human readable paper audit trail with
other properties that allow for more thorough audit of the correct construction of used
ballot forms.
In Chapter 7 Remote voting using paper-based schemes we propose a set of techniques
and procedures that enables the use of the paper-based electronic voting systems Preˆt
a` Voter and Punchscan as postal ballots whilst limiting the extent of the threat to the
secrecy of the election posed by remote voting.
8.1 Contribution
This thesis contributes to the understanding of electronic voting systems as follows:
• Our work with the implementation of Preˆt a` Voter provides a rare case study of
transforming a theoretically well-specified end-to-end verifiable electronic voting
system into a functional prototype. We have enumerated the problems that we
encountered and that are inherent to the version of Preˆt a` Voter that has been
implemented, but our understanding of implementing Single Transferable Vote
and other non-single choice election systems, of the problems with Optical Cha-
racter Recognition and of adapting an electronic voting system to varying legal
requirements around the world has increased.
• Our hierarchical component-based model for electronic voting systems proposes
that such systems are different from other information technology systems in that
they do not only have requirements related to the systems’ ability to capture and
tally votes but a plethora of requirements from non-technical domains such as elec-
tion legislation and usability that have to be captured in the model. Even though
we have shown that it is very hard (if not impossible) to separate some compo-
nents in an electronic voting system and draw the full benefit of a component-based
design, we provide the foundation for a new way of thinking about these systems.
• In proposing our “simple and secure” Preˆt a` Voter variant, we have placed focus
on meeting real-world requirements (many candidates etc) that have hitherto been
somewhat overlooked and in doing so we have proposed a usable, inclusive system
that aspires to meeting high security and secrecy guarantees. Any system which
uses a computer to form the vote, that is to say where software running on that
computer can detect the choices made by the voter, has a set of secrecy concerns
that Preˆt a` Voter has aimed to solve by using a paper ballot form. However, we
believe that any practical end-to-end verifiable electronic voting system must be a
mix of procedures and technology.
• The addition of a human readable paper audit trail to Preˆt a` Voter does, we argue,
impose secrecy concerns that outweigh the added verifiability opportunity. Based
on this we have extended such a paper audit trail with several unique auditing
opportunities: the correct printing of ballot forms can be checked even for forms
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that have been used to cast votes, something which has been impossible in previous
versions of Preˆt a` Voter. It is valid to argue that we add complexity to the human
readable paper audit trail, but the fundamental auditing such a trail gives is still
there and we wish to make good use of the procedures in place to handle, and
make use of, such a trail.
• Finally we have shown how to use three well-known end-to-end verifiable electronic
voting systems (Preˆt a` Voter, Punchscan and Scantegrity) in postal ballots with
the result that voters who follow the proposed voting procedure are helped to
safeguard the secrecy of their own votes.
8.2 Future directions
We put forward the following directions for future research based on the work presented
here:
1. No further testing of the first Preˆt a` Voter prototype is required at this point:
a new version should be based on Preˆt a` Voter 2006, which makes it possible to
design the implementation to be faster and more robust. However, great care
should be taken to ensure that the system becomes more accessible and perhaps
the key to this is to enable a number of concurrent “input” methods, i.e. the use
of paper ballot forms that are scanned for most voters but the possibility to use
an accessible computer for those unable to form the vote on paper. Care should
also be taken not to build the new version such that it cannot (or cannot be easily
altered to) handle a number of different election methods and elections with very
large numbers of candidates. Preparing the system to be used in a national election
should be the guiding principle.
2. An implementation of our “simple and secure” touch-screen Preˆt a` Voter variant
may form the basis of an accessible and inclusive front-end to the new prototype.
Similarly, the human readable paper audit trail shown in this thesis can be imple-
mented in the new version — with the view to meet a potential call for a voter
verifiable paper audit trail when Preˆt a` Voter is ready to be used in a national
election.
3. Extending the component based model presented here with requirements, com-
ponent definitions and security analysis of components may yield a model that is
truly useful in analysing security and secrecy guarantees of the complete end-to-end
verifiable electronic voting system.

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